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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Automated Driving Systems (ADSs) offer many potential benefits like improved safety, 
reduced traffic congestion and lower emissions. However, such benefits can only be realised 
if drivers trust and make use of such systems. The two challenges explored in this thesis are: 
1) How to increase trust in ADSs? 2) How to identify the test scenarios to establish the true 
capabilities and limitations of ADSs? 
Firstly, drivers’ trust needs to be calibrated to the “appropriate” level to prevent misuse (due 
to over trust) or disuse (due to under trust) of the system. In this research, a method to 
calibrate drivers’ trust to the appropriate level has been created. This method involves 
providing knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the ADSs to the driver. 
However, there is a need to establish the capabilities and limitations of the ADSs which 
form the knowledge to be imparted to the driver. Therefore, the next research contribution 
lies in the development of a novel method to establish the knowledge of capabilities and 
limitations of ADSs (used to calibrate trust) in a reliable manner. This knowledge can be 
created by testing ADSs. However, in literature, an unanswered research question remains: 
How to identify test scenarios which highlight the limitations of ADSs? In order to identify 
such test scenarios, a novel hazard based testing approach to establish the capabilities and 
limitations of ADSs is presented by extending STPA (a hazard identification method) to 
create test scenarios. To ensure reliability of the hazard classification (and of the 
knowledge), the author created a novel objective approach for risk classification by creating 
a rule-set for risk ratings. 
The contribution of this research lies in developing a method to increase trust in ADSs by 
creating reliable knowledge using hazard based testing approach which identifies how an 
ADS can fail. 
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INTRODUCTION TO THESIS   
Chapter 1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Over the past five years, the automotive sector has seen a major evolution. New 
technologies, technology providers, start-ups (e.g. Tesla, Faraday Future, Byton etc.) have 
entered the automotive space. The beginning of the departure from the car ownership model 
with the introduction of the concept of Mobility as a Service (MaaS) is also a part of this 
ongoing change. The current transformation of the transportation sector has been aided in 
part by the introduction of driver assist technologies, i.e., Advanced Driver Assistance 
Systems (ADASs) and the rapid development of Automated Driving Systems (ADSs) by 
vehicle manufacturers, which remove the driver from the driving task in some situations. 
While early ADASs have been available on commercial models since late 1990s (e.g. 
Adaptive Cruise Control on Jaguar and BMW cars (Marsden et al., 2001)), ADASs have 
become ubiquitous more recently with the introduction of systems like Lane Keep Assist, 
Lane Departure Warning, Park Assist and Traffic Jam Assist. 
The sudden push to introduce ADAS and ADS is in part led by some of the potential 
benefits that these vehicle automation technologies bring, e.g. increased safety, lower 
emissions, reduced traffic congestion, increased traffic throughput, decreased drivers’ 
workload etc. The rapid introduction is also being helped by the rapid improvements in 
sensor technology and computation power. 
While the introduction of automation has many potential benefits, it also introduces many 
potentially unsafe situations which may lead to accidents. In comparison to automation in 
other domains like aviation, nuclear, process, chemical etc., introduction of vehicle 
automation is a more recent phenomenon. When automation was first introduced in other 
domains, it was coupled with the occurrences of catastrophic accidents (e.g. Three Mile 
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Island disaster, China Air 006, Air France 447), some of which have repeated themselves 
over the years (Le Coze, 2013). Such incidents have led to an increasing emphasis on 
ensuring that the introduction of vehicle automation (ADAS and ADS) is done in a safe 
manner. 
However, uptake of new technology by users is not only dependent on its technical features 
but also on how users perceive the introduced technology. ADASs have traditionally 
suffered low uptake by customers. Eichelberger and McCartt (2014) found that Volvo 
drivers used ADAS features Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and Lane Departure Warning 
Systems for only 51% of the time they spent on highways due to low trust in the systems 
leading to disuse. However, even more dangerous is the situation of misuse of ADAS and 
ADS due to over-trust. This was unfortunately seen in a fatal crash involving a Tesla Model 
S (NHTSA, 2017a). The driver had over-trust in the car’s Autopilot feature and wasn’t 
monitoring the road and a failure of the Autopilot led to a fatal collision with the rear end of 
a truck. However, another crucial factor, which added to the development of driver’s over-
trust in Autopilot, was the marketing of the system by the manufacturer and the use of the 
term “Auto-pilot” for an assistance feature. The term “Autopilot” gives an indication of the 
feature being autonomous when it was not. 
In order to realise the benefits of vehicle automation, in addition to ensuring that the 
technology in itself is safe, it is important to ensure drivers (and users) of the technology 
trust and use such features in their everyday drive in a safe manner.  
In this thesis, the author discusses how to ensure the use of ADAS and ADS in a safe 
manner, preventing any misuse of the systems. Misuse refers to the usage of the automated 
system in situations for which it has not been designed. Furthermore, the author also 
explores how to increase the use of ADAS and ADS, preventing disuse of the system. 
Disuse refers to the operator not engaging the automated system even if it is suitable for 
usage. Together, preventing misuse and disuse of the systems, will ensure “appropriate” use 
of the ADAS and ADS. 
 
1.1. Aims of the research 
Having briefly discussed the need to increase the use of vehicle automation while preventing 
misuse and disuse of automation to ensure that the benefits of automation are realised in a 
safe manner, the motivation for this research was: to increase “appropriate” use of ADAS 
3 
 
and ADS. Via an extensive review of literature, trust was found to be a key factor 
influencing the use of an automated system which led to the main aim of this research being:  
“To increase trust in automation in vehicles.” 
Trust can be classified into two types: 1) trust in the system and 2) trust with the system. 
“Trust in the system” means the drivers’ trust in the capabilities of the system and/or in the 
system’s ability to do what it is supposed to do. “Trust with the system” means drivers’ 
awareness or attitude towards the limitations of the systems and their subsequent ability to 
adapt their use of the system to accommodate for the limitations in order to realise the 
expected benefit from the system. Trust with the system is governed by accurate knowledge 
of the capabilities and limitations of the systems along with the real-time feedback about the 
working state of automation. Subsequently, the author set out to answer the following 
research question within the scope of this thesis: 
“How to increase “trust in/with” automation in vehicles?” 
The research question was driven by an aspiration to understand the development of trust in 
automation and ways of calibrating trust to prevent misuse or disuse of automation. In order 
to answer the central research question in a rigorous manner, the following research 
objectives were identified: 
1. To develop a conceptual model for development of drivers’ trust in automated 
driving systems 
One of the identified factors influencing drivers’ trust is “knowledge” of a system’s 
true capabilities and limitations. Based on how knowledge is imparted, knowledge 
can be classified into static knowledge, dynamic knowledge and internal mental 
model. Static knowledge refers to the understanding of the working of the automated 
system. Static knowledge is administered prior to the driving task and is akin to an 
owner’s instruction manual, however with information at a higher abstraction level. 
Real time knowledge (or dynamic knowledge) refers to the real time information 
about the automated system (e.g. automation health, current state of the automation, 
near-future intentions of the automation). Internal mental model refers to 
understanding or prior beliefs influenced by external sources (e.g. word of mouth, 
media etc.). Since the two former types of knowledge can be imparted or established 
through system design, they were the focus of the research. This led to the 
formulation of the second research objective. 
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2. To evaluate the effect of knowledge (static and dynamic) on calibration of trust. 
Calibration of trust has been defined as “the process of adjusting trust to correspond 
to an objective measure of trustworthiness” (Muir, 1994). This research objective 
explores the use of knowledge (static and dynamic) in adjusting trust levels in 
ADASs and ADSs. 
After having established that the knowledge about true capabilities and limitations of the 
systems could be used to calibrate trust to prevent misuse and disuse of automation, the next 
research question (answered in this thesis) was motivated by the desire to develop a method 
to create the knowledge which could be used to calibrate trust. Testing is a way to create the 
knowledge about the capabilities and limitations of ADSs. However, it is suggested that to 
prove ADSs are even 20% safer than human drivers, they need to be driven for more than 11 
billion miles (Kalra and Paddock, 2016a), making it an unfeasible proposition. Thus an 
efficient identification of test scenarios to be used in the testing process was identified as a 
gap in literature, leading to the following research question: 
“How to create test scenarios to establish the limitations of automated driving systems?” 
To answer the research question, the following research objectives were identified: 
3. To develop an understanding about the characteristics of a test scenario (especially 
for ADAS and ADS) 
4. To develop a methodology for creating test scenarios (based on the identified 
characteristics) 
Once the knowledge (to be imparted to the drivers) was created via testing, the next step 
involves the classification of knowledge (in terms of risk associated with it). The knowledge 
to be imparted to the driver includes both the failure and the risk associated with it. 
Automotive Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) comprises of severity, exposure 
and controllability ratings. A risk assessment is conducted by experts in the field of safety 
who have an in-depth understanding of the system workings and its failures, and is a 
specialised skill. However, any risk assessment method suffers from two types of reliability 
variations. Firstly, inter-rateability variation which is caused due to different mental models 
between different experts or different groups of experts. Experts’ mental model refers to 
their beliefs about how they perceive severity, controllability and exposure. This belief will 
be influenced by not only their knowledge and experience in the industry but also the type of 
organisation and culture they belong to. Secondly, intra-rateability variation which is caused 
due to variation in mental models of the same expert or the same group of experts at 
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different points in time. However, the knowledge imparted to the driver/user of ADASs or 
ADSs needs to be done in a reliable manner which leads to the next research question: 
How to improve the inter- and intra-rater-reliability of the automotive HARA process? 
 
 
To answer the research question, the following research objectives were identified: 
5. To develop a rule-set for conducting automotive HARA 
6. To determine the ability of the developed rule-set for HARA in improving the 
reliability of the automotive HARA 
1.2. Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured as follows (Figure 1.1): 
 Chapter 2: Provides an introduction to Advanced Driver Assistance Systems 
(ADASs) and Automated Driving Systems (ADSs). While discussing various 
benefits, the author elaborates some of the challenges that need to be overcome to 
ensure that we realise the benefits of automation. 
 Chapter 3: This chapter provides an in-depth discussion via a literature review 
especially focussed on development of trust in automation. Subsequently, one 
research question and two research objectives corresponding to it were identified. 
The review of literature on trust met research objective 1 (mentioned in section 1.1)  
 Chapter 4: Provides a description of the research methodology being adopted to 
answer the research questions and to meet the research objectives identified in the 
literature, and discusses some of the common tools (driving simulator, 
questionnaires etc.) used in the various experimental studies. 
 Chapter 5: Discusses research objective 2 and two driving simulator studies used to 
meet the research objective. The two studies establish the effect of knowledge (static 
and dynamic) of true capabilities and limitations of ADASs and ADSs on trust. 
 Chapter 6: This chapter provides an in-depth discussion via a literature review 
especially focussed on testing (test scenarios and safety analysis) to create the 
knowledge used to calibrate trust. Subsequently, two research questions and four 
research objectives corresponding to them were identified. 
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 Chapter 7: Meets research objectives 3 and 4 on creation of test scenarios to 
establish the limitations of ADASs and ADSs. In chapter 5, once it was established 
that by providing knowledge, trust can be calibrated to the appropriate level, the 
knowledge needed to be created. This chapter discusses the proposed method to 
create knowledge by testing ADASs and ADSs, which can be used calibrate trust. 
 Chapter 8: Discusses research objectives 5 and 6. One of the aspects of the 
knowledge creation process was to ensure that the knowledge about the risks 
communicated (to drivers) is generated reliably, giving identical results when used 
by different manufacturers. This chapter discusses a novel approach of rule-set 
based classification to increase the reliability of the created knowledge.  
 Chapter 9: While each chapter has its own discussion / summary of the results, an 
overarching discussion has been presented in chapter 9 to link each aspect of the 
research and findings with the overall aim of the research. This chapter also 
discusses the merits and limitations of this research and possible future work that 
might follow the work already presented in this thesis. 
 Chapter 10: Provides the final conclusions from the research work presented in this 
thesis. 
Figure 1.2 maps the thesis chapters to the research objectives discussed in this chapter. 
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Figure 1.1: Structure of this Thesis' chapters 
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Figure 1.2: Thesis chapters mapped to Research Objectives 
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AUTOMATED VEHICLES: BENEFITS AND 
CHALLENGES  
Chapter 2  
An Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
In the last decade, there has been a gradual increase of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems 
(ADASs) (e.g. Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), Lane-Keep Assist, Lane Departure Warning 
etc.) in on-road vehicles. More recently, there has been a push towards the introduction of 
higher levels of automation in vehicles with the aim of having Automated Driving Systems 
(ADSs). The push towards ADAS and ADS is driven by their many potential benefits like 
increased safety by reducing the number of accidents (Cicchino, 2017; Fagnant and 
Kockelman, 2015; Guériau et al., 2016; Tingvall, 1997), increased traffic throughput and 
road efficiency (Le et al., 2016; Talebpour and Mahmassani, 2016), time and monetary 
savings on parking (Fagnant and Kockelman, 2015), lower emissions (Fagnant and 
Kockelman, 2014), decreasing drivers’ workload (Balfe et al., 2015; Stanton and Young, 
1998) and providing more productive time to drivers (Cairns et al., 2014). 
Additionally, an average customer is willing to pay more for ADAS and ADS (e.g. up to 
$3500 for partial automation and $4900 for full automation (Daziano et al., 2017)). While 
there is a variation among customers about their willingness to pay for automation, in a 
survey of over 5000 participants from 109 countries, it was found that 69% of the 
respondents believed that fully automated features will have 50% market share by 2050 
(Kyriakidis et al., 2015). 
It is evident from these statistics that the introduction of ADAS and ADS is inevitable and 
highly beneficial. However, to realise any of the many potential benefits of these 
technologies, it is essential that their introduction be done in a safe manner. Moreover, 
11 
 
Billings (1991b) suggested that introduction of automated systems changes the role of the 
human from an active manual engagement to a more passive monitoring task. Evidence from 
the aviation industry has shown that even though automation may lead to removal of some 
of the traditional manual errors, it can lead to the introduction of new errors (such as 
understanding of the automated system in order to be ready in case of a system failure). 
Therefore, the argument that autonomy itself will reduce the number of accidents is only 
partially correct.  
This chapter discusses the various potential benefits that society at large could realise with 
the introduction of ADAS and ADS (section 2.2). Furthermore, the challenges that need to 
be overcome on the path to a safe introduction of automation in driving systems are also 
discussed (section 2.3). However, before discussing in detail the benefits and challenges of 
ADAS and ADS, it is important to understand the types of ADAS and ADS that exist and 
the basis for their classification. 
 
2.1. Levels of automation 
In order to better understand the types of automated systems, various organizations like 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the German Federal Highway 
Research Institute (BASt) and SAE International have come up with their classification 
schemes for automated systems based on automation of driving functions and driver 
responsibility during an interaction with those functions. Winner (2016) proposed the 
triangle of autonomous driving with three corners of the triangle being 1) simple scenario 
automation (e.g. Adaptive Cruise Control, Lane Keep Assist) 2) low speed automation (e.g. 
Automated Valet Parking) 3) High risk automation (e.g. Collision Mitigation Braking, 
Emergency Steering Assist) and the goal being to travel towards the centre where all three 
meet . Michon (1985) suggested three levels of driving tasks: 1) Strategic 2) Tactical and 3) 
Operational. According to Michon (1985), strategic driving task involves “general planning 
stage of a trip, including the determination of trip goals, route, and modal choice, plus an 
evaluation of the costs and risks involved.” Tactical driving task involves deciding the 
driving manoeuvres and avoiding obstacles in accordance with the strategic driving task. 
Operational driving task involves the execution of the tactical manoeuvres (e.g. steering and 
pedal inputs). 
For discussion in this thesis, the classification scheme by SAE International has been 
adopted as it is the most widely accepted industry standard and is now being created in a 
joint SAE-ISO document also. SAE International in their standard J3016 (SAE International, 
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2018) have presented a 6 level classification from level 0-5. Figure 2.1 shows the 
classification scheme (as per SAE J3016) for the different levels and the distribution of 
responsibility between the driver and the system to perform the Dynamic Driving Task 
(DDT) and the DDT fallback task. Dynamic Driving Task is defined as “All of the real-time 
operational and tactical functions required to operate a vehicle in on-road traffic, excluding 
the strategic functions such as trip scheduling and selection of destinations and waypoints, 
and including without limitation: 1) Lateral vehicle motion control via steering 
(operational); 2) Longitudinal vehicle motion control via acceleration and deceleration 
(operational); 3) Monitoring the driving environment via object and event detection, 
recognition, classification, and response preparation (operational and tactical); 4) Object 
and event response execution (operational and tactical); 5) Manoeuvre planning (tactical); 
and 6) Enhancing conspicuity via lighting, signalling and gesturing, etc. (tactical)”(SAE 
International, 2018). It also uses the Operational Design Domain (ODD) as a parameter for 
the classification. ODD is defined as, “operating conditions under which a given driving 
automation system or feature thereof is specifically designed to function, including, but not 
Figure 2.1: SAE Levels of Automation as per SAE J3016 
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limited to, environmental, geographical, and time-of-day restrictions, and/or the requisite 
presence or absence of certain traffic or roadway characteristics” (SAE International, 
2018). 
Furthermore, SAE J3016 defines DDT Fallback as “The response by the user to either 
perform the DDT or achieve a minimal risk condition after occurrence of a DDT 
performance-relevant system failure(s) or upon operational design domain (ODD) exit, or 
the response by an ADS to achieve minimal risk condition”. As we move from level 0 (no 
automation) to level 5 (full automation), the automation capability gradually increases. 
ADASs can be classified anywhere between SAE level 1 to SAE level 2. Systems like 
Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) which perform only longitudinal control are an example of 
SAE level 1 system, where as a Traffic Jam Assist (TJA) and Tesla’s Autopilot system are 
examples of SAE Level 2 system. Currently there is no commercially available passenger 
car which can perform both DDT and OEDR (Object and Event Detection and Response) 
even in a limited ODD. SAE level 3 (conditional driving automation) is considered to be a 
step change in the automation capability of the systems. Future systems in SAE level 3, 4 
and 5 will be called as ADSs. 
 
Figure 2.2: SAE Levels of automation, corresponding automotive systems and a potential introduction timeline  
(image source: KPMG: Connect and Autonomous Vehicles – The UK Economic Opportunity. March 2015) 
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With different levels of automation, different types of automated systems exist which 
provide varying degrees of assistance, from informative to warning to assistance. Drivers 
tend to use informative and warning systems more readily than assistive systems. This is 
because drivers are unwilling to give up control in critical scenarios. However, Parasuraman 
and Riley (1997) discussed that even an imperfect warning system (providing too many false 
warnings) can lead to disuse of the system. 
While in SAE level 1 and 2, the driver is actively involved in the driving task, in SAE Level 
3, the entire DDT (both vehicle motion and OEDR) is performed by the automated system, 
keeping the driver out of the loop. However, the driver is expected to perform the DDT 
fallback task in case of any failure of the system or in case the system has reached its 
operational boundaries (i.e., outside its ODD). The challenge here lies in ensuring that the 
driver has enough situation awareness about his role to perform the DDT fallback task and 
has enough time to perform the task. As we move to higher levels of automation (SAE Level 
4 and 5), the automated system can perform both DDT and DDT fallback in limited and 
unlimited ODD respectively. Table 2.1 provides a summary of some of the ADAS systems 
already in market and the AD systems under development. 
 
Table 2.1: Various ADAS and AD systems in market or in development (SMMT, 2019) 
ADAS / ADS feature Level of automation Commercial introduction 
Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) 1 Available 
Lane Keep Assist (LKA) 1 Available 
Park assistance 2 Available 
Traffic Jam Assist  2 Available 
Tesla’s Autopilot 2 Available 
Audi’s Traffic Jam Pilot 3 Potentially 2020-22 
Highway pilot 4 In development (2025+) 
Automated Valet Parking 4 2020 / 2021 
Low Speed Automated Driving 
Systems 
4 2022 - 2027 
Robot Taxi  5 2035 
 
 
2.2. Benefits 
In 1996, Sweden adopted a “Vision Zero” policy which states that “eventually no one will 
be killed or seriously injured within the road transport system” (Tingvall, 1998). It brought 
together multiple stakeholders like vehicle manufacturers, road designers, state, city 
councils, municipalities and individuals, in order to achieve the mission of zero on-road 
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fatalities. According to Vision Zero’s viewpoint, a holistic approach needs to be adopted. 
While changes in vehicles is a major aspect of the solution (with the introduction of passive 
safety, active safety and automated features), other aspects include changes in roads, streets, 
knowledge/awareness of individuals and legislations (Tingvall, 1998). While the principles 
of Vision Zero concept are valid for every country, the identification of changes and their 
implementation differs from country to country and the cultural aspect of the country needs 
to be taken into consideration in the strategic analysis plan (Johansson, 2009). With over 
90% of the on-road accidents being attributed to human error (Singh, 2015), introduction of 
automated driving systems which replace the driver’s driving tasks, have the potential to 
reduce the number of accidents and increase safety.  
It has been suggested that the introduction of automated vehicles will increase road capacity 
and traffic efficiency by reducing the time-gap between vehicles (Bishop, 2000; Shladover, 
2009; van Arem et al., 2005). However, Le Vine, Zolfaghari and Polak (2015) also suggest 
the existence of tension between the two factors: Increasing road capacity by reducing the 
time-gap between vehicles and driver comfort. Increasing road capacity might require 
acceleration and deceleration behaviour with which vehicle occupants may be 
uncomfortable. This would lead to a restriction in the allowable vehicle dynamics behaviour. 
Automated driving systems can also reduce driver’s stress and workload levels during 
driving by taking over the difficult and more mundane driving tasks (Balfe et al., 2015; 
Reimer et al., 2016) and subsequently increase a person’s usable time (Cairns et al., 2014; 
Le et al., 2015).  
Vehicles equipped with automated driving systems have the potential to increase usage 
efficiency of vehicles. Privately owned vehicles remain parked in garages or parking bays 
for over 95% of the time (Bates and Leibling, 2012). In case of automated vehicles, instead 
of being parked in the parking bays, these vehicles could be used to provide “transport 
services” like on-demand mobility, to increase their usage time. Not only will such services 
change the way cities are planned (e.g. fewer parking spaces), they will potentially change 
the car ownership model and reduce the total number of vehicles on road (Sparrow and 
Howard, 2017). Reduction in the total number of vehicles will also lead to reduction in 
vehicular emissions. An additional societal benefit of “transport services” inspired by 
automated driving systems is that they will provide mobility and independence for people 
with disability or elderly people who can no longer drive due to reduced eyesight.  
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2.3. Challenges 
2.3.1. Reaping the safety benefits 
While it is important to provide drivers the opportunity to use ADAS and ADS (with 
development in technology), it is equally important to ensure that the drivers use the systems 
in order to realise the potential benefits of such systems (Diels and Bos, 2015; Lee and See, 
2004). Drivers’ choice for use is influenced by their beliefs which form their internal mental 
model. Unfortunately, the usage of ADAS features like ACC and Lane Departure Warning 
has been traditionally low (51% of highway driving time (Eichelberger and McCartt, 2014)).  
Exploring the possible variation in acceptance of Automated Vehicles (AVs) (which is 
influenced by user’s propensity to trust AVs)  due to culture and background, Haboucha et 
al. (2017) found that Israeli individuals are more willing to accept AVs as compared to 
North Americans, as the former care more for marginal cost as compared to capital cost. 
Similar results were found by Shin et al. (2015), where age of the respondents led to a 
heterogeneous mix of acceptance levels which suggested that early adopters of technology 
tend to be from the younger age group. This illustrates the influence of various factors on 
trust, acceptance and subsequently use of AVs. Interestingly, 44% of the respondents to Shin 
et al.’s survey mentioned that they would choose a regular vehicle over an AV.  
Studies discussing the introduction of new technology in different domains like aviation, 
rail, automotive, etc. have shown that for the new technology to be accepted and used, effort 
needs to be made to introduce trust towards the new technology (Molesworth and Koo, 
2016). Molesworth and Koo (2016) discussed that when participants were given a choice 
between conventionally piloted aircraft and remotely piloted aircraft (new technology), 
participants chose the former as they trusted it more, even though the latter was safer. 
While the introduction of automated systems (e.g. ADAS or ADS) in the automotive 
industry is a relatively recent phenomenon, other industries like aviation, rail, process and 
manufacturing incorporated automation much earlier. Interestingly, while these industries 
have benefitted from automation, the introduction of automation in these industries was not 
smooth and faced various challenges, some of which continue to exist (Le Coze, 2013). 
Initially the introduction of automated systems suffered from reliability and safety issues. 
Gradually as these issues were eliminated via technological and process development 
advancements, a new type of issue emerged which was caused by human-automation 
interaction. Accidents like the Asiana 214 accident, China Air 006 accident (NTSB, 1986), 
the Three-Mile Island accident (Perrow, 1981), have occurred where the operator/pilot has 
incorrectly identified (due to over-trust) the state of the automation which led to the 
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accidents. The understanding of the human-automation interaction is still improving and 
unfortunately learning experiences have arisen from fatal accidents. Historically, similar 
accidents have repeated themselves in a 20-30 year cycle in different domains, referred to as 
the “déjà vu experience” (Le Coze, 2013) which emphasizes the need for a better 
understanding of the human-automation interaction in order to prevent similar accidents 
from recurring. 
The potential for small and large scale fatalities is high in the medical, aviation, rail and 
nuclear industries. Thus, various procedures have been established to help identify the safety 
issues and reasons for the occurrence of any accidents (Olsen and Williamson, 2017). With 
the introduction of automation, a similar approach needs to be adopted in the automotive 
domain to identify system failures and driver-automation interaction failures to pre-empt the 
occurrence of a possible human error. Early detection of potential human errors and 
corresponding action can inhibit minor incidents from developing into catastrophic failures 
(Bennett, 2017). 
Incorrectly designed automation can have negative impacts and thus, defeats the purpose of 
automation itself.  Exploring this further, Bainbridge (1983) discussed the ironies of 
automation. Introduction of automation has been discussed widely among legislators and the 
automotive industry due to its ability to possibly remove the human driver from the control 
loop, thus reducing errors due to an unreliable and inefficient human driver. However, 
removal of the human driver makes the system prone to errors introduced in the system by 
the designer (another human influence) (Bainbridge, 1983), forming the first irony. 
Moreover, designers automate only the tasks they can automate without proper thought 
given to whether the task needs to be automated or not (Bainbridge, 1983). There is a 
likelihood that the designers’ view of the best design of automation for a system and task 
distribution between the driver and the automated system differs from the driver’s 
perception; and may potentially increase the workload of the driver due to the mismatch 
between driver’s mental model and actual design (Sheridan, 1995). This forms the second 
irony. Thus, drivers’ trust is affected which ultimately leads to misuse or disuse of the 
system if the system is not correctly designed or tested (Parasuraman and Riley, 1997). 
Misuse refers to the usage of the automated system in situations for which it has not been 
designed. Disuse refers to the user not engaging the automated system even if it is suitable 
for usage. 
Once the designers have designed automation according to their understanding of 
requirements, the driver is left with the task of 1) monitoring the automated tasks 2) 
performing the non-automated tasks. A near-perfect automated system is more detrimental 
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for human-automation interaction than an unreliable automated system due to the rare need 
for human intervention in a near-perfect system. It leads to the human driver being out of the 
loop (not actively engaged in the driving tasks) for most periods. This means that the driver 
has to perform the monotonous task of monitoring the automated system, which as per Fitts 
list’s (Fitts et al., 1951) is not a task humans are good at when compared to a machine. This 
has been said to be the third irony of automation (Bainbridge, 1983). Fitts suggested that 
tasks where machines outperform humans should be automated and tasks where humans 
outperform machines should be left to manual control. Thus, driving tasks that are 
automated need to be carefully selected and designed in order to enable drivers to use the 
systems in a correct and a safe manner. Therefore, designing automation in vehicles to 
ensure correct use of the ADAS and ADS remains a challenge. 
2.3.2. Establishing the safety level 
As improved safety has been advocated to being one of the major benefits of ADAS and 
ADS, it is important to ensure that the systems themselves are safe and reliable. However, 
both ADAS and ADS offer new challenges for testing and the safety analysis of the systems 
which are used to establish their safety level. A variety of ADAS and ADS exist or are in 
development, each of them offering a different kind of a challenge. As we move towards 
higher levels of automation in the SAE’s levels of automation (level 0-5) (SAE 
International, 2018), the software and the electronic content in vehicles increase drastically. 
Over the past two decades, the software content in road vehicles has increased. It is said that 
cars have over 100 million lines of code compared to a jet fighter which has just over 1.7 
million lines of code (Charette, 2009). Additionally, most of the upcoming innovations in 
the automotive industry have been credited to be due to software. With the increase in driver 
assistance and autonomous technologies, increased importance is being placed on rigorous 
Verification and Validation (V&V) processes which need to be established. While the ISO 
26262 standard (ISO, 2018a), attempts to add clarity for V&V practices that should be 
followed for automotive software development to meet the functional safety goals, it falls 
short for higher levels of automation (Yu et al., 2016). This is mainly because for ADASs, 
the driver is always the fall-back, i.e., responsible for safe operation of the system. However, 
for higher levels of automation, the system must assume the fall-back role and bring the 
system to a safe state which increases the complexities and combinations of the scenarios in 
which the system needs to be tested. 
In the absence of any common standards, there has been extensive discussion in the 
automotive industry regarding defining the completeness of testing for an automated system. 
Some experts have mentioned about 100,000 driven miles as a requirement for defining 
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completeness of testing, while others believe 11 billion miles are required (Kalra and 
Paddock, 2016b). However, the author is of the opinion that instead of the accruing miles, 
the scenarios experienced by the automated system during those miles are of more 
importance and should be the focus of research. 
To meet the 11 billion mile challenge, role of simulation in testing of ADAS and ADS is 
gaining momentum (Bareket et al., 2003; Gordon et al., 2010), while many real-world Field 
Operational Test studies have also been conducted in US (Gordon et al., 2010; LeBlanc et 
al., 2006) and Europe (euroFOT project - (Benmimoun et al., 2012)). Various test methods 
like VEHiL (Vehicle Hardware-in-the-Loop) (Verburg et al., 2002), Vehicle-in-the-Loop 
(Bock et al., 2007), Co-ordinated automated driving (Schöner and Hurich, 2015) and test 
track testing have been developed for validation of ADAS and automated systems. 
Increasingly, driving simulators are also being used for testing ADAS and ADS as they offer 
a safer and a more reproducible environment for verifying and validating such systems. 
Real-world testing and test track testing (to some extent) produce the most valid results and 
can have the driver-in-the-loop for evaluation. However, the controllability and repeatability 
of scenarios is limited in such environments. On the other hand, VEHiL, Vehicle-in-the-
Loop, Coordinated automated driving, are expensive setups and remove or modify the driver 
interaction with the system. While each of these test methods serves a specific purpose, they 
have a common requirement. All of these methods require the generation of test scenarios 
for which the systems are to be tested. An additional challenge with verification and 
validation of ADAS and automated driving is the need for testing for the huge sample space 
of system environment interactions. Without a robust verification and validation process, the 
chances of finding faults at later stages of development or even worse, after the release of 
the product increase. The increase of cost of bug fixing through a development cycle can be 
illustrated by the fact that it costs an average of $25 to fix a bug during development period 
which increases to $16000 after release (W.P. Klockwork, 2012). Any bug found after a 
vehicle’s release is essentially a function of the number of affected vehicles. To fix the 
ignition switch issue affecting 2.6 million General Motors vehicles, GM had an estimated 
cost of $400 million (Malek, 2017). The identification of the “unknown unknowns”, 
(unforeseen events) which are also known as “black swan” scenarios remains a challenge 
for the research and the industry community. 
2.3.3. Driver Take-Over Scenario 
In SAE Level 3 automated system (discussed in section 2.1), the driver is not involved in the 
driving task for sustained periods, however is expected to take control and perform the DDT 
in case the automated system hands control back or in case of a failure of the ADS. When a 
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driver is not actively involved in the DDT, there is a tendency for the driver to be in an out-
of-the-loop state. This is in line with the Fitts’ list which suggested that humans are poor at 
monitoring systems as compared to machines (Fitts et al., 1951). Various studies (Dogan et 
al., 2017; Eriksson and Stanton, 2017a; Gold et al., 2013; Louw and Merat, 2017; Merat et 
al., 2012), have suggested that it takes anywhere between 5-40 seconds to bring the driver 
back-in-the-loop depending upon the driving situation, driver’s state, vehicle velocity etc. 
However, no consensus has been achieved yet and more research is being carried out on 
take-over time.  
Not only the duration of take-over time is important, the manner in which the driver is 
brought back in the loop is also under investigation. Different feedback mechanisms 
(audible, visual, haptic, multi-modal) are being evaluated to understand the optimum level 
and modality of feedback (Biondi et al., 2017). 
2.3.4. Answering the ethical question 
ADAS and ADS are capable of performing tactical and operational driving tasks. Thus, they 
are governed not only by technical requirements but social requirements also (Winner, 
2016). Since an automated vehicle is essentially driven by software, the engineer or 
engineering team responsible for writing the software would be responsible for any 
accidents (ethically, if not legally). Such a situation brings to light the much debated “trolley 
problem” in an automotive perspective (Bonnefon et al., 2016; Keeling, 2019). Since the 
actions of the automated vehicle are essentially pre-coded by an engineer, how shall the 
engineer code the solution to the trolley problem? 
Consider an example where an automated vehicle is going to have an imminent collision. 
However, in order to save the occupants of the vehicle, it can either swerve to the right and 
hit an old person or swerve to the left and hit a child (Bonnefon et al., 2016). The decision 
the automated vehicle will take has to be programmed by the engineers. However, any 
decision that the program makes will seem very much like a targeted decision. It is also 
suggested that trolley dilemmas for ADSs will not occur or are an incredibly rare 
phenomenon (De Freitas et al., 2019). With conflicting points of viewpoint, the trolley 
problem remains unanswered. 
2.3.5. Legal and insurance considerations 
One of the possible solutions to the trolley problem could be legislation. Legislation 
suggesting “minimal loss of life is the correct decision”, could aid in the development of 
solutions for the trolley problem. However, like any new technology, ADSs necessitate new 
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policies and legislations. While incremental technologies can be catered by regular revisit of 
the policy framework, disruptive technologies (like automated vehicles) require a detailed 
review of the policies and in many cases may lead to a complete overhaul of the policy 
framework. One of the distinguishing features of disruptive technologies like automated 
vehicles is that not only the technology is radical, but also traditional vehicle manufacturers 
now face competition from non-traditional players like Google, Uber etc.  
Due to lack of legislations, development of a new insurance framework for the situation 
where the driver is not driving, but the ADS caused an accident has been slow. The question 
remains: who is liable for the accident? A question which has stirred a lot of debate but still 
to yield any convincing answers.  
2.3.6. Security and Privacy 
It is in human nature to expect security and privacy in their lives. Therefore, any collection 
of data needs to adhere to the laws of privacy and security. Currently, humans knowingly or 
unknowingly share a lot of their data about their private and professional life. Features like 
location services on mobile phones, work and home details on navigation devices, e-
commerce etc., collect all types of data. An automated vehicle will also have the capability 
to record large amounts of detailed data (vehicle parameters, GPS location, frequented 
destinations etc.) about the vehicle which will not only help accident investigations but also 
insurance providers. Most of the times, customers are unaware that their data is being 
collected by manufacturers or third parties (Markey, 2015). However, there are discussions 
about the ownership of the data and third-party companies trying to monetise the use of 
personal data coming from vehicles. Legislators are having extensive discussions on the data 
privacy laws and their enforcement process. 
Additionally, the large amounts of data is vulnerable to a cyber-threat due to hacking. This 
may lead to individuals’ identities been stolen by malicious attackers. Furthermore, the 
vehicle itself is susceptible to cyber-attacks (Markey, 2015). A connected vehicle extends 
the boundaries of the vehicle. It now interacts with other vehicles and infrastructure. In 
addition, many human-machine interface systems possess mobile connectivity too. All these 
external interfaces are potential attack points for cyber-attacks. In the widely discussed Jeep 
hack, Miller and Valasek (2015) demonstrated a cyber-attack on commercially available 
vehicle (Jeep Cherokee) running on the road and applying brakes on the car from a remote 
location. Subsequently, vehicle manufacturers, suppliers and data service providers have 
acknowledged the need to develop communication protocols for Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) 
and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication to secure all such communications.  
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2.3.7. Sensor and control technology 
Modern cars are equipped with variety of sensors (e.g. RADARs, ultrasonic sensors, 
cameras etc.) which are currently being used in SAE level 1-2 ADASs (e.g. Adaptive Cruise 
Control, Lane Keep Assist, park assist etc.). Future ADASs and ADSs will add even more 
sensors (e.g. LiDAR, high resolution cameras) which will enable the collection of detailed 
information about the vehicle’s environment. However, adding more sensors to the vehicle 
increases the cost and complexity of the final product. Therefore, a trade-off decision 
between automation capability and cost (due to selection of sensor suite) needs to be made, 
while ensuring safe and optimum performance of the vehicle. In addition, the ability to 
achieve complete situational awareness based on the environmental data from various 
sensors is needed, especially in dynamic conditions (Winner, 2016). The current limitations 
on this aspect were highlighted in the fatal crash involving a Tesla Model S in which the 
Autopilot system used a combination of RADAR and camera (NHTSA, 2017a). While one 
of the sensors (camera) was able to detect the rear end of a white truck on a sunny day, the 
combined sensor suite and associated autonomous control algorithm chose to discount the 
sensor input, causing the fatal crash. Thus, not only is it important to ensure an optimum 
selection of the sensor suite, it is equally important to ensure that based on the data collected 
by various sensors, the vehicle is situationally aware about its environment. 
2.3.8. In-Vehicle Design 
As we move up the SAE levels of automation, the degree of automation increases and the 
drivers’ role in the driving task decreases. In higher levels of automation (SAE level 3, 4 and 
SAE level 5) where the driver is not responsible for the Dynamic Driving Task (DDT) for 
long durations, the drivers (and passengers) may decide to do a variety of other (non-
driving) tasks from reading newspapers/books, to watching movies, have official meetings 
etc. This shift in driving tasks has opened debates about how the interior of the vehicle 
should be designed to ensure the ideal user experience. However, while designing various 
in-vehicle layout concepts, an interesting issue of self-driving car-sickness has been 
identified (Diels and Bos, 2015). This is an interesting challenge as it is necessary to 
mitigate self-driving car-sickness in order to realise the benefits stated earlier, especially the 
idea of having more free-time for drivers / passengers. 
2.4. Discussion 
Like any new technology, ADAS and ADS have benefits and challenges associated with 
them (discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3). As per the SAE Levels of Automation, ADASs are 
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classified between SAE Level 1-2. ADSs are classified between SAE Level 3 -5. ADAS 
systems (e.g. Adaptive Cruise Control, Lane Keep Assist etc.) have been commercially 
available in market since the late 1990s. One key and major difference between ADAS and 
ADS is the responsibility of the driver. In ADASs, the driver is always responsible for the 
safety of the vehicle. However, in ADSs the driver may be out of the driving loop for long 
sustained durations. Therefore, the safety of the system is a responsibility of the ADS 
(although in SAE level 3, the driver shall perform the DDT-fallback task). This change in 
driving role and responsibility makes some of the issues discussed in section 2.3 even more 
challenging. Thus, this thesis will focus primarily on ADSs and the challenges associated 
with commercial introduction and deployment of ADSs. 
2.5. Summary 
Automation in vehicles can take various forms from driver assistance to full autonomous 
control. In this chapter, the author introduces the concept of automation in the driving 
context and discusses the various potential benefits provided by the introduction of ADAS 
and ADS. These include: 
 Increased safety 
 Lower emissions 
 Reduced traffic congestion 
 Increased traffic throughput  
 More free time available to drivers etc. 
However, the author also discusses various challenges associated with the introduction of 
automation. Some of the main challenges include: 
 Increasing use of available ADAS and ADS 
 Ensuring the safety of ADAS and ADS 
 Legal and insurance framework 
 Security and Privacy while using ADAS and ADS 
In order to realise any of the benefits mentioned earlier, it is important to find solutions to 
the challenges posed by the introduction of ADAS and ADS. In the next chapters (chapter 3 
and chapter 6), some of the challenges (e.g. increasing use of available ADS and ensuring 
safety of ADS) are discussed in more detail and subsequently, research questions to be dealt 
within the scope of this thesis have been identified.  
 
24 
 
AUTOMATED VEHICLES: DEMYSTIFYING THE 
CHALLENGES - PART 1 (TRUST)1  
Chapter 3  
Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
 
In chapter two, the author identified various opportunities and challenges associated with 
Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS) and Automated Driving System (ADS). 
However, in order to reap the benefits of the ADAS and ADS, it is essential that drivers use 
the systems. Therefore, it becomes imperative that solutions are found to the challenges 
offered by ADAS and ADS.  
The two main challenges discussed and explored within the scope of this thesis are: 1) Trust 
and 2) Testing. In this chapter, the author discusses one of the challenges (trust) in greater 
detail and subsequently identifies associated research question which will be tackled within 
the scope of this thesis. While there is existing literature which attempts to find solutions to 
the challenges, this chapter and chapter 6, highlight the unexplored research areas and 
unanswered research questions. 
The review of literature revealed that in order to increase drivers’ use of the ADASs and 
ADSs, their trust in such systems needs to be increased. While exploring the concept of trust 
in the literature, the author proposes (hypothesises) that accurate knowledge about the 
capability of the ADAS and ADS can potentially increase trust. However, in order to 
generate this knowledge, ADAS and ADS need to be tested in a robust manner to establish 
                                                     
1 Contents of this chapter have been published in the following publication: 
Khastgir, S., Birrell, S., Dhadyalla, G. and Jennings, P. (2017) ‘Calibrating Trust to Increase the Use 
of Automated Systems in a Vehicle’, in Stanton, N. et al. (eds) Advances in Human Aspects of 
Transportation. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing. Springer, Cham, pp. 535–546. 
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their true capability and limitations and also the scenarios which illustrate their limitations 
need to be identified. In this chapter, the author discusses existing literature from various 
domains (aviation, process, chemical, nuclear and automotive) around trust. In chapter 6, the 
author discusses existing literature on testing (used to create the knowledge to increase trust) 
systems and the challenges associated with testing. 
3.1. Introduction 
In the USA over 90% of all on-road accidents are caused due to human error. Therefore, one 
may argue that the introduction of systems which assist or even replace the driver have a 
potential to reduce the number of accidents. This argument is based on the traditional belief 
as laid down by the Fitts’ List (Fitts et al., 1951) which states that machines (automated 
systems) outperform humans in certain tasks. One such task is the ability of automated 
systems to react faster to a possible accident situation in comparison to an alert human driver 
(Carbaugh et al., 1998). Investigations of some of the major accidents in recent times in non-
automotive domains have identified that human errors were amongst the causal factors 
(Lenné et al., 2012; Rasmussen, 1990; Shappell et al., 2007; D. Wiegmann and Shappell, 
2001a) and have continued to be present despite the knowledge of various management 
methods (Salmon et al., 2010). In 2015, 1732 on-road fatalities were reported in the UK 
(Department for Transport HM Government, 2015), with the majority of those being due to 
driver error.  
These statistics tend to suggest that human error is the cause of most accidents, however it is 
important to understand the nature of the human error and its causes. While the introduction 
of automation is a potential way to remove human error, incorporating automation also 
makes the system more complex and with it, the interaction between the human and the 
system also. It has been suggested that it is unfair to “criminalize” human error solely 
(Dekker, 2011) as "errors" in complex systems are inevitable and are caused by the complex 
interactions (Perrow, 2011). Therefore, automation, if not correctly designed into the system, 
can defeat the very aim with which it was introduced in the system, i.e., to reduce human 
error. However, if automation itself is inappropriately designed, it may be wrong to blame 
users or call it human error (Dekker, 2011). Before discussing automation further, it is 
important to understand “human error” and its types to understand design means to prevent 
the occurrence of human error. 
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3.2. Human Error 
The changing nature of human-machine interaction and the introduction of more automation, 
has made the causal analysis of error challenging as the human task has shifted from an 
active manual role to a more passive supervisory role (Rasmussen, 1990, 1982). Skilled 
operators tend to adopt a dynamic approach to choose strategies to resolve conflicts in 
resource management to ensure performance levels and are driven by their knowledge base 
(Rasmussen, 1990). This dynamic approach adds to the challenges in the causal analysis of 
an error and also in the design of such systems. 
Before the author delves into details of human error, it is important to define it. While it is 
hard to agree on a universally accepted definition for human error, this thesis adopts the 
definition of (human) error as: “a generic term to encompass all those occasions in which a 
planned sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, and 
when these failures cannot be attributed to the intervention of some chance agency” 
(Reason, 1990). A series of planned activities may fail either if the execution of the activities 
didn’t go as planned or if the plan itself was incorrect. This concept aids in classifying errors 
into two categories: slips (or lapses) and mistakes. Slips are “errors which result from some 
failure in the execution and/or storage stage of an action sequence, regardless of whether or 
not the plan which guided them was adequate to achieve its objective” (Reason, 1990). 
Mistakes are defined as “deficiencies or failures in the judgemental and/or inferential 
processes involved in the selection of an objective or in the specification of the means to 
achieve it, irrespective of whether or not the actions directed by this decision-scheme run 
according to plan” (Reason, 1990). Due to the subtle nature of mistakes, they are difficult to 
detect and hard to predict, whereas slips are more obvious in nature (Woods, 1984). 
3.2.1. Types of Human Error (slips and mistakes) 
Human errors tend to occur when the constraints designed in a system fail (Nancy G. 
Leveson, 2011). In order to understand the nature of errors, it is important to understand the 
human behaviour that may be adopted in realizing the designed constraints. Rasmussen 
introduced three different levels of human behaviour: skill, rule and knowledge based 
performance (Rasmussen, 1983). According to Rasmussen, Skill Based (SB) behaviour 
represents “sensory – motor performance during acts or activities, …., take place without 
conscious control as smooth, automated, and highly integrated patterns of behaviour”. An 
important aspect of SB behaviour is that it occurs intuitively (without conscious effort). Rule 
Based (RB) behaviour is “controlled by a stored rule or procedure which may have been 
derived empirically during previous occasions”. The distinguishing feature of RB behaviour 
27 
 
is that it occurs consciously with the human having the ability to report the rules used in 
performing the activity. However, when faced by an unfamiliar situation, humans need to 
resort to a higher conceptual level of behaviour: Knowledge Based (KB) behaviour. As the 
situations are unfamiliar, there are no rules or previously acquired skills available to deal 
with the situation. The behaviour becomes goal-controlled and requires an understanding 
(i.e. a mental model) of the structure of the system and surroundings to make a cognitive 
decision (Rasmussen, 1983). This distinguishes KB behaviour from RB and SB, and its 
significance in human-automation interaction will be discussed in section 3.5 and section 
3.6.2. Inspired from Rasmussen’s SRK framework, human errors can be similarly classified 
into three categories (Reason, 1990): 
 Skill based slips 
 Rule based mistakes 
 Knowledge based mistakes 
The three categories are distinguished by the fact that whether or not a human is involved in 
the process of problem solving at the time when an error occurs (Rasmussen, 1983; Reason, 
1990).  SB slips are precursors to the detection of a problem as they occur unconsciously. 
During RB and KB mistakes, the human is actively involved in finding a solution to the 
problem. According to Reason, SB slips tend to occur due to improper/insufficient attention, 
whereas RB mistakes occur due to the inability of the human to match the rule that is needed 
for that situation. It is important to know that the correct rule required for the situation is 
present in the person’s mental model. KB mistakes are characterised by absence of any rule 
or experience as they occurs in an unfamiliar environment. While majority of errors which 
occur in daily life are either SB slips or RB mistakes, their probability of occurring is lower 
as compared to KB mistakes. SB is displayed primarily in routine tasks and non-challenging 
tasks. Challenging tasks require either RB behaviour (which means a stored rule-set is present 
in the mental model) or KB behaviour (in the absence of any stored rule-set). As humans have 
an extensive array of rule-sets that are ever evolving, the instances of display of KB behaviour 
are rare. In other words, KB mistakes have a higher opportunity cost. KB mistakes lead to 
decrease in trust, and subsequently lead to the disuse of the system. The author will discuss in 
detail how the opportunity cost for KB mistakes could be reduced in a driver-automation 
context in section 3.6.2. 
As discussed in section 2.3.1, while an automated system removes human from the control 
loop, it makes the system prone to the errors introduced by designers (another human 
influence) (Bainbridge, 1983). For complex systems, there is the possibility the designer’s 
choice for the best design for a system and the distribution of tasks between the human and 
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the machine, and the human driver’s perception of the task distribution do not match 
(Rasmussen, 1990). This may ultimately affect a user’s trust in the system (in case automation 
is not correctly designed) and his/her ability to use the system. Even though there is a 
mismatch in the perceptions or sometimes absence of operators’ consideration in the design 
of the system, most accident investigations still blame the human operator as a cause for an 
accident and not a possible flawed design of the automated system or in other parts of the 
system or user training (Leveson, 2017). Additionally, introduction of automated systems 
introduces the possibility of new errors on the part of the human operator: 1) during monitoring 
the automated tasks 2) during performing the non-automated tasks. One way of compensating 
for the difference in the mental model of the human (driver) and designer, is by providing 
more skilled training to the human to better familiarize the human. While this approach is 
valid for aviation, chemical, nuclear etc. industries, this approach may not be feasible for the 
driving context due to the large number of vehicles and huge variation in driving abilities of 
humans (even though all drivers would have passed their driving test). 
Introduction of automation in flights has been coupled with degradation of pilots’ skills 
(Wiener and Curry, 1980). Long haul pilots tend to be more prone to skill degradation as 
compared to short haul pilots (Haslbeck and Zhang, 2017). In an aircraft simulator study 
involving 51 professional pilots, Haslbeck and Zhang found that the visual scanning pattern 
of long haul pilots was inappropriate for manual landing task and the need to address this 
skill degradation issue by providing specific training to the pilots in order to prevent Skill 
Based (SB) lapses. In sub-section 3.3, the author discusses the continuing occurrences of SB, 
RB and KB errors in different domains. 
3.3. Types of “use” of automation 
An operator’s use of automation is influenced by many factors which will be discussed in 
detail in section 3.6. However, qualitatively, use of an automated system can be classified as 
(Parasuraman and Riley, 1997):  
 Misuse: Misuse refers to the usage of the automated system in situations for which it 
has not been designed. This could potentially be a result of over-trust on the system. 
Instances of misuse have caused fatal accidents: e.g. China Air 006 (NTSB, 1986) 
 Disuse: Disuse refers to the operator not engaging the automated system even if it is 
suitable for usage. This may be a result of lack of trust on the system. Disuse or 
distrust of automation has caused many accidents: for example Überlingen mid-air 
crash (BFU, 2004), Air France 447 (BEA, 2012) 
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 Correct use: Correct use of an automated system refers to the driver engaging the 
automated system only for the tasks and situations for which it has been designed. 
This requires the driver to have knowledge of the workings of the automated system, 
and acceptance of its limitations. 
 
Table 3.1: Some accidents caused by Misuse and Disuse of automation 
Type of 
use 
Domain 
Accident 
(year) 
Type of 
Error 
Brief Description 
Misuse  
(Over-trust) 
Aviation 
Asiana 214 
(2013) 
SB slips 
Pilots over-trusting the autopilot flight director system and 
auto-throttle system due to fatigue causing complacency 
and not monitoring the air speed gauge. 
TransAsia 
235 (2015) 
RB 
mistakes 
Pilots didn’t abort take-off when the ARM pushbutton 
didn’t light. Pilots incorrectly identified the defective 
engine and shut down the operative engine. Pilots didn’t 
respond to stall warnings. 
Kegworth air 
crash (1989) 
RB 
mistakes 
Pilots incorrectly identified the defective engine and shut 
down the perfectly working engine (engine 2). They didn’t 
evaluate the reading on the engine instrumentation before 
shutting down engine 2. 
China Air 006 
(1985) 
RB 
mistakes 
Pilots’ over-reliance on the autopilot system after one of 
the engines lost thrust. 
XL Airways 
Flight 888 
(2008) 
SB slips 
Crew carried out a demonstration to undertake a check of 
the low speed protections at a low height, while not taking 
into account the speeds mentioned in the programme. 
Tenerife 
(1977) 
RB 
mistakes 
Pilots incorrectly came to the conclusion that they were 
cleared for take-off. 
Nuclear / 
Chemical 
Three Mile 
Island (1979) 
RB 
mistakes 
Operators didn’t recognize the open state of the relief 
valve. This was due to lack of sufficient feedback from the 
instrumentation. 
Bhopal Gas 
(1985) 
RB 
mistakes 
Workers and plant managers didn't follow standard 
procedures as per plant rules 
Automotive 
Tesla 
Autopilot 
RB 
mistakes 
Driver over trusted the Autopilot system and didn’t monitor 
the environment and didn’t keep hands on steering wheel. 
Disuse Aviation 
Überlingen 
mid-air crash  
(2002) 
RB 
mistakes 
TU154M pilots distrusted the TCAS warning and over 
trusted the ATC instruction. 
Helios Air 
552 (2005) 
SB slips 
Pilots didn’t recognize the cabin warnings (cabin altitude 
warning horn, passenger oxygen mask deployment 
indicator and master caution) 
Air France 
447 (2009) 
RB 
mistakes 
Pilots distrusting the stall warning and mistrusting (over-
trusting) the flight director. 
 
3.4. Automation in automotive context 
The automotive industry needs to ensure that the introduction of ADAS and AD systems is 
not coupled with the introduction of human errors as experienced by other industries 
(aviation, chemical process, nuclear, petroleum etc.). Compared to other industries, 
introduction of automation within the driving context offers different challenges. Firstly, the 
number and density of vehicles on the road is far more than any other sector (aerospace, rail 
etc.). Secondly, each vehicle has its own driver, who may have a different behaviour and 
may interact differently with the vehicle. Thirdly, currently vehicle drivers don’t undergo 
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any specialized training as pilots do in aviation, or operators do in manufacturing industries, 
making it even harder to bring all drivers to the same skill and understanding level for 
working with automated systems. While drivers also undergo a legally mandated driving 
test, the test doesn’t address driving with ADAS or AD systems. 
Automation in the driving context varies in the levels of autonomy and the role assumed by 
the driver (Banks et al., 2014). With different levels of automation, different types of 
automated systems exist which provide varying degrees of assistance, from informative to 
warnings, or assistance to full handover of control. In order to understand driver-automation 
interactions, the goal of the automated system needs to be put in context to the different 
driving tasks that are to be performed. Three levels of driving tasks are defined as 1) 
Strategic 2) Tactical and 3) Operational (Michon, 1985). In a manual drive, each of the three 
tasks is governed by the driver’s mental model. This mental model is a result of the 
knowledge, rules and skills of the driver about working with the vehicle. The introduction of 
automation in vehicles has changed the driver’s roles (in driving tasks) from being actively 
involved in the driving task to being a passive supervisor of the driving task (Merat et al., 
2012). A fully automated system shall be able to perform all three driving tasks or both 
tactical and operational driving tasks with the human providing the strategic task input e.g. 
selection of destination and route driven. Between no automation and full automation, SAE 
J3016 (SAE International, 2018) defines different levels of automation. The responsibility of 
the different driving tasks changes in these levels. Table 3.2 depicts the division of driving 
tasks between the driver and the automated system for different automation levels. As a 
vehicle can potentially have SAE Levels 1-4 systems combined, the decision to shift 
authority between the driver and the automated system should be governed by the situation 
the vehicle is in and would differ from situation to situation. 
This decision of handing over control between an automated system and the driver can vary 
in real time due to interactions between different factors like trust, knowledge, situation 
awareness, self-confidence and others (discussed in section 3.6). One of the fundamental 
bases for answering the question of division of driving task responsibility is to understand 
that technology development is just an enabler for the division of driving tasks and not the 
reason for task division. In other words, it is important to have an understanding of whether 
a system should be automated, rather than just knowing that a system can be automated, and 
which conditions can result in a successful driver-automation interaction (Wiener and Curry, 
1980). 
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Table 3.2: Types of automation and its influence on task division 
Type of 
Automation 
Role of Driver Role of Automated System 
Informative and 
Warning 
(SAE Level 0) 
All dynamic driving tasks. Perceive 
informative systems to increase situation 
awareness. 
Only provide information or warning signals to 
possibly increase situation awareness. 
Assistance 
(SAE Level 1/2) 
Some dynamic driving tasks shared between 
driver and automated system. Object and 
event detection responsibility lies with the 
driver. Driver responsible for ensuring safety 
of the system and serves as fall-back. 
Some dynamic driving tasks shared between 
driver and automated system. 
Conditional 
Automation 
(fully automation 
in some scenarios) 
(SAE Level 3) 
Passive role in some situations. Driver 
responsible for ensuring safety of the system 
and serves as fall-back. 
Performing all dynamic driving tasks in some 
situations and providing feedback and increasing 
situation awareness to enable driver to perform 
the fall-back task. Object and event detection 
responsibility lies with the system. 
High Automation 
(full automation in 
some scenarios 
with fall-back 
capability) 
(SAE Level 4) 
None 
Performing all dynamic driving tasks in some 
situations and has the ability to perform the fall-
back manoeuvre to reach a minimal risk 
situation. Object and event detection 
responsibility lies with the system. 
Full Automation 
(SAE Level 5) 
None 
All dynamic driving tasks. May provide SA to 
occupant. 
 
In order to reap the benefits of automation, it is important to provide a system to the drivers 
which they would use. Design of an automated system cannot be analysed fully unless the 
interactions of the automated system with humans are considered in the design and analysis 
process (Karltun et al., 2017) in both adverse and ideal working environments (Sauer et al., 
2013), as the interaction differs with changing environments. In addition, the human-
automation interaction differs with age and gender too (Son et al., 2015). This emphasises 
that human drivers are not deterministic actors. They are driven by goals and actively search 
for new information in order to update their goals depending on the changing environments 
(Rasmussen, 1983). The dynamic nature of drivers’ decision making process makes the 
driver – automation interaction a complex process which warrants more exploration. 
Therefore, factors influencing the use of ADAS and AD systems in a vehicle (if it were to be 
offered to the driver) need to be identified and will be discussed in section 3.6. 
One of the key contributors to drivers’ use of such systems is the drivers’ trust on the 
systems (Lee and Moray, 1992; Lewandowsky et al., 2000; Muir and Moray, 1996). Many 
studies have discussed individual factors affecting trust and by way of theoretical and 
experimental results, have established a correlation between some of the factors and trust 
and use of automated systems (Inagaki, 2003; Lee and See, 2004; Mouloua et al., 2001; 
Rajaonah et al., 2008). However, a conceptual model of driver-automation interactions in an 
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automotive context has not yet been proposed. Thus, there is a gap in the existing literature 
to develop a conceptual model for the driver-automation interaction in the driving 
(automotive) context to aid the design of such systems to ensure their appropriate use. This 
gap has been addressed in section 3.6. 
3.5. Drivers’ “correct” use of automation 
In a survey of Volvo drivers, Eichelberger and McCartt (2014) found that drivers used 
ADAS features like Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and Lane Departure Warning Systems 
for only 51% (of highway driving time) and 59% of all the time, respectively. Similarly, in 
another Field Operational Test study, over one-third of the drivers indicated that they would 
have turned the ADAS (FCW) off if they were given an opportunity (Ervin et al., 2005). 
While there has been low uptake of ADAS in general, there are certain examples of ADASs 
which have had a high uptake. For example, Honda’s night vision system has received high 
uptake and high user reputation in Japan (Nakajima, 2008). This is due to the fact that the 
system’s value in daily usage for customers is not restricted to rare occasions when the 
feature is invoked, e.g. accident scenarios. This strengthens the earlier argument that design 
of systems should be driven by usage value to the driver and not the technological ability to 
create a system. Technology itself should be treated as an enabler, not as the causal factor. 
The primary evaluation criterion for the benefit of automated systems should be functional 
performance in the context of human interaction with automated systems. In technology 
driven development of automated systems, the designers of the automated systems automate 
tasks they technically can automate, leaving the driver to perform the tasks which they can’t 
automate, an irony of the introduction of automation (Bainbridge, 1983). While the move 
towards ADASs and ADSs is partly due to the increased technological ability to automate 
driving tasks (Hancock, 2014), the ADASs and ADSs have technical and safety boundaries 
which are defined by the designer and mostly not conveyed to the driver (Naujoks et al., 
2015). Some of the early studies conducted using ADAS found that “false alerts” were a 
major concern for participants in a Field Operational Test study (Ervin et al., 2005; LeBlanc 
et al., 2006). However, participants were more accepting of the perceived benefits of the 
ADASs (Gordon et al., 2010). In the absence of this knowledge of the boundaries of safe 
operation, drivers tend to use the ADASs and ADSs in an inappropriate manner causing 
unsafe situations. This defeats one of the key purposes of the introduction of automation 
which is to improve safety, a trend initially also experienced in the aviation industry. 
A near-perfect automated system is counter-productive to the intention of automation (Itoh 
et al., 2013). One possible explanation is that in a near-perfect automated system, the driving 
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task changes from being actively involved in driving to monitoring the automated system; a 
task in which human driver fairs worse as compared to a machine (Fitts et al., 1951). As per 
the Malleable Attentional Resources Theory (Young and Stanton, 2002), drivers’ attention 
capacity decreases in low load conditions and increases their propensity to be distracted in 
low load conditions (Young et al., 2017). Thus, increasing their reaction times in critical 
situations (Young and Stanton, 2007). Therefore, it is suggested that the driver should 
periodically be brought back in the control loop from an out-of-the-loop situation to improve 
driver attentiveness while using automation (Casner et al., 2016). In a driving simulator 
study exploring this concept, Navarro et al. (2017) showed that partial automation or 
imperfect automation is better than a near-perfect automation with very few misses (i.e., 
automation failures). However, the study conducted used a lane departure warning system, 
which does not take over active control of the vehicle. Therefore, the results of the study 
need to be cautiously interpreted as an automated system which takes active control of the 
vehicle may not provide similar driver response. This difference in driver behaviour with 
automated systems that take active control is further illustrated in an experiment studying a 
semi-automated forward obstacle collision avoidance system, which found that the semi-
automated system is not effective in avoiding collisions due to delayed or inappropriate 
action by the driver as the avoidance system was triggered by driver’s intention (Itoh et al., 
2013). The difference in results between an automotive context and other domains is 
apparent as a simulation study (automated cabin air management system) requiring the 
operator to take active control found contrary results to studies in driving context 
(Chavaillaz et al., 2016a). 
Differing comprehension of working processes (between designer and user, i.e., driver) of 
automated systems can lead to incorrect use of these systems by the driver. Automation, if 
used incorrectly, can lead to catastrophic consequences. Many aircraft accidents have 
occurred as a result of pilots using the automated systems in an aircraft (e.g. autopilot) in 
situations for which they were not designed (Sparaco, 1995). Drivers engaging ACC without 
full knowledge of the system’s true capabilities, use it in conditions like fog, rain, steep 
curves and forget to override the ACC system leading to accidents or near misses 
(Hoedemaeker, 2000). As described in section 3.3, incorrect use (misuse or disuse) of 
automated system has resulted in many fatal and severe accidents in other industries too. 
In section 3.6, the author discusses approaches to ensure drivers’ “correct” use of the 
automated systems by calibrating the drivers’ trust on the automated system to the 
appropriate level as per the system capabilities and limitations. 
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3.6. Conceptual model for driver-automation interaction 
One of the most widely used models for human-automation interaction developed from 
experiences in the aviation and manufacturing industry was proposed by V. Riley (Riley, 
1996). When Riley’s framework for the use of automated systems is applied in the 
automotive context, two aspects are inadequate. Firstly, interaction in an automotive context 
is fundamentally different from aviation and manufacturing (as discussed earlier). Secondly, 
while Riley’s study consisted of a game-based experiment, it failed to capture an essential 
factor of “risk” or “felt-cost” for the user in the use of an automated system. In this section, 
the author presents a conceptual model for the development of trust on automated systems in 
the driving context and also for drivers’ use of automated systems. 
3.6.1. Trust 
Trust is one of the most crucial factors for the driver to use the automated system (Lee and 
Moray, 1992; Lewandowsky et al., 2000; Muir and Moray, 1996; Parasuraman and Miller, 
2004; Parasuraman and Riley, 1997; Walker et al., 2016). Drivers will give up control of a 
vehicle to an automated system, only if they trust the automated system (Muir, 1987). In an 
experiment where participants were given the choice to use different levels of automation, 
participants chose to use lower levels of automation for 95% of the time (Sauer et al., 2013). 
Participants chose higher manual control than to give-up control. An operator’s use of the 
system has been shown to be correlated with the subjective measure of trust in an automated 
system or sub-system (Muir and Moray, 1996). Drivers do not use a well-designed and 
highly capable automated system, if they find it untrustworthy (Parasuraman and Miller, 
2004). Ironically, misplaced trust (leading to misuse or disuse) in an automated system can 
lead to incorrect usage of the system (Parasuraman and Riley, 1997) with catastrophic 
consequences. For example Air France 447 crash (BEA, 2012), China Air 006 accident 
(NTSB, 1986), Überlingen mid-air collision (BFU, 2004), Three-Mile Island (Randolph et 
al., 1980) etc.  
Before discussing details of the development of trust, it is important to define trust in driving 
context. In order to define trust, the author adapts the definition of trust from Lee and See 
(2004) as, “a history dependent attitude that an agent will help achieve an individual’s goals 
in a situation characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability”. The addition of the reference 
to “history dependent” is particularly important for this work because prior knowledge 
about the system’s capabilities and limitations affects an individual’s attitude towards a 
system, thus affecting their trust. Trust is said to be influenced by various factors (Lee and 
See, 2004; Walker et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2014). Additionally, author proposes that this can 
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also include knowledge, certification, situation awareness, workload, self-confidence, 
experience, consequence and willingness. The addition of the history dependent context is of 
key importance and will be discussed in section 3.7, where the concept of calibration of trust 
is introduced. 
In order to reap the true benefits of an automated system, one needs the driver to develop 
appropriate trust to ensure “correct use” of the system (Lee and See, 2004; Parasuraman 
and Miller, 2004). Trust, like use of technology is influenced by many factors (Lee and See, 
2004; Xu et al., 2014). Within scientific literature, trust is often discussed as a single 
construct. However, inspired by Rajaonah et al. (2008) who suggest two forms of trust: trust 
in automation and trust in the cooperation with automation; for the automotive context, the 
author classifies trust quantitatively into two forms: 
 Trust in the system  
 Trust with the system 
“Trust in the system” means the drivers’ trust in the capabilities of the system and/or in the 
system’s ability to do what it is supposed to do. “Trust with the system” means drivers’ 
awareness or attitude towards the limitations of the systems and their subsequent ability to 
adapt their use of the system to accommodate for the limitations in order to deliver the 
expected benefit from the system. Trust with the system implicitly means that the drivers are 
aware about the true capabilities, and limitations of the system, and are able to adapt their 
usage to overcome the limitations of the system in real-time. This paradigm of trust is going 
to be adopted in this thesis. Similar to the use of technology, trust is influenced by many 
factors (Lee and See, 2004; Xu et al., 2014). These factors will be discussed in greater 
details in the next sections. 
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3.6.2. Knowledge 
In supervisory task domain, communication between the actors is key to development of 
trust (Ashleigh and Stanton, 2001; Stanton et al., 1997), by making the cooperation between 
the actors transparent (Casner et al., 2016; Nicola et al., 2013). In order to design a reliable 
system, the driver needs to be provided with the flexibility to cope up with an aberration 
rather than the constraints of an unknown system (Rasmussen, 1990). For a safe system, 
designers aim to have wide margins between normal operation and loss of control to enable 
easy detection of these boundaries by the driver. However, designers assume that the drivers 
will be aware about these margins and will be able to ensure reliable performance due to the 
flexibility being provided to them. This highlights an important requirement for driver-
automation interaction: the need to make the driver aware about system boundaries for safe 
operation (both initially, i.e. statically and dynamically). 
Knowledge about the automation capabilities and their current state encourage the 
development of trust. If the knowledge is factually correct and a true representation of the 
automation, it leads to the development of “appropriate trust”, leading to correct use of the 
system (by preventing disuse and misuse), and avoids introducing a false perception of 
capability, i.e., the driver having false expectations from the automated system or about 
system state (Sarter, 2008). The accuracy of the knowledge is especially important as it leads 
Figure 3.1: Framework for driver-automation interaction in automated systems in vehicles 
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to the formation of a mental model of the driver. A correct mental model of the system 
forms the basis of development of appropriate trust in/with the system (Kazi et al., 2007). 
Lenné et al. (2011) found in a driving simulator study that by providing training (imparting 
knowledge) to participants, appropriate use of the systems (larger following distance and 
reduced speed) could be induced. In a systems engineering world, where safety is considered 
a control problem, accidents are said to occur when the driver’s understanding of the 
automation (driver’s own understanding of the process model, i.e. driver’s interpretation of 
the working of the automated system), is inconsistent with the system’s actual (real time) 
process model (Leveson, 2017). Knowledge about the automated system is one of the factors 
that leads to the creation of driver’s mental model (process model) of the system 
(Rasmussen, 1983). For appropriate use of the system and successful deployment, the 
driver’s mental model needs to be aligned with system’s capabilities (Reimer et al., 2016; 
Xiong et al., 2012). A survey of 130 participants who were owners of a Volvo XC60 with an 
adaptive cruise control system as a feature, (Larsson, 2012) found that 40% of the 
respondents lacked knowledge about the ACC system’s (which is the simplest example of  
ADAS) limitations. Drivers need to understand the limitations of ACC systems, such as 
compromised performance around bends, or in adverse weather conditions, to safely use the 
systems (Rajaonah et al., 2006; Seppelt and Lee, 2007). A survey of 370 ACC owners, 
(Jenness et al., 2007) found that 72% of the customers were unaware of the warnings 
detailed by the manufacturer about the system’s limitations.  
With increasing automation, system complexity is bound to increase and drivers may be 
required to take-over in instances where the automation fails or is unable to deal with a 
situation. In such scenarios, drivers require accurate and comprehensible information about 
the system in order to appropriately supervise the system to ensure a safe take-over. Quality 
of supervision of an automated system by drivers is guided by drivers’ understanding of how 
the system behaves in complex situations, system failures, along with the knowledge and 
understanding of their own role in terms of human actions to ensure safety (Jamson et al., 
2013; Richards and Stedmon, 2016). Moreover, any failure occurring in an automated 
system does not negatively affect trust if the driver has the knowledge of the possibility of 
such failure(s) beforehand, i.e., is aware of the system limitations (Beggiato and Krems, 
2013). 
In the absence of knowledge of the system’s capability, operators find it hard to calibrate 
their trust level according to reliability of the system causing lower level of trust in 
automations (Chavaillaz et al., 2016b; Lee and See, 2004).  Based on literature (Bennett, 
2017; Biassoni et al., 2016; Feldhütter et al., 2016; Miller et al., 2016; Rasmussen, 1985; 
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Seppelt and Lee, 2007; Xu et al., 2014), the following classification for knowledge about 
automated systems is proposed: 
 Static knowledge: static knowledge refers to the understanding of the working of the 
automated system (Eichelberger and McCartt, 2014; Larsson et al., 2014) 
 Real time knowledge: refers to the real time information about the state of the 
automated system (Banks and Stanton, 2015; Eriksson and Stanton, 2017b; Louw 
and Merat, 2017; Miller et al., 2016; Seppelt and Lee, 2007) 
 Internal mental model: refers to understanding or influence of external sources (e.g. 
word of mouth, media etc.) (Biassoni et al., 2016), as drivers expect the ADASs and 
AD systems to behave as they were advertised (Casner et al., 2016). 
Providing information about the true capabilities of an automated system leads to the 
development of “appropriate trust” (Dzindolet et al., 2003) and helps drivers to make rule-
based and knowledge-based decisions. One of the key benefits of real-time knowledge is 
that it helps drivers make the correct knowledge-based decision by helping them select the 
correct rule from their rule set or adapt from it (Naujoks et al., 2014; Richards and Stedmon, 
2016). 
Louw and Merat (2017) demonstrated that by providing real time information about the 
reliability of an automated system, the driver could be brought back “in-to-the-loop”, as it 
provides a link between the driver and the system (Banks and Stanton, 2015). However, the 
absence of static knowledge about the workings of the system leads to the occurrence of 
mode error and the inability of the driver to respond to a situation appropriately (Banks and 
Stanton, 2015; Sarter, 2008), which leads to lack of “trust in the system” and “trust with the 
system”. Another dimension to knowledge is the accuracy of the information presented. If 
automation does not meet the initial expectations (information conveyed) about the 
automation capabilities, it can lead to disuse of automation and reduced “trust with the 
system”. This is due to the larger cognitive effort required to recalibrate driver’s mental 
model to have a correct representation of the system (Beggiato and Krems, 2013).  
The classification of knowledge into the three types is discussed in detail in chapter five in 
which results from two experimental studies (conducted as part of this research) exploring 
the role of knowledge in development of trust have been included. 
3.6.3. Certification 
In order to define “certification”, the author adopts the definition from IEEE 24765 (IEEE, 
2010) which defines “certification” as “a written guarantee that a system or component 
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complies with its specified requirements and is acceptable for operational use”. By 
definition, certification establishes the safety level of a system in a binary manner, with 
certified systems being safe and uncertified systems being unsafe. 
The existing literature fails to identify certification as an influencing factor for development 
of trust. The author’s proposed conceptual model introduces certification as a factor 
influencing “trust in the system” and is the basis of the “knowledge” required to inform 
“trust with the system”. Thus, certification or testing to certify a system plays a binary role 
in the development of trust in an automated system and helps form the static knowledge that 
should be imparted to the driver to develop “trust in the system” and “trust with the 
system”.  
A system which is certified “safe” and “tested” leads to the development of an inherent trust 
by the driver, i.e., the initial trust level.  In a study involving 54 participants to evaluate the 
antecedents of trust in technology via a questionnaire study, Xu et al. (2014) found that 
competence of the automation is one of the main factors leading to the development of trust 
in the automated system. This is in line with results from earlier studies which stated that 
trust varies as a function of system’s reliability (Muir and Moray, 1996).  
In order to create this knowledge, it is the responsibility of the manufacturer/legislative 
bodies to ensure that a certified system does ensure the safety in all possible scenarios or 
explicitly mentions the conditions under which it has been tested (Schöner et al., 2009). 
Thus, there is a need for the development of test scenarios and test methods for these 
systems in critical conditions (Hendriks et al., 2010). Existing testing methodologies fail to 
test systems exhaustively, in order to mitigate the occurrence of acute failures and 
establishing system limitations (discussed in Appendix 2). If an automated system is able to 
perform safely only in some situations, the system should be certified for only those 
situations and the driver needs to be explicitly informed about the certified abilities and 
working situations. This will form part of the static knowledge imparted to the drivers and 
aid their knowledge based decision making leading to higher “trust with the system” and 
“trust in the system”. The knowledge of limited capability provides drivers with the ability 
to predict potential system failures or aberrations which helps them better prepare to mitigate 
or prevent accidents due to system failures, thus increasing their “trust with the system”. 
In order to certify an automated system for all situations, it is important to identify all 
possible critical conditions by conducting an in-depth hazard analysis. Hazard analysis of 
automated systems with a driver-in-the-loop is still an open question which warrants further 
discussion. Thus, when a claim is being made for certification of an automated system, it is 
important to provide the context in which the certification has been made to provide accurate 
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information to the driver. The discussion about the method of knowledge creation or ways of 
testing and hazard identification have been discussed in chapter 6 and chapter 7. 
3.6.3.1. Good failures and bad failures 
In order to have a better understanding of the impact of certification, it is important to 
understand failures, their link with certification and subsequently drivers’ trust on automated 
systems. Adapted from (Itoh et al., 1999)’s classification of failures, the author classifies 
failures into two groups: good failures and bad failures. “Good” failures are those which are 
predictable, repeatable and are known to the driver. Good failures may occur during the 
usage of the system. However, the predictable and repeatable nature of these failures will 
inform the driver not to use the system under the conditions which caused the failure.  
“Bad” failures are those which are unpredictable, random, occur instantaneously and are 
hard to replicate. The aim of certification is to eliminate bad failures and identify good 
failures (i.e., system limitations) or to completely remove them by altering the systems in 
order to inform the driver of the system’s true capabilities. The need for the development of 
use case scenarios for testing automated systems in critical conditions stems from this 
requirement. The spontaneous nature of bad failures makes it difficult for the driver to 
predict the occurrence of the failure leading to decreased “trust with the system”, whereas 
the knowledge of good failures aids in the development of “trust in the system” and “trust 
with the system”. Additionally, knowledge of good failures allows the driver to form rules 
regarding dealing with the failure, eventually leading to a rule-based behaviour. An 
additional dimension to “good” failures and “bad” failures is the temporal aspect associated 
with their occurrence. The prediction time associated with a failure will ensure whether the 
driver has the ability to intervene or otherwise control the situation. Thus, while good 
failures are predictable, they also provide sufficient time for the driver to react to them to 
ensure safe operation of the vehicle. On the contrary, bad failures are unpredictable and thus 
spontaneous in nature. Recurring bad failures can lead to disuse of the system (Parasuraman 
and Riley, 1997). The unpredictable nature of the bad failures forces drivers to resort to 
knowledge based behaviour which calls for high cognitive load which causes a decrease in 
the level of “trust with the system”. The challenges involved in identifying “good failures” 
to reduce the occurrence of “bad failures” is discussed in detail in chapter 6. Methods to 
overcome these challenges are discussed in chapter 7 and chapter 8. 
3.6.4. Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness (SA) is an emergent property of a system and a key factor influencing 
designer’s design decision (Stanton et al., 2017). In the automotive context, SA is not only 
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crucial in helping the driver perform the new supervisory task due to introduction of 
automation, but also aids the ability of the driver to safely take back control when required 
(Beukel and Voort, 2017; Richards and Stedmon, 2016). SA affects both the development of 
trust and use of an automated system. With an increase in automation in systems, due to 
shifting of the driver’s driving task, there is a possibility of loss of situation awareness of the 
driver (Mouloua et al., 2001). Irrespective of the complexity of task, humans are said to be 
poor monitors of automated systems (Parasuraman, 1987). Lack of situation awareness can 
lead to catastrophic results; Northwest Airlines MD-80 crashed at Detroit airport on take-off 
due to incorrect flap and slats settings. In its report, the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) mentioned the failure of the automated take-off configuration warning 
system as the reason for the crash and the reliance of the crew on it. They failed to realize 
that the aircraft had been incorrectly configured and when the automation failed, they were 
not aware of the state of the automated system and other critical parameters (NTSB, 1988). 
Inadequate information conveyed to the driver about the state of an automated system or 
over trust on automated system could therefore lead to complacency. SA is classified into 
three levels (Mouloua et al., 2001): 
 Level 1 SA (SA1): perceiving critical factors in environment 
 Level 2 SA (SA2): understanding the meaning of the perceived factors (individually 
and collective) 
 Level 3 SA (SA3): predicting the future state of the automated system 
SA is important to understand the distinction between the three levels and its influence on 
trust and use of automated systems. This differentiation holds more value when taken into 
account with the levels of automation in the automotive context. As the level of automation 
increases, the need for higher levels of situation awareness also increases. For a level 3 
automated system, where the driver is supposed to take control in case of a system failure, 
the driver should have high level of level 3 SA and level 2 SA in order to anticipate a system 
failure and be ready for a manual takeover of the system. The ability to predict the future 
state of the automated system (level 3 SA) is developed as a result of the “knowledge” about 
the working of the automated system. 
While automation may provide more situation awareness at one of the levels, it may reduce 
SA for other levels. This is true in a situation where the operator/driver is provided raw 
information from all sensors (thus increasing SA1), however, reducing their ability to 
comprehend the presented information (thus reducing SA2). Careful design and 
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consideration needs to be employed and a holistic approach needs to be adopted to increase 
situation awareness (SA1-3). 
Situation awareness can vary with different levels of automation. A study by Endsley and 
Kiris (1995) found that situation awareness was reduced under fully and semi-automated 
systems than under manual control of an automobile navigation task. Interestingly, however, 
only SA2 (knowledge) was negatively impacted and SA1 remained unaffected. Although the 
drivers perceived the information (SA1), they were unable to understand it (SA2). Stanton et 
al. (2011) demonstrated that for a Stop & Go ACC system, by providing a representation of 
the radar system (representing SA2), drivers had higher detection rates for targets as 
compared to iconic display or flashing iconic display (representing SA1).  
Norman (1990) suggested that feedback from automation is an aspect of keeping the 
operator engaged in the control loop. Automation of various tasks leads to new forms of 
feedback. However, the question remains unanswered on what is the correct form of 
feedback. For example, the introduction of electronic fly-by-wire flight controls in the F-16 
fighter aircraft planes led to inappropriate control as the vibration which came through the 
flight stick was missing (even though the information was presented clearly on the visual 
displays). This led to the introduction of artificial “stick shakers” on the fly-by-wire systems 
to provide the appropriate feedback. Feedback such as situation awareness can be assumed 
to have different levels. Feedback of raw information can broadly lead to the development of 
SA1. Feedback from a “correctly” designed information display augmented by other forms 
(like auditory or haptic) can lead to correct knowledge and understanding of the information 
(i.e., development of SA2). The author proposes the following classification for feedback: 
 Level 1 Feedback (FB1): feedback of raw information 
 Level 2 Feedback (FB2): feedback of correct integrated (process) information   
FB1 would increase SA1, while FB2 would increase both SA1 and SA2. While FB2 should 
be used most commonly for drivers, the author proposes that the drivers should have an 
ability to request for FB1 to aid their knowledge based behaviour in unfamiliar situations. 
SA2 is more important as drivers do not always possess the technical knowledge to 
understand the raw information and need to be presented with comprehensive processed 
information which may aid in their skill-based and rule-based behaviours. This differs from 
information presented to pilots; because pilots undergo appropriate training, they are better 
technically equipped to process raw information too. Thus, for aviation pilots both FB1and 
FB2 are important. “Correctly” designed information which may be provided to the driver 
by means of visual display or auditory message or haptic warning, can lead to correct 
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knowledge and understanding of the information (development of level 1 and level 2 SA). 
An in-vehicle speech assistant system (which provides process information to the driver) 
was found to increase situation awareness of drivers while positively affecting emotions too 
(Jeon et al., 2015). Type of feedback can be unimodal (Mohebbi et al., 2009) or multimodal 
(Biondi et al., 2017). Multi-modal feedback can be especially useful in conveying the 
urgency of the situation (hazard mapping) by manipulating the mode parameters, thus 
helping to achieve a cooperative teamwork between the driver and the automation (Dambock 
et al., 2013). 
3.6.5. Self-Confidence 
Various authors (Chavaillaz et al., 2016a; Lee and See, 2004; Lewandowsky et al., 2000; 
Riley, 1996) have discussed the role of self-confidence in trust and use of automated 
systems. Higher self-confidence is shown to cause lower use of automation (Riley, 1996). 
This suggests that high self-confidence has an influencing role on the decision to use 
automation. Furthermore, low self-confidence influences “trust in” the automated system. 
This can be explained as people having low self-confidence have more trust in the 
automated system’s abilities than their own abilities (Lewandowsky et al., 2000). While Lee 
and See (2004) did suggest the relation between trust and self-confidence influencing usage, 
they failed to distinguish between effects of low self-confidence and high self-confidence. 
High self-confidence results in low “trust in” the system which may or may not result in 
decreased use of the system, depending on the interaction of trust with other factors. 
3.6.6. Workload 
While some studies suggest that a decrease in workload due to automation can lead to an 
increase in situation awareness (Billings, 1991b), others suggest a more independent 
relationship between workload and situation awareness (Riley, 1996). Endsley (1996) 
suggests that workload has a negative impact on situation awareness, but only at high levels 
of workload. Parasuraman et al. (1993) showed that with increases in workload, there is a 
possibility for an increase in the “complacency” or over-trust in the automated system.  
Contrary to existing frameworks for driver’s use of automated systems, and based on 
literature focussed on driver workload (Merat et al., 2012; Young and Stanton, 2002), the 
author classifies workload into two categories as both have differing effect on the 
development of “trust with system” and use of an automated system: 
 Internal workload: this refers to the vigilance and mental effort involved in 
performing a task using automation and it affects “trust with the system”. With 
increases in internal workload, “trust with the system” decreases. 
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 External workload: this refers to any secondary task a driver may perform (e.g. 
texting, reading etc.). With increases in external workload, tendency to use 
automation increases. 
Monitoring of automated systems has been replete with issues of false alarms and warnings. 
This leads to the operator ignoring such alarms and reducing their level of “trust in the 
system”. Additionally, in the absence of knowledge, decreased automation reliability can 
also increase workload causing low levels of “trust with the system” (Chavaillaz et al., 
2016b; Dadashi et al., 2013). This is due to the higher cognitive effort required to recalibrate 
the driver’s mental model of the automated system to correspond to its true capabilities. 
Fuller (2005) suggested that driver task difficulty is inversely related to the difference 
between driver capability and driving task demand (i.e. workload). Collision or accidents 
tend to occur when task demands exceeds capability. Design of automation should thus aim 
to reduce workload while capability can be increased with experience or knowledge.  
3.6.7. Experience 
As discussed in section 3.6.1 and section 3.6.2, development of trust is a dynamic process. 
Trust in automation has been shown to increase with more experience with the automated 
systems (Beggiato et al., 2015; Chapman and Underwood, 2000; Hergeth et al., 2017).  In a 
real-world study involving 15 participants, Beggiato et al. (2015) demonstrated that trust has 
a non-linear relationship with experience – specifically a power function.  An experiment 
evaluating ACC usage by drivers, Pereira, Beggiato and Petzoldt (2015) found that the 
driver’s use of ACC increased with experience, but only on motorways and not on urban 
roads. This illustrates that drivers’ use and trust on automated systems is influenced by many 
factors. Irrespective of the age of the drivers, experience with automation helps build “trust 
with automation” and improves the quality of use of automated system. In a driving 
simulator study involving older (>=60years) and younger (<=28 year) drivers, Körber et al. 
(2016) demonstrated improved takeover quality with experience for both groups leading to 
less riskier manoeuvres between the first and the last situation. Similarly, Louw and Merat 
(2017) by measuring drivers’ gaze dispersion, revealed that drivers’ understanding of the 
system and hazardous situations increased with experience, leading to increased trust levels. 
It was found that after the first accident incident, the vertical gaze dispersion of the drivers 
reduced, indicating increased understanding of the system and possible hazards, and re-
calibration of drivers’ trust of the system. In a driving simulator study with 82 participants, 
Hergeth, Lorenz and Krems (2017) found that in a take-over scenario, trust in the automated 
system increased with experience in the second run. Experience helps calibrate the mental 
model of the driver to an appropriate and representative level leading to better driver 
performance (Lu et al., 2017). However, infrequent limitations or limitations which are not 
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experienced tend to “drop out” of the driver’s mental model. Thus, drivers need to be 
intelligently tutored to remind them about the system limitations to correctly shape their 
mental model (Beggiato et al., 2015). It has been demonstrated that with increasing 
experience, drivers’ workload decreases while using an automated system in complex 
situations (Paxion et al., 2015).   
The author classifies experience into two categories: 1) experience with the system 2) 
experience of the external environment. While the former has been discussed in the 
preceding text, experience with the external environment can lead to complacency due to 
over-trust (Marieke H. Martens and Fox, 2007). In a real-world study involving 20 
participants, Colonna et al. (2016) found that familiarity of external environment led to 
increased average speed among participants as compared to unfamiliar environments, thus 
leading to development of “trust in the system”. However, Martens and M. Fox (2007), and 
Martens and M. R. J. Fox (2007) found that with increase in (experience) familiarity of a 
route, driver’s glance duration at traffic sign decreases which led to less active information 
processing. This is due to the driver’s mental model which has resulted from experience. 
The pre-emptive nature of the mental model and decreased active information processing 
leads to losses in the situation awareness of the driver (SA2). When unexpected events 
occur, the mental model requires longer processing time, leading to higher cognitive loads to 
process the change in environment resulting in an inadequate or missing response. 
3.6.8. Consequence 
Automation of different types of tasks are affected differently by the presence and removal 
of the automation support (Cullen et al., 2013). Different tasks vary in their attributes (e.g. 
visual assistance, cognitive assistance, motor tasks etc.) and therefore the absence of 
automation has varied consequences. In a multiple task environment study, Cullen, Rogers 
and Fisk (2013) found that tasks which benefited the most due to the presence of automation 
(high criticality / low frequency tasks), were affected the most when automation was 
removed. It was found that a “felt-cost” or degree of consequence could affect the adoption 
of strategies and workload when dealing with complex situations (Paxion et al., 2015), with 
complex situations leading to higher workload levels. In an automotive context, it is hard for 
a driver to give-up control of the vehicle due the safety critical nature of the consequence. 
Thus, drivers are more accommodating of ADASs (assistance features) as compared to 
higher levels of automation. This may be because the degree of consequence is lower for 
assistance features as compared to higher levels of automation where they are expected to 
give-up control of the driving task for sustained periods of time. 
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3.7. Calibration of Trust 
Calibration of trust has been defined as “the process of adjusting trust to correspond to an 
objective measure of trustworthiness” (Muir, 1994). Furthermore, calibration of trust is a 
result of dynamic interactions between the driver and the automated system and the driver 
can be shown to have characteristic stages. Initial development of trust on a system is easier 
to build than recovery of trust after a failure has occurred in the automated system (Lee and 
Moray, 1992; Muir, 1987). 
Various stages of calibration of trust have been shown in Figure 3.2. However, it is 
important to note that the duration and rate of change of trust in each of the sections is a 
function of the type of automation, type of failure and the consequence of failure. The 
following stages characterize the process of calibration of trust on an automated system: 
 Stage A: Initial phase: Influenced by static knowledge and an internal mental model 
of the driver 
 Stage B: Loss phase: Influenced by failures (frequency and severity). The rate of 
decrease is influenced by the consequences of the failures 
 Stage C: Distrust phase. 
 Stage D and stage E: Recovery phase. 
 
 
As discussed in section 3.6.7, the development of trust has a non-linear relationship with 
failures (Beggiato et al., 2015).  However, the author suggests that the slope of the various 
stages is a design parameter and can be manipulated based on the factors discussed in 
Figure 3.2: Trust calibration graph: Representing trust hysteresis 
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section 3.6. In order to provide guidance to designers, the author proposes the concept of 
Trust Calibration Number (TCN). TCN has three aspects: 1) Area enclosed by the trust 
calibration graph, referred to as Area of uncertainty 2) Slope of stage B 3) slope of stages C, 
D and E. 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟
  =  Area of uncertainty + Fcn1(slope of stage B) – Fcn2(slope of stages C,D, E) 
𝑫𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏 𝑮𝒐𝒂𝒍: 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟) 
 
The area enclosed in the graph (Figure 3.2) is defined as the area of uncertainty. The smaller 
the area of uncertainty, the better the design of the automated system. A smaller area of 
uncertainty refers to fewer changes in trust levels and more predictable behaviour of the 
driver’s trust level. However, as area of uncertainty is a relative concept, in order to ensure 
high use of the automated systems, the absolute trust should also be high. Design goals for a 
design should potentially be to have a small area of uncertainty along with ensuring high 
initial trust. A smaller area of uncertainty can be achieved by either an original design of the 
system or by intervention methods to calibrate trust to an appropriate level. Reduction of the 
area of uncertainty can be achieved by various techniques depending on the cause of the 
reduction in the level of trust. A manifestation of each of the factors discussed in the 
framework for driver’s use of automated systems (Figure 3.1) can be used as an intervention 
method to calibrate level of trust to appropriate levels and prevent rapid degradation of trust. 
For example, informing the driver about the state/capability of the automated system in real 
time is one of the intervention methods. 
However, there are additional dimensions to trust development and they focus on the rate of 
trust development (in the recovery phase) and the rate of trust degradation (in the loss 
phase); both factors together comprise the Trust Calibration Number. The second term 
comprising TCN focusses on the rate of trust loss on a system. This is important as it affects 
the duration of the system use and reduces the potential benefits the system could provide if 
used. System design or intervention techniques should not only stem the loss of trust, but 
also monitor the rate of trust loss. The third term in TCN focusses on the rate of trust 
recovery. The faster the rate of trust recovery, the faster the driver would start using the 
system and potentially reap the benefit(s) of the system. Overall, as a designer, the design 
goal should be to minimize the TCN. A lower TCN signifies minimal changes in the level of 
trust on the automated system which is an ideal scenario for the use of the automated system. 
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The use of knowledge as an intervention method in the process of calibration of trust to 
increase “appropriate” use of ADAS and ADS (by preventing disuse and misuse) is 
discussed in Appendix A1 via a case example. 
 
3.8. Discussion: Identifying the research question 
In the past 30-40 years, the introduction of automation in various domains has led to a 
change in the role of the human performing a task. Ironically, this was coupled with many 
accidents occurring due to inappropriate design of automation or human error due to the 
changing role of the human in the task. Unfortunately, due to our inability to learn from 
accidents (Christophe and Coze, 2013), there has been a repeat of similar accidents after 20-
30 years. Therefore, the benefits realised from automation have come at the cost of human 
life. This highlights that designers and engineers still do not correctly understand the human-
automation interaction process and the need for more research in order to ensure future 
automated systems introduced in different domains are safe, and free from similar accident 
situations.  
Similar to other domains, automation in the automotive context offers many benefits, e.g. 
increased safety, reduced emissions, increased traffic throughput etc. However, to realise 
those benefits, drivers need to use the automated systems provided to them. While the 
introduction of automated systems in driving context has been quite recent, the industry has 
already seen two major issues: disuse (due to distrust or lack of trust) e.g. ACC in cars 
(Nakajima, 2008), and misuse (due to mistrust / over trust) e.g. the Tesla Autopilot fatal 
crash (NHTSA, 2017a). While discussing existing literature on use of automated systems (in 
sections 3.3 - 3.6), the author identified trust as a key factor influencing use. Therefore, the 
first research question to be discussed in this thesis is: 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 1 
How to increase “trust in/with” automation in vehicles? 
In order to facilitate the process of answering the research question, two research objectives 
were identified.  
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Research Objective One 
“To develop a conceptual model for development of drivers’ trust in automated driving 
systems” 
In order to ensure that drivers safely use automated systems (i.e. prevent the occurrence of 
human error) and have the correct level of trust in them, it is important to understand the 
factors affecting the development of trust and driver-automation interaction. An 
understanding of human-automation interaction (discussed in section 3.6) formed the base 
for understanding the factors affecting the development of trust and developing a conceptual 
model for the process of trust development. Thus, the first objective was met with the 
formulation of the conceptual model for drivers’ trust of automated systems in vehicles 
(presented in section 3.6) which is based on theoretical evidence. The model details various 
factors affecting the use of such systems and the development of trust in them. To the best of 
the author’s knowledge, the conceptual model presented in this thesis is the first attempt to 
comprehensively capture various factors influencing development of trust in automated 
systems in a driving context. 
As discussed in section 3.6.1, trust is one of the key factors influencing use of an automated 
system and in order to realise the benefits of automated systems, drivers need to use the 
automated systems. Having identified various factors affecting development of trust, the 
author then explored how to increase trust to the correct level (calibrate trust to the correct 
level) by using the factors as an intervention method. To manage the scope of the research, 
the author identified one of the factors as “knowledge”, which is discussed within the scope 
of the research. Thus, this formed the basis of the second research objective. 
 
Research Objective Two 
“To evaluate the effect of knowledge (static and dynamic) on calibration of trust” 
The author has suggested in section 3.8 that knowledge comprises of three factors: 1) static 
2) dynamic 3) internal mental model. While the latter is influenced by society, the first two 
components can be explicitly imparted to drivers as a part of system design. Thus, the 
second research objective was conceived to evaluate the effect of use of knowledge (static 
and dynamic) to calibrate trust. 
Static knowledge may be presented via drivers’ manual or a pre-use script. Dynamic 
knowledge may be presented to the drivers via a human-machine interface display to inform 
the driver about the true capabilities and limitations of the system. 
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3.8.1. Next research steps 
If knowledge (static or dynamic) is found to have a statistically significant increase in trust 
levels, then the next research step will involve exploring methods for creation of the 
knowledge required to calibrate trust. Review of methods for creation of knowledge and the 
associated research questions are identified in chapter 6. 
3.9. Summary 
While automated systems offer many benefits in non-automotive industries too where they 
have been introduced, e.g. aviation, nuclear, chemical process, railways etc., their 
introduction in these industries was coupled with many accidents, some of which have 
continued to repeat themselves. The introduction of automated systems in the automotive 
industry has had an exponential growth in last decade. Automation has potentially many 
benefits such as improved efficiency, reduced emissions and safety by changing the role of 
the conventional driver in the driving task. Ironically, the changing role of the driver during 
the driving task due to the introduction of automation has potential safety concerns if the 
systems are not used appropriately. While there is a need to ensure that the drivers use these 
systems, so that their potential benefits can be realized, it is more important to ensure that 
the drivers use the systems correctly and in a safe manner. According to the existing 
literature, trust is one of the key factors influencing drivers’ use of systems.  
In this chapter, the author has discussed existing literature on trust and factors influencing 
the development of trust. Moreover, the author has identified a gap in the literature on a 
possible intervention method to increase or calibrate trust to the appropriate level with the 
introduction of knowledge. The discussion on the means to create the knowledge reliably is 
presented in chapter 6 – 8, where creation of test scenarios and safety analysis have been 
discussed. 
3.9.1. Research Questions and Research Objectives 
Based on the review of the literature on trust in section 3.6, the following research questions 
(RQ) and their corresponding research objectives (RO) have been identified: 
RQ 1. How to increase “trust in/with” automation in vehicles? 
RO 1. To develop a conceptual model for development of drivers’ trust in 
automated driving systems 
RO 2. To evaluate the effect of knowledge (static and dynamic) on calibration of 
trust 
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In the next chapter (chapter 4), the author discusses the research methodology applied to 
answer the research questions and meet the research objectives identified in this chapter and 
in chapter one.  
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HOW TO MEET THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES?  
Chapter 4  
The Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In chapter three, the author had mentioned that two main challenges will be explored within 
the scope of this thesis. These being: 1) Trust and 2) Testing. Subsequently, the research 
methodology is also split into these two sections shown as Blue (Trust) and Orange 
(Testing) sections in Figure 4.1. 
While the concept of “informed safety” (green box in Figure 4.1) will be introduced in 
chapter 6, in summary it means informing the driver (via static and dynamic knowledge) 
about the true capabilities and limitations of the ADAS or ADS, and the real-time state of 
the ADAS or ADS. Informed safety needs to be created in a manner that the driver (human) 
correctly understands it. It is essential to ensure that a high level knowledge of the system’s 
working is conveyed and understood by the driver to ensure safe use of ADAS and ADS to 
maintain appropriate trust levels.  
In this chapter, the author discusses the research methodology undertaken to create informed 
safety and investigate its effect on drivers’ trust in automated driving systems. 
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Figure 4.1: Schematic representation of research methodology and research stages mapped to various research objectives 
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4.1. Research methodology 
The research methodology used to answer the three research questions (mentioned in chapter 
1) have been discussed in this chapter. In order to answer research question 1, two research 
objectives (RO 1 and RO 2) were created. Meeting research objective one led to the creation 
of a conceptual model for development of trust. Research objective two focussed on one 
factor (knowledge of true capabilities and limitations of ADAS and ADS) of the conceptual 
model and explored its effect on trust and led to the creation of the concept of “informed 
safety”. 
Research questions 2 and 3 were focussed on the creation of the content of knowledge (to be 
imparted to the drivers) in a reliable manner, with each of them being associated with two 
research objectives (RO 3-4 and RO 5-6 respectively).  
For RO 2, RO 3, RO 5 and RO 6, both qualitative and quantitative methods were used to 
evaluate the subjective response. For RO 4, qualitative methods were used. Figure 4.1 shows 
a schematic representation of the research methodology and the various research stages 
which are mapped to the individual research objectives. 
4.1.1. Methods for Research Question 1 (RQ 1) 
“How to increase “trust in/with” automation in vehicles?” 
In order to answer RQ 1, the author deployed a hybrid approach of literature review and 
driving simulator studies. Furthermore, two research objectives were created to answer 
research question 1 (as discussed in chapter 3) (blue section in Figure 4.1). 
4.1.1.1. RO 1: To develop a conceptual model for development of drivers’ trust in 
automated driving systems (via literature review) 
In order to develop a conceptual model for the development of trust in automated driving 
systems, the author needed to identify the factors that influence development of trust. To 
identify various factors, the author conducted a review of literature. The literature review 
encompassed literature from the aviation, process industry and the automotive domains. It 
was found that while extensive work had been done on the subject of human-automation 
interaction in the aviation and process industries domains, there was a limited understanding 
for the subject in the automotive domain. Additionally, various studies identified different 
aspects of human-automation interaction. Drawing inspiration from systems thinking, the 
intertwined nature of the relationships between the factors influencing human-automation 
interaction makes it essential to understand the concept as a whole (as a single system), 
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rather than evaluating individual factors independently. While effect of individual factors 
might be well understood separately, the interactions between factors could potentially 
display a different behaviour on development of trust. Thus, it was essential to develop a 
comprehensive conceptual model to understand the interactions between individual factors 
and trust on automated driving systems. 
Once factors were identified (as a result of the literature review in chapter 3), a conceptual 
model (Figure 4.2) was proposed by the author to understand the development of trust in the 
driving domain. The author’s focus in this thesis will be on one of the factors (from the 
proposed framework) influencing trust: knowledge. 
“Informed safety” (mentioned earlier and discussed in detail in chapter 6) comprises of both 
“static knowledge” and “dynamic (real-time) knowledge”, giving the driver the knowledge 
of the true capabilities and limitations of the systems. Based on the framework for 
development of trust, the author proposed the following hypothesis:  
“Trust increases with accurate “informed safety” (provided in a static and/or a dynamic 
manner).” 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Framework for development of trust  
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4.1.1.2. RO 2: To evaluate the effect of knowledge (static and dynamic) on calibration of 
trust (via driving simulator studies) 
In order to evaluate the hypothesis as stated in RO 1 (and also answer the research question 
1), RO 2 was designed and driving simulator studies were conducted to determine the 
relationship between static and dynamic knowledge with trust. Two separate studies were 
designed and conducted. Study one was designed to evaluate the relationship between static 
knowledge and trust. A driving simulator study involving 56 participants was conducted. 
Study six was designed to evaluate the relationship between dynamic knowledge and trust 
involving a 37 participants driving simulator study. In both the studies, participants 
experienced two different automated systems with contrasting capabilities. The studies were 
designed to evaluate the effect of “informed safety” on trust for two different systems (low-
capability and high-capability automation). Some tools and methodological aspects of both 
the studies were similar and are discussed in section 4.2 and section 4.3, while the unique 
aspects of each of the studies are discussed in chapter 6. 
One of the requirements for providing knowledge of the true capabilities and limitations of 
the ADS to the drivers leading to informed safety, was to create the knowledge in a reliable 
manner. To meet this requirement, research question two and research question three were 
created (discussed in chapter 6). 
4.1.2. Methods for Research Question 2 (RQ 2) 
“How to create test scenarios to establish the limitations of the automated driving systems?” 
In order to answer RQ 2, two research objectives (RO3 and RO4) were created: 
4.1.2.1. RO 3: To develop an understanding about the characteristics of a test scenario 
(for ADAS and ADS) (via literature review and semi-structure interview study) 
In order to develop test scenarios for ADAS and ADS, an understanding of the 
characteristics of a test scenario needed to be developed. This was done via a literature 
review of test scenario generation in different domains (like aviation, computer science and 
automotive) and by conducting a semi-structured interview study (study two) involving 
verification and validation experts in the automotive domain. Participants were recruited 
from UK, Germany, India, Sweden, and USA and across the automotive supply chain, in 
order to avoid biasing the data due to nature of participants’ organisations (OEM, tier-1 
supplier, academia etc.). 
Semi-structured interviews were adopted as they provide the flexibility to the interviewee to 
provide wider information and thus richer data, by enabling the formation of an 
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understanding between the interviewer and interviewee (Louise Barriball and While, 1994). 
Themes in the interview transcripts were identified via a coding analysis. 
4.1.2.2. RO 4: To develop a methodology for creating test scenarios (via case study) 
Scenarios present possible ways in which a system may be used to accomplish a desired 
function. After identifying the characteristics of test scenarios needed for ADAS and ADS, 
the author created a methodology to generate test scenarios. From the analysis of the semi-
structured interviews, it was concluded that for ADASs and ADSs, it is essential to test 
“how a system will fail” in addition to “how a system works”. Thus, based on the analysis of 
the semi-structured interview study, the author developed a two branched approach to test 
scenario definition: hazard based test scenario definition and requirements based test 
scenario definition. Requirements based test scenario definition has existed in the 
automotive industry and is a standard practice. In this thesis, the author focussed on hazard 
based test scenario definition or hazard based testing. 
Hazard based testing comprises of three steps: identification of hazards, creating test 
scenarios from hazards and classifying risks associated with the hazards reliably. For the 
first step (hazard identification), the author proposed the use of Systems Theoretic Process 
Analysis (STPA) as it captures the analysis of system interactions in the most efficient 
manner as compared to other hazard identification methods. For the second step, the author 
created an extension to the STPA process to create test scenarios. This (extension) process 
involves parametrizing elements of the STPA process outputs to create test scenarios. One of 
the features of the method created, is the ability to create both test scenarios and the pass/fail 
criteria for the test scenarios. To demonstrate the application of the created method, it was 
applied to a real-world system (low-speed automated driving system). 
To perform the third step of hazard based testing, i.e., classifying risk associated with the 
hazards reliably; led to the formulation of research question three. 
4.1.3. Methods for Research Question 3 (RQ 3) 
“How to improve the inter- and intra-rater-reliability of the automotive HARA process?” 
In order to impart knowledge of “informed safety” and its classification, there is a need to 
ensure that the “informed safety” concept is reliable. Reliability refers to the “extent to 
which a framework, experiment, test, or measuring instrument yields the same results over 
repeated trials” (Pg.11) (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). This suggests that the process of 
creation of the knowledge (necessary to create informed safety), i.e., hazard identification 
and risk classification and the manner in which the systems are tested, needs to be reliable. 
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Since the hazard identification and test scenario method have been discussed in RQ2, 
reliability of the risk classification process which forms part of the dynamic knowledge is 
explored in this research objective. 
At the onset this seems to be a trivial problem, however the author demonstrates via 
literature review (from non-automotive domains) and conducted studies, that even experts in 
the field vary in their understanding and implementation which may lead to unreliable 
results for hazard classification in the automotive domain. To address this unreliability in the 
automotive Hazard Classification and Risk Assessment (HARA), the author created a rule-
set for objectively performing HARA, i.e., classifying hazards for automated driving 
systems. To answer research question three, two research objectives (RO 5 and RO 6) were 
created: 
4.1.3.1. RO 5: To develop a rule-set for conducting automotive HARA (via literature 
review, driving simulator study and feedback from international functional 
safety experts) 
To develop a rule-set for automotive HARA, the author parametrized the three different 
aspects of an automotive HARA (severity, exposure and controllability ratings).  
Controllability is defined as “an estimate of the probability that the driver or other persons 
potentially at risk are able to gain sufficient control of the hazardous event, such that they 
are able to avoid the specific harm” (ISO, 2018b). Exposure is defined as the “state of being 
in an operational situation that can be hazardous if coincident with the failure” (ISO, 
2018b). Severity is defined as an “estimate of the extent of harm to one or more individuals 
that can occur in a potentially hazardous situation” (ISO, 2018b). 
In order to identify the parameters for severity, exposure and controllability ratings, 
literature review, review of existing standards and accident data were conducted. The rule-
set was further re-calibrated (like introduction of new parameters, removal of certain 
parameters etc.) based on the feedback from international functional safety experts. 
Additionally, one of the key parameters identified for the controllability rating was vehicle 
speed. To establish the rule-set for controllability (with respect to speed of the vehicle), the 
author performed a driving simulator study involving 44 participants (study two) where 
participants experienced three different speeds (low, medium and high). The details of the 
study are discussed in appendix three. The objective method created was then applied on to a 
real-world example (low-speed automated driving system, e.g. pod) via a series of 
workshops. 
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4.1.3.2. RO 6: To determine the ability of the developed rule-set for HARA in improving 
the reliability of the automotive HARA (via workshop studies: study four and 
study five) 
After the creation of the rules for objective HARA (meeting RO 5), the rule-set was then 
applied on to a real-world example (low-speed automated driving system, e.g. pod) via a 
series of workshops to establish its effectiveness. Study four and study five were conducted 
to establish the basis of the hypothesis and then validate the rule-set created by the author. 
Both the studies were conducted with international safety analysis experts (from UK, US, 
Sweden, Hungary, Australia, Italy, Japan and Germany) in order to ensure that the opinions 
of the automotive industry experts from different countries were captured.  
In order to evaluate the reliability challenges, it was important to gather responses from 
experts from different backgrounds (country, automotive supply chain hierarchy etc.). In 
order to tackle this challenge, international conferences were identified as a platform where 
functional safety experts would come together at the same time. In order to answer the 
research question 3 (improving reliability of automotive HARA) and to meet the research 
objective 6, the study required safety experts to perform HARA multiple times and in 
different groups. Therefore, it was decided to use a “workshop” format with multiple rounds 
as a way of getting experts to perform the HARA. The workshop was inspired from the 
World Café method (Fouche and Light, 2011). The world café method was used as it keeps 
the participants engaged in the task given to them and also allows to mix participants to form 
new groups (which was essential to evaluate the reliability challenges of the automotive 
HARA).  
The workshops were conducted at international conferences in US and Germany. The 
workshops in UK and Sweden were conducted by inviting industrial contacts of the author 
which were made during his time in the industry, and while attending various international 
conferences. Study four was an initial study to evaluate the hypothesis of the existing 
reliability challenges involved with automotive HARA process. Study five consisted of a 
series of workshops conducted in Sweden, Germany and the UK. The countries hosting the 
workshops (and conferences) were selected on the basis of their active work in the area of 
functional safety and automated driving. Feedback from safety experts was captured from 
each of the workshops and was incorporated in the rule-set and the experiment design of the 
subsequent workshops. Study four and study five are discussed in greater detail in chapter 8. 
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4.2. Driving simulator studies 
A driving simulator was used as a tool for studies (discussed in this thesis) to meet the 
research objectives in both the themes of this thesis (trust and testing), general information 
about the driving simulator is discussed in this section. More detailed information (specific 
to each study) is discussed in chapter 5 (for trust studies: study one and study six) and 
appendix 3 (for controllability study: study two).  
Driving simulators offer benefits over real-world driving studies. Specifically, relevant for 
this thesis, the principal reasons for choosing driving simulator as a tool for this research 
were: 
 Putting the participants in a driver-in-the-loop environment where they are 
immersed in the simulation environment leading them to behave in a similar 
manner as real world driving (Underwood et al., 2011) 
 Possibility of putting the participants in a dangerous / hazardous driving situation 
while ensuring they do not experience any physical harm 
For the driving simulator studies presented in this thesis, WMG’s 3xD driving simulator was 
used (WMG, 2017). The 3xD simulator offers a unique platform for system validation, as 
well as for driver behaviour studies around autonomous vehicles with varied levels of 
automation. The WMG’s 3xD simulator provides a 360° Field of View (FoV) which helps 
immerse the participants in a driver-in-the-loop simulation environment. Apart from the 
reasons for choosing a driving simulator (mentioned above), the choice of using the 3xD 
simulator was the ability to control the simulation (i.e., simulation entities like ego vehicle, 
other vehicles, environment, pedestrians etc.) in real-time. Details about the WMG 3xD 
simulator have been discussed in Appendix 2. 
4.2.1. Driving Scenarios 
Scenario creation in the 3xD simulator is a two-step process: 
 World generation: this step creates the base map for the simulation environment 
which involves the road layout, traffic light layout and buildings (Figure 4.3) 
 Adding scenario entities to the world: this step adds the dynamic entities of the 
scenario like other vehicles, pedestrians, cyclists etc. (Figure 4.4) 
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One of the key learnings on scenario design from study one was the finding that steep turns 
and roundabouts have the potential to increase chances of participants experiencing 
simulator sickness. This learning was incorporated in the scenario design for study six in 
which sweeping turns were used. 
4.2.2. Questionnaires used in driving simulator studies  
Study one, study two and study six used questionnaires to collect participants’ subjective 
ratings for trust on an automated system, simulator sickness, and the workload during 
experiment runs, and acceptance of the system under evaluation. Since the trust and 
Figure 4.3: World Generator grid environment (with tiles of different road types) 
Figure 4.4: Scenario Editor Environment with dynamic elements (vehicle, vehicle path and event triggers) 
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workload questionnaires were used only for the studies evaluating trust (study one and study 
six), their details have been discussed in chapter five. 
Self-reported questionnaires are used to collect subjective data from people in a time and 
cost efficient manner. However, it is important to ensure that correct language and an easy to 
understand terminology is used in the questionnaire. A sub-standard questionnaire could 
potentially confuse the participants by using technical jargon or open ended questions, thus 
compromising the quality of the collected data.  
All driving simulator studies required participants to fill the Simulator Sickness 
Questionnaire (SSQ) (SSQ) (Kennedy et al., 1993), during and at the end of the study. This 
was done to evaluate the onset of simulator sickness and monitor participant comfort due to 
the simulation environment by making a judgement based on the SSQ scores reported 
between two runs. This was also a way to ensure that the subjective trust and workload 
ratings weren’t affected by the driver experiencing simulator sickness. In case any of the 
participants felt simulator sickness, the subjective ratings for that run were discarded and not 
included in the study’s analysis. 
Simulator Sickness Questionnaire 
In order to ensure that ratings collected during the studies correspond to participant’s true 
perception of the system, it is important to ensure that the participants are in a good state of 
mind. During any driving simulator study, there is always a possibility for the onset of 
simulator sickness which can affect any subjective ratings provided by participants rendering 
them unusable for study analysis as they would be influenced by simulator sickness. 
Therefore, it is important to measure the onset of simulator sickness during any driving 
simulator study at different points in time. In order to measure simulator sickness, the author 
used the well-established Simulator Sickness Questionnaire. Participants were asked to fill 
the SSQ after experiment runs in study one (trust and static knowledge), study two 
(controllability and speed) and study six (trust and dynamic knowledge). In case there were 
three or more moderate ratings after any experiment run, the study was stopped. 
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4.3. Ethical and practical considerations 
4.3.1. Ethical considerations 
Since study 1-6 involved human participants, ethical approval was secured from University 
of Warwick’s Biomedical & Scientific Research Ethics Committee (BSREC). All data 
gathered from the studies was treated in accordance with the University of Warwick’s Data 
Protection Policy and participant’s confidentiality was maintained. Informed consent was 
obtained from all participants. 
Learnings from study one and study two (first two driving simulator studies) were 
incorporated in the design of study six (third and last driving simulator study) in order to 
reduce the onset of simulator sickness. These learnings influenced scenario design and 
simulator setup. From study one and study two, it was noticed that roundabouts (with > 90 
degree turns) and sharp cornering manoeuvres increased the onset of simulator sickness. 
Therefore, the scenario design of study six had only sweeping corners and only two 
roundabouts with 90 degree turns at slow speed (<20 miles per hour). Additionally, in order 
to increase the immersion of the participants in the driving simulator, additional seat 
vibration feedback was given to participants which replicated high frequency road feedback 
which drivers experience in normal road driving conditions. Due to these modifications in 
study design, study six had a low drop-out rate. 
Figure 4.5: Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (adapted from (Kennedy et al., 1993)) 
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4.3.2. Practical considerations 
Since none of the studies provided monetary compensation to the participants for their 
participation, care was taken to limit the duration of each of the study runs and the 
interviews. 
4.4. Summary 
In this chapter, an overview of the various stages of the research undertaken to answer the 
research questions and meet the research objectives has been presented. While illustrating 
the two themes of the thesis, the research methods adopted for each of the individual themes 
have been discussed. Both qualitative and quantitative methods have been used, which 
together provide a robust approach towards meeting the research objectives of creating and 
evaluating the effect of informed safety on trust. 
65 
 
CALIBRATING TRUST ON AUTOMATED DRIVING 
SYSTEMS WITH INFORMED SAFETY2 
Chapter 5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Having discussed the factors influencing trust on automated driving systems in chapter 3 and 
introduced the concept of “informed safety” in chapter 4, the author will discuss how 
informed safety aids in developing appropriate trust on automated driving systems. While 
defining trust in chapter 3, the author mentioned that trust is a history dependent construct, 
suggesting its dynamic nature. The dynamic nature of trust lends support to the concept of 
calibration of trust which has been defined as “the process of adjusting trust to correspond 
to an objective measure of trustworthiness” (Muir, 1994). In chapter 3, the author 
introduced the five stages of calibration of trust: initial phase (stage 1), loss phase (stage 2), 
distrust phase (stage 3) and recovery phase (stage 4 and stage 5) and the concept of trust 
calibration number (TCN) as a design goal. The design goal being to minimize trust 
calibration number by using various intervention strategies to calibrate the trust to a high and 
appropriate level. There can be various intervention methods to potentially increase /adjust 
trust in different stages of calibration. One potential intervention method could be the use of 
knowledge to: 
                                                     
2 Contents of this chapter have been published in the following publications: 
 
Khastgir, S. et al. (2018a) ‘Calibrating trust through knowledge: Introducing the concept of informed 
safety for automation in vehicles’, Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies. Elsevier, 
96, pp. 290–303. doi: 10.1016/j.trc.2018.07.001. 
 
Khastgir, S. et al. (2019) ‘Effect of Knowledge of Automation Capability on Trust and Workload in 
an Automated Vehicle: A Driving Simulator Study’, in Advances in Human Aspects of 
Transportation. AHFE 2018. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing. Springer, Cham, pp. 
410–420. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-93885-1_37. 
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a) develop high level of initial trust (in stage 1) by providing accurate static knowledge 
about the automation capabilities and limitations (trust in the system) 
b) stem the loss of trust (in stage 2) by complementing static knowledge with dynamic 
(real-time) knowledge about the automation health, intentions and real-time 
capabilities (trust with the system)   
In this chapter, the author discusses the use of knowledge (static and dynamic) as an 
intervention method to calibrate trust to the “appropriate” level. Thus, meeting the Research 
Objective (RO) 2 identified in chapter 3 (which answers in part the research question 1 
(identified in chapter 3) : 
Research Objective 2 
“To evaluate the effect of knowledge (static and dynamic) on calibration of trust.” 
5.1. Introduction 
While introduction of automation assumes the removal of human error, in fairness it only 
shifts the human error from the driver to the designer of the system (Bainbridge, 1983). Muir 
(1994) has suggested that as the automation capability or reliability increases, trust on 
automation also increases. Thus, conveying designers’ assumptions about the system design 
(via static or dynamic knowledge) to drivers (users) is essential. However, a mismatch 
between drivers’ perception and expectations about the capability of the automated system, 
and the designers’ assumptions can lead to misuse (due to mistrust), disuse (due to distrust) 
or abuse of the automated system (Parasuraman and Riley, 1997). Misuse is a situation when 
the driver uses the automated systems for tasks it was not designed to perform and is caused 
due to mistrust, thus making the situation more unsafe than manual driving. Disuse is a 
situation when the driver doesn’t use the system in situations where the automation is 
suitable to use due to distrust or dislike in the system, thus not benefiting from the system. 
Thus, in order to ensure appropriate use of the system, it is essential to calibrate drivers’ 
trust on the system to the appropriate level. Trust on automation is one of the most important 
factors influencing use of automation (Lee and Moray, 1992; Muir, 1987; Muir and Moray, 
1996; Parasuraman and Miller, 2004; Parasuraman and Riley, 1997; Rudin-Brown and 
Parker, 2004; Walker et al., 2016). 
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5.1.1. Knowledge: a factor influencing trust 
In order to have appropriate trust, is it important to convey the designer’s assumptions about 
the safe boundaries of the system to the driver. The knowledge of these boundaries provides 
the ability to have a safe cooperation with the automated system (Beller et al., 2013). In the 
absence of such knowledge, drivers may not be able to calibrate their trust to an appropriate 
level (Chavaillaz et al., 2016b; Lee and See, 2004). In chapter three, the concept of “good 
failures” has been discussed which have negligible impact on trust. As discussed earlier in 
chapter three, good failures are those whose occurrence is predictable, which allows the 
driver to be prepared to accommodate for it. Predictability of failures of an automated 
system comes with knowledge about the true capabilities and limitations of the system. 
For complex systems requiring supervision, it has been argued that there is a need for an 
abstraction hierarchical representation of knowledge of the functional properties of the 
system (Rasmussen, 1985). The abstraction hierarchy can potentially be done on two fronts. 
The first category is a whole/part of the system hierarchy, in which the system is viewed as a 
number of interacting sub-systems working together at different physical levels (Rasmussen, 
1985). The second category suggested in Rasmussen’s hierarchical knowledge 
representation is the abstraction of the functionality (Rasmussen, 1985). The physical form 
of the system represents the lowest level of abstraction. Moving up through the levels, 
physical functions represents the next level, next is generalized functions, abstract functions 
forms the penultimate level with functional purpose forming the highest level of knowledge 
abstraction. The higher abstraction levels do not just represent the abstraction of physical 
form, they provide knowledge about the control laws for the interactions of the functions at 
the lower levels. Moving up the abstraction levels provides a purpose of the task for the level 
below, while moving down the levels provides information about how the task will be 
achieved.  
When put in a driving context, the lower levels of abstraction represent the operational (as 
per Michon (1985)) driving task (means to a desired end goal) while the higher levels of 
abstraction represent the tactical and strategic driving tasks (defining the desired end goal). 
As priority is always given to higher levels of abstraction, a driver has to make a trade-off 
between the end goal (tactical / strategic goals) and means to achieve it (operational goals), 
to ensure the means to achieve the goal (lower levels of abstraction) lie within the safe 
boundaries of the system. In a manual driving task, such a trade-off has clear boundaries and 
represents a causal system (Rasmussen, 1985). The introduction of automation makes the 
driving task and the system more complex with blurred boundaries and no simple 
relationship between function and physical processes making it difficult to represent them as 
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a causal system. Such systems are referred to as intentional systems. For intentional systems 
(ADAS and AD systems), decision making requires knowledge about the system, its 
limitations and the actual input to the system (from the environment) and a top-down 
approach to control the system in a safe manner (Rasmussen, 1985). 
5.1.1.1. Types of knowledge 
In chapter three, three types of knowledge about capabilities and limitations of the systems 
has been proposed based on literature (Bennett, 2017; Biassoni et al., 2016; Feldhütter et al., 
2016; Miller et al., 2016; Rasmussen, 1985; Seppelt and Lee, 2007; Xu et al., 2014). These 
are: 
 Static knowledge: Understanding of the functionality of the automated system 
(intentions behind the design of the system and functionality) (Eichelberger and 
McCartt, 2014; Larsson, 2012). Static knowledge is administered prior to the driving 
task and is akin to an owner’s instruction manual, however with information at a 
higher abstraction level. Over time, a person can also build up static knowledge 
based on experiences. Knowledge of the limitations of the system leads to “good 
failures” or predictable failures enabling the driver to be prepared for such 
situations. 
 Real time knowledge: or dynamic knowledge about the automated system (e.g. 
automation health, current state of the automation, near-future intentions of the 
automation). With the help of real-time information about the automated system 
health, drivers can be brought back “in-to-the-loop” (Louw and Merat, 2017), as it 
helps increase their awareness (Banks and Stanton, 2015) and increase transparency 
in the cooperation between humans and automation (Eriksson and Stanton, 2017b). 
While in-vehicle information systems (IVISs) are known to have detrimental effect 
on driving performance (Peng et al., 2014), they have a potential to have a 
contrasting effect in an automated vehicle as the driver is not actively involved in 
the driving task. Real time knowledge during repeated driving cycles leads to 
supplemental static knowledge of the driver about the capability and limitations of 
the system as it forms part of the consciously imparted knowledge driver brings to 
the next use of the automated system. Similar to static knowledge, real-time 
knowledge about the system limitations enables the driver to predict failures (good 
failures) and be prepared to overcome such situations. 
 Internal mental model: Prior beliefs influenced of external sources (e.g. word of 
mouth, media etc.). Marketing of an automated system can affect the public trust and 
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perception towards the product. This can potentially backfire if the information 
provided in marketing material is inaccurate as customers expect the systems to 
function as advertised (Casner et al., 2016). Inaccurate information can potentially 
cause over-trust or mistrust in the system. Internal mental model is the pre-
conceived notion a person brings to the first use of automation, without any 
conscious effort to understand the system. While internal mental model is influenced 
by other sources, static knowledge is consciously imparted to a person prior to the 
use of automation. 
Comparing the presented knowledge classification with Rasmussen’s abstraction hierarchies, 
the author suggests that static knowledge helps adopt a top-down approach, while dynamic 
knowledge helps adopt a bottom-up approach. Static knowledge further provides the ability 
to shift the decision making to a higher level or a lower abstraction level depending on the 
level of dynamic knowledge provided to the driver, i.e. to facilitate the user to more easily 
transition between levels of the abstraction hierarchy. With the introduction of automation, 
complexity of system increases, requiring drivers to demonstrate top-down (mean-end) 
reasoning approach to accommodate for deviations in performance while receiving 
knowledge about the operational driving parameters (bottom-up knowledge) (Rasmussen, 
1985), to demonstrate their knowledge-based behaviour due to unfamiliar nature of the 
situations (Rasmussen, 1983). The significance of the abstraction hierarchies can be further 
illustrated by the fact that causes of failures or incorrect function are explained by a bottom-
up approach whereas the reasons for the proper function are explained by a top-down 
approach  (Rasmussen, 1985). 
Qualitatively, knowledge can potentially be classified into: 1) signals 2) signs and 3) 
symbols (Rasmussen, 1983). Signals which display time-space sensory data, help the drivers 
demonstrate skill-based behaviour (based on intuition and experience). While signs indicate 
towards a stored rule, they do not provide the ability for drivers to process the situation in 
case a stored rule does not exist in their mental model. Symbols on the other hand represent 
the relationship between signs and provide the ability for drivers to demonstrate their 
knowledge-based behaviour and process the information to create a new rule (by shifting the 
processing to a higher or a lower level of abstraction). Signals, signs and symbols increase 
situation awareness (SA) of the driver. In chapter three, three levels of situation awareness 
(SA1, SA2, SA3)  have been discussed. Knowledge-based behaviour enables the 
development of Level 3 SA, enabling the driver to predict future state of the automated 
system. 
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5.1.2. Creation of knowledge: identifying failures 
While, as described above, providing knowledge to the drivers has a potential of increasing 
trust, it needs to be stressed that the accuracy of the knowledge provided is key. Inaccurate 
knowledge plays a detrimental role in development of trust as it takes additional cognitive 
effort on the part of drivers to re-calibrate their mental model (initially formed in accordance 
to the inaccurate knowledge) to the true capabilities of the system as they experience the 
system (Beggiato and Krems, 2013).  
In order to create the knowledge of the true capabilities and functionality of the automated 
system (i.e., to identify failures), it is essential to conduct a thorough verification and 
validation process. Moreover, due to the safety critical nature of ADAS and AD systems, 
their deployment needs to be preceded by extensive testing to establish their safety level and 
performance boundaries (Sepulcre et al., 2013). In chapter three, it was suggested that the 
identification of failures helps classify them as “good failures” as it provides a level of 
predictability about them and thus do not have a detrimental effect of trust (Lee and See, 
2004). However, knowledge creation about the capabilities and limitations of ADAS and 
ADS faces reliability challenges (discussed in chapter six) and validation challenges which 
include challenges in test methods and test setup (discussed in chapter two, six and appendix 
A2). The approach to knowledge creation reliably which is an important part of the process 
of development of trust will be discussed in detail in chapter seven and chapter eight. 
While defining trust in chapter 3, it was proposed that trust is a history dependent construct, 
suggesting its dynamic nature. The author adopts the definition of calibration of trust as “the 
process of adjusting trust to correspond to an objective measure of trustworthiness” (Muir, 
1994). In chapter three, five stages of calibration of trust were introduced. These are: initial 
phase (stage 1), loss phase (stage 2), distrust phase (stage 3) and recovery phase (stage 4 and 
stage 5). There can be various intervention methods to potentially increase/adjust trust in 
different stages of calibration. In this chapter, the use of static and dynamic knowledge as an 
intervention method in the process of calibration of trust has been discussed. 
5.2. Research Objective 
Many authors have studied the effect of reliability (or automation capability) on trust on the 
system (Chavaillaz et al., 2016b; Muir, 1994; Muir and Moray, 1996), suggesting that with 
increased reliability, trust increases. However, there is no published research on the effect of 
static knowledge of automation capability on trust in a driving context (both “trust in the 
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system” and “trust with the system”). With the help of driving simulator studies, the 
Research Objective (RO) 2 identified in chapter 4 has been answered in this chapter: 
“To evaluate the effect of knowledge (static and dynamic) on calibration of trust” 
In order to answer the above mentioned objective, two driving simulator studies were 
planned and conducted. The first study evaluated the relation between static knowledge and 
trust (discussed in section 5.3) and the second study evaluated the relation between dynamic 
knowledge and trust (discussed in section 5.4). 
5.3. Calibrating Trust with Static Knowledge (study one) 
5.3.1. Method 
5.3.1.1. Driving Simulator 
The experimental study was conducted in WMG’s 3xD simulator for Intelligent Vehicles at 
the University of Warwick, UK (WMG, 2017). The 3xD simulator consists of a Land Rover 
Evoque Built-Up Cab (BUC) which is housed inside a cylindrical screen of 8 m diameter 
and 3 m height. The cylindrical screen provides a 360⁰ field of view for the driver siting 
inside the BUC. A push button (with a backlight) (akin to an emergency stop button within a 
highly autonomous vehicle) was connected (hardwired) to a Raspberry Pi 2 board which in 
turn was connected to the 3xD simulator through a TCP/IP client-server interface. When the 
participants pressed the button, the backlight switched-off and the vehicle applied 
emergency braking and came to a stop. When the participant pressed the button again, the 
emergency brake was released and vehicle continued to drive in autonomous mode, with the 
backlight glowing again. This setup enabled a true user in the loop simulation platform, with 
the user being able to transition in and out of autonomous driving mode anytime they 
desired, rather than only at predefined, scripted simulator events. 
5.3.1.2. Participants 
Ethical approval for the experiment was secured from the University of Warwick’s 
Biomedical & Scientific Research Ethics Committee (BSREC) (REGO-2015-1746 AM02). 
Fifty six participants (16 female and 40 male) were recruited for the study via email 
invitations. The mean age of the participants was 36.29 years (S.D. = 12.82 years). All 
participants were required to have a valid, UK full driving license and be at least 21 years of 
age. The average driving experience of the participants was 14.29 years (S.D. = 13.73 
years). The participants’ assignment was counter balanced among three groups which were: 
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1) control group 2) low (20%) capability automation 3) high (80%) capability automation. 
The difference in automation capability is described in section 5.3.1.3.2. In addition to the 
study group, five additional participants were part of the pilot study group to fine tune the 
study. This was done as the mentioned study was the first study to be conducted on the 
WMG 3xD simulator and simulator and scenario design needed to be re-calibrated based on 
the user feedback. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
Out of the 56 participants who took part in the study, eight participants were not able to 
complete the study due to simulator sickness and technical issues while running the driving 
simulator. The 48 participants who completed the study were assigned to three groups (see 
Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1: Study design: participant groups 
 Control Group: Without knowledge 
Group 1: Low 
capability 
automation 
Group 2: High 
capability 
automation 
Number of 
Participants 
8 7 21 12 
Run 1 
Low capability 
automation 
High capability 
automation 
Without knowledge 
Without 
knowledge 
Run 2 
High capability 
automation 
Low capability 
automation 
With knowledge With knowledge 
 
5.3.1.3. Study Design 
The experiment was designed as a 2 x 2 mixed factorial design with automation capability as 
the between-subject factor, and knowledge of the automation capability as a within-subject 
factor. For the control group, automation capability was used as a within-in subject factor to 
evaluate whether trust increased with experience without providing any knowledge to the 
driver (participant) about the automation capability. As a part of the study, each participant 
was driven in automated mode (SAE Level 4 as per SAE J3016 (SAE International, 2018)) 
twice and witnessed five hazardous incidents during each complete run. Since the study was 
evaluating SAE Level 4 automation, participants were asked to sit in the front passenger’s 
seat and hold the emergency stop button in their hands. Such an arrangement also ensured 
that the participants could only use the button (instead of brake pedal) to stop the vehicle. 
They were further informed that when the emergency stop button was pressed, the vehicle 
will apply emergency brakes and will need to cover the braking distance depending on the 
speed of the vehicle. In cases where the participant met with a simulated accident, the run 
ended abruptly. The driving simulator route for the experiment involved a drive around the 
University of Warwick campus. Each complete run lasted around 10 minutes. The route 
around University of Warwick was chosen to provide a better immersive environment for 
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the participants as most of them were familiar with the university campus. Additionally, the 
University of Warwick route in the 3xD simulator has photo-realistic imagery and realistic 
road feedback (vibration) due to a LiDAR scan input which forms the base for the 
simulation environment. The speed of the automated vehicle was according to the speed 
limits set on the campus map, ranging from 10-30 miles per hour. 
In order to overcome the lack of real-world consequences often experienced by simulation 
participants, who can easily choose not to react as they might if their own life were in 
jeopardy (as in real-world), the study had a gamification aspect to it. The game gave 
participants a goal during the experiment run and added an element of risk to the study 
(Table 5.2). Both these factors have been discussed in chapter 3 as being essential to 
evaluate development of trust on automated system. Participants were awarded 1 point for 
every second they spent in automated mode. Every time they pressed the button, the button 
press was classified as a “correct stop” or an “incorrect stop”. For every correct stop they 
were awarded a bonus of 200 points and for every incorrect stop, a penalty of 200 points. 
Before the run, they were further provided information about what defined a correct and an 
incorrect stop. A correct stop was one where the participant correctly identified that the 
automated system wouldn’t be able to handle the situation, prompting the participant to 
intervene and press the emergency stop button. An incorrect stop was one in which the 
participant pressed the emergency stop button and brought the vehicle to standstill, even 
though the automated system was capable of handling the situation. Additionally, in case 
any participant crashed (met an accident), a penalty of 10000 points was given and the 
experiment run came to an end.  
An extremely high penalty was added for a crash to add a high degree of risk and motivate 
participants to avoid crashing the vehicle as perceived risk influences driver’s interaction 
with the automated system (Eriksson et al., 2017). The penalties were added to get the 
participants to react in a similar manner as if they were in real danger. The participants were 
asked to maximise their score. However, the score was not a variable within the study. It was 
more of a mechanism to encourage engagement in the task. Participants were provided 
information about their score after the study was completed. Participants were given two 
objectives: 1) avoid crashing the vehicle by pressing the button (emergency stop) 2) 
maximize time spent in automated mode. They were asked to press the button only if they 
felt that the automated system couldn’t handle the situation or if they felt unsure about the 
automated system’s performance. 
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Table 5.2: Scoring criteria for study (gamification) 
Type of Action Points 
Automated mode 1 / second 
Correct Stoppage of the automated vehicle +200 
Incorrect Stoppage of the automated vehicle -200 
Crash -10000 
 
5.3.1.3.1. Hazards 
In order to choose the five hazardous events, a hazard analysis of an automated vehicle was 
conducted as per the ISO 26262 (ISO, 2011a) functional safety process. Five different 
automated vehicle functions were identified and a hazard was identified for each of the 
functions (Table 5.3). For each hazard, a hazardous event was identified which was created 
in each of the driving scenarios in the experiment runs in the 3xD simulator. The hazard and 
hazardous event identification was done by independent safety experts. One of the factors 
influencing the selection of the hazardous events was the ability to create the events in the 
3xD simulator. 
Table 5.3: Description of five hazardous events 
Function Hazard Hazardous event description 
Braking Lack of Braking 
Pedestrian suddenly changes direction and comes in front 
of ego vehicle (automated vehicle) 
Torque 
Excessive torque – 
excessive acceleration 
Vehicle approaching round-about and accelerates instead 
of braking 
Object Detection 
Blind-spot and delayed 
object detection 
Another vehicle in perpendicular lane comes in path of 
the ego vehicle suddenly 
Path Planning 
Not following rules of 
road  
Ego vehicle joins a roundabout while another vehicle is 
still in the roundabout and has right of way. 
Object Detection 
Compromised detection 
due to environmental 
factors 
In foggy/rainy weather, ego vehicle is not able to detect 
traffic lights within the specified range. 
 
5.3.1.3.2. Automation Capability 
Two levels of automation capability were used in the study: 1) low capability automation 2) 
high capability automation. The difference between the two systems was based on the ability 
of the automated system to tackle the five hazardous events mentioned in section 5.3.1.3.1. 
Low capability automated system was able to handle one out of the five hazardous events, 
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requiring the driver to intervene in four hazardous events to ensure safe performance of the 
vehicle. High capability automated system was able to handle four out of the five hazardous 
events, requiring the driver to intervene in only one hazardous event situation to ensure safe 
performance. 
5.3.1.4. Procedure 
When participants arrived for the experiment, they were initially briefed about the 
experiment following which informed consent was taken from each participant and they 
were asked to fill in a demographic questionnaire. Before the start of the study runs, each 
participant was given a trial run (on a route different from the one used for the study runs) 
on the driving simulator with the author seated next to the participant, to familiarize the 
participant with the visuals, motion feedback, experience of sitting inside a car within a 
simulator and using the button to apply emergency brake on the vehicle. Participants were 
told that they can ask for as many trial runs as they wish, in order to make them comfortable 
with the simulator environment. Each trial run was of five minutes in length. While most of 
the participants requested only one trial run, some participants requested for an additional 
(second) trial run. After the trial runs, participants were asked whether they would like to 
continue the study. In the case that the participant agreed, each participant experienced two 
experiment runs of around 10 minutes each. Before the second run (for group 1 and group 
2), participants were provided knowledge about the capabilities of the automated system. 
Commentary was read out to them via a prepared script. Effort was put into the preparation 
of the script in order to avoid introducing any experiment bias. The script was reviewed by 
three independent human factors experts. 
For the control group, participants were told that in the two runs, they will experience 
automated control systems from two different suppliers. No other information about system 
capabilities was given. However, before the second run, it was reiterated that the participants 
will now experience a different automated control system from a different supplier. Such a 
design of the control group was implemented to check if there was any changes in the trust 
levels due to experience. Eight out of 15 participants in the control group experienced low 
capability automation in their first run and high capability automation in their second run. 
The remaining seven participants experienced the runs in the reverse order. Add the end of 
each experiment run, participants were asked to fill a trust rating questionnaire (discussed in 
section 5.4.1.5.2) and Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (SSQ) (Kennedy et al., 1993). 
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5.4.1.5.1. Imparting Static Knowledge 
Knowledge was imparted to the participants via a prepared script which included 
illustrations regarding the automated systems’ capability and limitations. Special care was 
taken to ensure that participant’s mental model was informed so that they understood the 
functioning of the system in a lay-man language to ensure higher level system 
understanding. This was particularly important in order to ensure they were imparted with 
knowledge-based behaviour, as compared to rule-based or skill-based behaviour. The 
knowledge imparted would enable them to deal with the unfamiliar situation by transferring 
the cognitive task to a higher level or a lower level of abstraction in search of an existing 
rule or intuition of their mental model (Rasmussen, 1985). In the automated driving context, 
the significance of knowledge-based behaviour is further emphasized as it helps a driver 
adopt a means-end approach to execute the appropriate human intervention needed for the 
task. The following scripts were used to impart knowledge to the participants. 
Script 1: “The automated control system from the two suppliers are based on camera based 
sensors and each automated control system will be trialled in separate runs in the sim. 
However, due to cost pressures, they have chosen a single low quality camera with reduced 
field of view. 
Vision based systems are dependent on the quality of the camera used. Due to cost 
pressures, the supplier has compromised with the accuracy of the camera used for the 
vehicle. In this vehicle, a lower grade camera has been used. Lower grade cameras are 
vulnerable to environmental factors and image recognition degrades with lower visibility. 
E.g., certain cameras find it hard to detect objects in rain, snow or fog or at certain times of 
the day due to image washout (Figure 5.1). In your drive today, you might have witnessed 
brigh sunlight or rain. You have the luxury of using sunglasses, wipers etc. However, 
Camera doesn’t have that. It has been found that light colour objects against a bright sky is 
difficult to detect. This was the case in the recent Tesla Model S crash (NHTSA, 2017a) 
where the white rear end of the truck was not detected against the bright sky.” 
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Script 2: Obstacle detection, e.g., pedestrian detection or vehicle detection is a challenge for 
on-board sensors as it requires sensor fusion between different sensor readings, like RADAR 
data and camera data. This is dependent of the quality and amount of data received by the 
sensor fusion control unit. The supplier is using only camera based systems. No other sensor 
systems have been used. 
Camera based systems are unable to process the images for sudden obstacle detection (e.g. 
pedestrian jumping on the street) due to high computing power. In optimum lighting, camera 
based systems are suitable when steady performance is required (e.g. detecting lane 
Figure 5.1: Camera view while driving in fog 
(Image source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/kubina/2160242894; date accessed: 2017-12-04) 
Figure 5.2: Field of view of camera based detection systems 
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markings, traffic lights or speed signs). As drivers we know that we are supposed to scan all 
around our vehicle to anticipate sudden obstacles. 
In order to avoid sudden obstacles, the vehicle needs either a good camera sensor with wide 
field of view to sense the oncoming obstacle or multiple cameras to give it a wide field of 
view (Figure 5.2). Some camera sensors have a wide field of view or multiple cameras can 
be used to obtain a wide field of view. However, since this supplier is using a single, low 
quality camera, dynamic object detection may be compromised. 
Script 3: “While, automated vehicles have a repeatable and predictable behaviour, their 
behaviour is “programmed” by human engineer. Every vehicle before being released to 
market undergoes rigorous testing. However, it is possible that sometimes a programming 
bug introduced by a human error manifests itself into a larger failure. The rules of the road 
are pre-programmed into the automated control system. The automated system in your next 
run is a pre-production control system and is still undergoing testing. While previous test 
results have been extremely positive, I advise you to take caution. An example of this might 
be that as a driver, we know that if a pedestrian is standing next to a zebra crossing, they 
have the right of way (Figure 5.3). However, for a camera system, he/she will only be a 
pedestrian with unknown intention. In this example the automated control system wouldn’t 
know the rules of the road and will not have the understanding of the priorities.  
Another rule of the road that we as drivers are used to is the priorities at roundabouts and 
junctions (Figure 5.3). Imagine a person is given a driving license when he/she doesn’t 
know the rules of the road. Not only its dangerous for him/her, it is hazardous for the traffic 
around.” 
 
In the above examples, effort was made to differentiate between knowledge and rule-based 
behaviours. Simple rules are comparatively easy to convey to participants, for example in 
Figure 5.1, a rule would be ‘automated system will not work in fog’. However, there is no 
Figure 5.3: Rules of road: rule 19 (left) and rule 185(right). (DfT, 2017)  
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understanding why it will not work (e.g. image recognition degrades with lower visibility 
which was provided as a part of the script). Knowledge about other similar situation where 
the camera may not work was also provided via the script (…hard to detect objects in rain, 
snow or fog or at certain times of the day); (You have the luxury of using sunglasses, wipers 
etc. However, Camera doesn’t have that. It has been found that light colour objects against 
a bright sky is difficult to detect. This was the case in the recent Tesla Model S crash where 
the white rear end of the truck was not detected against the bright sky). By trying to impart 
knowledge the participant can envisage their own varied and numerous situations where the 
automated system might act unexpectedly. 
5.4.1.5.2. Trust Questionnaire 
Trust is a subjective construct and has been measured via different rating scales in literature 
(Jian et al., 2000; Muir and Moray, 1996). As discussed in chapter 3, the author classified 
trust into two aspects: “trust in the system” and “trust with the system”. A subjective rating 
scale was used and participants were asked to draw a line across a 100 mm box to indicate 
their level of trust (c.f. (Muir and Moray, 1996; Rajaonah et al., 2006)). Before being asked 
to rate different trust levels, participants were briefed about the difference in the different 
types of trust via a prepared script which included examples (was read to the participants as 
well as given in text form) to highlight the difference between “trust in the system” and 
“trust with the system. Existing rating scales like Jian’s scale (Jian et al., 2000), couldn’t be 
used as they don’t classify trust into the two components discussed in chapter 3 (as they treat 
trust as a single construct). In order to explain the two different concepts of trust, 
participants were briefed using an example of a mobile phone and call service provider. The 
following text was used for the explanation: 
“Trust in the system means that you have trust on the capabilities of the system and in its 
ability to do what it is supposed to do as advertised to you. In other words, it does what it says 
on the box. Trust with the system means that you are aware of the limitations of the systems 
and you adapt your use of the system to accommodate for the limitations in order to get 
maximum benefit from the system. 
For example, if you buy a mobile phone, you have trust in the systems about its advertised 
capabilities. You develop trust with the system once you start using it and understand its 
limitations. Ability to work with limitations guides your trust with the system. For the mobile 
phone and the call service provider you have, you get call drop-outs in certain part of our 
house and not in another part of your house. You would adapt your usage of the mobile 
phone by making calls only when you are in a part of the house where you know call 
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connection service is good. This is an example of you acknowledging the limitations of the 
system, adapting your usage and developing trust with the system” 
 
On the trust scale (Figure 5.4), a 0% rating suggested very low trust and 100% suggested 
very high trust. As trust is a continuum, any value in between 0 -100 suggests that the 
participant had partial trust. 
5.3.2. Results 
5.3.2.1. Trust levels 
The average “trust in the system” for low capability automation increased substantially from 
32.4% to 65.4 %, with the introduction of knowledge about the system capabilities and 
limitations (Figure 5.5). While an increase in “trust in the system” rating with the 
introduction of knowledge was seen for high capability automation from 54.2% to 70.5% 
also, the effect was comparatively lower. It is interesting to note that with the introduction of 
knowledge about the automated system’s capabilities and limitations, both median and mean 
values for “trust in the system” for low-capability and high-capability automated system 
were similar (Figure 5.5). In the low capability automation group, barring two participants 
out of the 21 participants, all participants showed an increase in trust in the system with the 
introduction of knowledge (Figure 5.6). High capability automation group also showed a 
similar trend. The box-plots for trust in the system illustrate a higher convergence in trust 
ratings with the introduction of knowledge, potentially due to appropriate calibration of trust 
level (Figure 5.5).  
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for the “trust in the system” and “trust with 
the system” ratings with automation capability as the between factor variable and knowledge 
as the within factor variable. The introduction of knowledge about the automation 
capabilities and limitations had a highly significant statistical effect on the level of “trust in 
the system”, F(1, 31) = 33.712, p = 0.000002 with a ηp2 = 0.521, suggesting 52.1% of the 
variance being associated with the introduction of knowledge. While the introduction of 
knowledge didn’t have an interaction effect with automation capability, F(1, 31) = 3.846, p = 
0.059 (ηp2 = 0.11). Therefore, there was no effect of automation capability on trust in the 
system ratings when knowledge was introduced. 
Figure 5.4: Subjective (Trust) rating scale (100 mm) (c.f. (Muir and Moray 1996; Rajaonah, Anceaux, and 
Vienne 2006) 
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While the average “trust with the system” changed with the introduction of knowledge 
(Figure 5.7), the effect was statistically insignificant, F(1, 31) = 3.652, p = 0.065 with a ηp2 = 
0.105. There was no interaction effect between knowledge and automation capability for 
trust with the system ratings, F(1, 31) = 0.742, p = 0.396 (ηp2 = 0.023). 
In order to negate the effect of experience on trust ratings, a repeated measures ANOVA was 
performed on the control group. The effect of the runs was statistically highly insignificant 
on the level of “trust in the system”, F(1, 13) = 0.105, p = 0.751 with a ηp2 = 0.008. There 
were no interaction effects between the runs and the two control groups, F(1, 13) = 0.020, p 
= 0.89 (ηp2 = 0.002). 
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5.3.2.2. False presses 
While the introduction of knowledge about system capabilities and limitations increased 
trust in the system for both low and high capability automation, it had contrasting effect in 
the two groups in terms of number of false presses. In the context of this study, a false press 
is defined as a button press in a situation which could be handled by the automated system, 
indicating distrust in the system. 
For low capability automation, the average number of false presses increased significantly 
from 0.47 to 2.67 with the introduction of knowledge. On the contrary, for high capability 
automation the average number of false presses decreased from 1.73 to 1.36 with the 
introduction of knowledge (Figure 5.8). The outlier data from the box-plot were removed for 
mean calculation. This meant one data point each from the two runs for high capability 
automation was removed. There were no outliers in the data set for low capability 
automation group. 
As discussed in section 5.4.1.5.1, for the low capability automation group, participants were 
given lot of knowledge due to limited capability. One of the potential reasons for the 
contrasting results between the two groups could be the amount of knowledge provided in 
the low capability automation group and the participants’ ability to process all the 
knowledge, develop accurate mental model and display knowledge-based behaviour. 
However, higher trust ratings with introduction of knowledge suggest that knowledge-based 
behaviour was displayed. Another potential reason for the contradictory results could be the 
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lack of dynamic (real-time) knowledge provided to the participants (discussed in section 
5.3.3).  
A paired-sample t-Test was conducted to assess the significance in the number of false 
presses with the introduction of knowledge. For low capability automation, there was a 
statistically significant difference in the number of False Presses (FP) for without knowledge 
run (M = 0.47, SD = 0.60) and knowledge run (M = 2.67, SD = 1.65); t (20) = -6.398, p = 
0.000003. For high capability automation, the number of False Presses (FP) for without 
knowledge run (M = 2.41, SD = 2.79) and knowledge run (M = 1.67, SD = 1.43) was 
statistically insignificant; t (11) = 0.792, p = 0.445. 
 
 
5.3.2.3. Accidents 
In the context of this study, an accident is defined as a collision of the ego vehicle 
(automated vehicle) with other entities (vehicles, pedestrians or cyclists) in the scenario or if 
the own vehicle doesn’t follow the traffic light rules. Introduction of knowledge about the 
automated system capability had similar effect on the average number of accidents for both 
the automation groups. For low capability automation, the average number of accidents 
reduced significantly from 1 to 0.38 with the introduction of knowledge (Figure 5.9). For 
high capability automation, the average number of accidents reduced slightly from 0.58 to 
0.42 (Figure 5.9). It is interesting to note that most of the accidents were caused to due to 
late interventions rather than absence of interventions. This may be explained due to lack of 
accurate situation awareness about scenario handling capabilities of the automated system 
during the automated driving scenario which could potentially be due to the lack of dynamic 
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Figure 5.8: Average number of false presses 
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knowledge of the participants. A paired sample t-Test was conducted to assess the statistical 
significance in the number of accidents with the introduction of knowledge. There was a 
statistically significant difference in the number of accidents between the without knowledge 
(M = 1, SD = 0) and with knowledge (M = 0.38, SD = 0.49) conditions; t (20) = 5.701, p = 
0.000014, for low capability system. 
Similar to the false presses, the number of accidents for without knowledge (M = 0.5, SD = 
.52) and with knowledge runs (M = 0.42, SD = 0.51) conditions for high capability 
automation was insignificant; t (11) = 0.321, p = 0.754. 
 
 
5.3.2.4. Workload 
While conducting study one, the author received qualitative feedback from the participants 
suggesting that there was an increase in their workload during the driving task when static 
knowledge was provided to them. To evaluate this suggestion scientifically, workload 
experienced by participants was also measured during the latter part of the study one using 
the Overall Workload Scale (OWS) (Hill et al., 1992). OWS scale requires participants to 
rate their workload on a scale of 0-100 with intervals of five. In the study presented, 
participants were not exposed to any secondary task. Therefore, the measure of the internal 
workload (measured using OWS) can be considered as the total workload of the driver. The 
extended study had 19 participants assigned into three groups: 1) control group (N = 4) 2) 
low capability automation group (N = 6) and 3) high capability automation group (N = 9). 
Table 5.4 depicts the average workload levels for the two automation capability groups. 
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Table 5.4: Average Workload levels 
Group 
Average Workload level (out of 100) 
Without knowledge With knowledge 
Low capability automation 24.2 61.7 
High capability automation 55.5 61.1 
 
Figure 5.10 depicts the workload ratings given by the participants in different groups. 
Interestingly, when knowledge about the automation capability was provided, the increase in 
workload in the low automation capability group was larger than in the high automation 
capability group. This result may be due to the increased number of interventions required to 
ensure safety while using a low capability automated system and more effort required to 
recalibrate the driver’s mental model of the system capability based on the knowledge 
provided. 
 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for the workload ratings with automation 
capability as the between factor variable and knowledge as the within factor variable. The 
introduction of knowledge about the automation capabilities and limitations had a highly 
significant statistical effect on the workload level, F (1, 13) = 32.619, p = 0.000072 with a 
ηp2 = 0.715, suggesting 71.5% of the variance being associated with the introduction of 
knowledge. However, the introduction of knowledge had a statistically significant 
interaction effect with automation capability, F (1, 13) = 17.956, p = 0.001 (ηp2 = 0.580). For 
post-hoc analysis, paired sample t-Tests were conducted for low capability and high 
capability automation. There was a significant difference in the workload levels for low 
capability automation between the runs without knowledge (M = 24.17, SD = 11.58) and the 
runs with knowledge (M = 61.67, SD = 15.38); t (5) = -5.326, p = 0.003. There was an 
insignificant difference in the workload levels for high capability automation between the 
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runs without knowledge (M = 55.55, SD = 22.83) and the runs with knowledge (M = 61.11, 
SD = 21.47) conditions; t (8) = -1.37, p = 0.206. This suggests that introduction of static 
knowledge increases workload levels in the case of low capability automation, while there is 
no significant effect in the case of high capability automation. Thus providing us another 
reason to ensure the introduction of high capability automated systems along with the 
identification of their limitations and capabilities which need to be communicated to the 
drivers. 
5.3.3. Discussion 
Study one has demonstrated that with the introduction of static knowledge about the system 
capabilities and limitations, “trust in the system” increases, to similar trust ratings for low-
capability and high-capability systems. These results differ from the study in (Helldin et al., 
2013) and (Hergeth et al., 2017). While these studies did provide some feedback about the 
system boundaries to the drivers, they were unable to instil knowledge-based behaviour as 
they didn’t mention how the system works due to which the driver’s higher level mental 
model could not be made.  
It is worth noting that the effect of knowledge on “trust in the system” had a statistically 
highly significant relationship (p = 0.000002), the effect of knowledge on “trust with the 
system” was statistically not significant (p = 0.065). This can be explained by analysing the 
nature of knowledge provided to the participants. As mentioned in section 5.1.1, knowledge 
can be qualitatively classified into three categories. In the study presented, participants were 
provided with only static knowledge about the capabilities and limitations of the systems. 
While this allowed them to demonstrate their knowledge-based behaviour and helped them 
calibrate their trust in the system, the lack of system feedback on the real-time state and 
intention of the system, led to lower levels of trust with the system. This inference is further 
corroborated by the qualitative feedback from participants who were asked to explain their 
rating of trust in their own words. One of the participants (participant #20) commented: 
“warnings from the car missing” while other (participant # 40) commented “no warnings & 
notification”. Another participant (participant #37) mentioned: “I was able to accommodate 
for the system but it was discomforting… near misses and close calls”. These comments can 
possibly explain the high level of workload experience by the drivers with the introduction 
of static knowledge (in low capability automation group) as dynamic (real-time) knowledge 
was absent in study one. 
In other words, the introduction of static knowledge provided participants the capability to 
demonstrate top-down understanding as per the abstraction hierarchy levels. However, with 
the absence of dynamic knowledge, they were unable to get feedback (signs and signals) on 
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the causes of the failure, subsequently their reasoning capability was limited. Thus, in order 
to be able to work with the system, i.e. accommodate for the limitations of the system and 
display their knowledge-based behaviour appropriately, participants also require real-time 
knowledge (e.g. signals and signs) to move the decision task to a higher or a lower 
abstraction level in search of pre-existing rules or intuition, similar to a co-pilot in the 
aviation domain (Eriksson and Stanton, 2017b). Thus, the author suggests that “trust with 
the system” is potentially influenced to a larger extent by dynamic (real-time) knowledge 
about the system capabilities and limitation and this subject has been explored in section 5.4.  
The introduction of knowledge didn’t have an interaction effect with automation capability 
on trust ratings (p = 0.059 for “trust in the system” and p = 0.065 for “trust with the system” 
ratings). Thus suggesting that similar levels of trust can be achieved if knowledge about the 
true capabilities and limitations of the systems is provided to the driver. 
While due to the study design the control group’s trust ratings can’t be compared with the 
low-capability automation or high-capability automation group’s trust ratings, they do 
provide more confidence in the results obtained in the two latter groups. The role of the 
control group was to either support or negate the hypothesis that any change in trust ratings 
could be a result of experience. Results showed that automation capability has no interaction 
effect on experience of the system (p = 0.89), thus negating the hypothesis. 
5.3.4. Study one limitations 
Knowledge has two main facets (which can be imparted through system design): 1) static 
knowledge (e.g. initial briefing and driving manual) and 2) dynamic knowledge (via as 
human-machine interface display). In study one (discussed in section 5.3), the author only 
provided static knowledge to the participants. Study six (discussed in section 5.4) was 
planned where participants were provided both dynamic knowledge and static knowledge to 
compare the effect of static and dynamic knowledge on trust ratings. 
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5.4. Calibrating Trust with Dynamic Knowledge (study six) 
In section 5.1.1.1, knowledge has been classified into static knowledge, dynamic knowledge 
and internal mental model. It is evident from study one (trust and static knowledge), that the 
introduction of static knowledge while increasing trust levels, also increases workload. In 
this section, the effect of dynamic knowledge on trust is investigated by means of a driving 
simulator study. Dynamic knowledge provides real-time information about the automation 
health and near-future intentions of the system. The main difference with static knowledge is 
that static knowledge is administered prior to use of the system while dynamic knowledge is 
administered continuously in real time. Real time status of the system or warnings have a 
potential to increase safe use by drivers’ situation awareness and enable them to display 
knowledge-based behaviour (Baldwin and Lewis, 2014; Robinson, 1986). However, it is 
essential to design the dynamic knowledge in a way that is understandable to drivers by 
ensuring concise and brevity of the knowledge and also be accurate (Riley, 2014; Wogalter 
et al., 1991). The accuracy aspect of dynamic knowledge is associated with the creation of 
the knowledge and will be discussed in detail in chapter six and seven which focus on test 
scenarios. The hypothesis for this study is - “dynamic knowledge will enable the drivers to 
work with the system”. This is based on the feedback from the participants of study one 
(trust and static knowledge) who mentioned about the lack of warnings. 
5.4.1. Method 
5.4.1.1. Driving Simulator 
Similar to study one (section 5.3), the experimental study was conducted in WMG’s 3xD 
simulator for Intelligent Vehicles at the University of Warwick, UK (WMG, 2017) with a 
push button (with a backlight) which was connected (hardwired) to a Raspberry Pi 3 board 
which in turn was connected to the 3xD simulator through a TCP/IP client-server interface. 
In this study a Raspberry Pi 3 was used instead of Raspberry Pi 2 as the experiment setup 
required connecting two Raspberry Pis via Bluetooth connection. Bluetooth adapter is 
available only on Raspberry Pi 3. Participants could engage or disengage automated mode 
by pressing the button. The button backlight glowed in automated mode and was turned off 
in manual mode. There were other mechanisms to disengage automated driving mode (i.e. to 
bring the car in manual mode) which have been discussed in section 5.4.1.4. 
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5.4.1.2. Human-Machine Interface (HMI) display setup 
In order to provide real-time information to the participants, an HMI display was designed 
and mounted over the central console of the Land Rover Evoque (BUC). A Raspberry Pi 
screen attached with a Raspberry Pi was used as the HMI display. In order to create the HMI 
design, GL Studio software was used. The Raspberry Pi and the screen was connected to a 
laptop on which GL Studio HMI design was designed. The HMI design is discussed in 
section 5.4.1.5.1 (titled Imparting Dynamic Knowledge). An “http” server was implemented 
in GL studio and the corresponding executable was executed on the Raspberry Pi attached to 
the screen (in the BUC). The laptop and the Raspberry Pi screen communicated via the http 
server-client interface. A second Raspberry Pi communicated with the 3xD simulator via a 
TCP/IP client-server interface (similar to study one: section 5.3.1.1). The laptop (with http 
client) could have been directly connected via UDP (User Datagram Protocol which is 
another type of communication protocol between two processors) to this (second) Raspberry 
Pi. However, a third Raspberry Pi was required in order to reduce the network load on the 
Ethernet port of the second Pi. If both UDP (to laptop) and TCP/IP (to simulator) were done 
from the same Ethernet port (of the second Pi), many communication (message) packets 
were missed. Therefore, the Ethernet port of second Pi was exclusively used for TCP/IP 
messages and its Bluetooth adaptor was used to transfer data to the third Pi whose Ethernet 
port was exclusively used for UDP communication with the laptop. Figure 5.11 shows the 
schematic of the Raspberry Pi, laptop and the simulator setup. 
Figure 5.11: Study six setup schematic 
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5.4.1.3. Participants 
Ethical approval for the experiment was secured from the University of Warwick’s 
Biomedical & Scientific Research Ethics Committee (BSREC) (REGO-2015-1746 AM02). 
Thirty seven participants (six female and 31 male) were recruited for the study via email 
invitations. The mean age of the participants was 34.81 years (S.D. = 10.39 years). All 
participants were required to have a valid driving license and be at least 21 years of age. The 
average driving experience of the participants was 14.69 years (S.D. = 11.78 years). 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
Out of the 37 participants who took part in the study, two participants were not able to 
complete the study due to the onset of simulator sickness while experiencing the driving 
simulator. Thirty five participants who completed the study were assigned to four groups 
(Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5: Study 6 design: participant groups 
 
5.4.1.4. Study Design 
The experiment was designed as a 2 x 2 mixed factorial design with automation capability as 
the between-subject factor and knowledge of the automation capability as a within-subject 
factor. Out of the 35 participants, 13 participants underwent three different runs while 
remaining 22 participants experienced two runs. With the benefit of hindsight, for future 
studies, it was concluded to use statistical power analysis to determine the sample size and 
group size. In order to negate the possible argument that trust ratings would increase due to 
learning experience, the study design required 13 participants to experience three runs 
(Group L1a and L1b). Additionally, three study runs required around 90 -110 minutes 
commitment from the participants. As the study wasn’t providing any monetary incentives 
for participants, author believed that over 90 minutes commitment would be a lot from all 35 
participants. Therefore, due to time constraints, 13 participants were asked to undergo three 
runs, as it was the minimum requirement of the study design. Furthermore, to explore the 
difference in the effect of only dynamic knowledge and dynamic knowledge along with 
  
 
Group 1: Low capability automation 
Group 2: High 
capability automation 
Number of 
Participants 
7 
(Group L1a) 
6  
(Group L1b) 
8  
(Group L2) 
14 
(Group H) 
Run 1 No Knowledge No Knowledge No Knowledge No Knowledge 
Run 2 
Dynamic 
Knowledge 
Dynamic Knowledge + 
Static Knowledge 
Dynamic 
Knowledge 
Dynamic Knowledge 
Run 3 No Knowledge No Knowledge - - 
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static knowledge, the study design differentiated low-capability automation groups into 
group L1a and group L1b, with the former receiving only dynamic knowledge in run 2 and 
the latter receiving both dynamic and static knowledge in run 2. No such differentiation was 
implemented for Group H (high capability automation) with all participants receiving only 
dynamic knowledge in run 2. As a part of the study, each participant was driven in 
automated mode twice (group L2 and group H) and thrice (for group L1a and group L1b) 
and witnessed five hazardous events during each complete run. Participants could disengage 
automation (i.e. starting driving in manual mode) by either pressing the brake or accelerator 
pedal, or turning the steering wheel or by pressing a button present inside the vehicle. Once 
in manual mode, participants could re-engage automation by pressing the button. The button 
had a backlight which glowed in automated mode indicating mode of the vehicle.  
In contrast with study one, the driving simulator route for the experiment involved a drive in 
a built-up world with sweeping bends to reduce the onset of simulator sickness. The built-up 
world had urban, rural and motorway sections. Each complete run lasted around 15 minutes. 
The speed of the automated vehicle was according to the speed limits defined in the built-up 
world (urban: 30 mph, rural: 40 mph and motorway: 60 mph). 
Similar to study one (section 5.3), this study also had a gamification aspect to it, in order to 
give participants a goal during the experiment run and add an element of risk to the study 
(Table 5.6). The game design was to overcome the lack of real-world consequences often 
experienced by participants in a simulator environment, who may not react like they would 
in real-world if their own life was in jeopardy. In addition, the scoring gave participants a 
goal for their task (along with ensuring safe operation of the vehicle) and the penalties added 
an element of risk during the task.  Participants were awarded 1 point for every second they 
spent in manual mode and 10 points for every second they spent in automated mode. Every 
time participants made a transition from automation to manual or vice-versa, the transition 
was classified as a “correct” or an “incorrect” transition. For every correct transition they 
were awarded a bonus of 100 points and for every incorrect transition, a penalty of 200 
points. In case they met with an accident or had a traffic rule violation (going through a red 
traffic light or speeding), a penalty of 4500 points was incurred. Similar to study one, an 
extremely high penalty was added for an accident and traffic rule violation to add a high 
degree of risk and to motivate participants to avoid them. Similar to study one, participants 
were asked to maximise their score. Participants were given two objectives: 1) avoid any 
accident or traffic rule violation by the vehicle by taking control of the vehicle 2) maximize 
time spent in automated mode. They were asked to transition to manual mode only if they 
felt that the automated system could not handle the situation or if they were not confident 
about its abilities. 
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Table 5.6: Scoring criteria for study 6 (gamification) 
Type of Action Points 
Manual mode 1 / second 
Automated mode 10 / second 
Correct transition (manual to automated or vice versa) +100 
Incorrect transition (manual to automated or vice versa) -200 
Accident (crash) / traffic rule violation -4500 
 
5.4.1.4.1. Hazards 
In order to choose the five hazardous events, a hazard analysis of an automated vehicle was 
conducted using the STPA process (discussed in chapter 7). Like in study one (section 5.3), 
five aspects of an automated vehicle functions were identified and a hazard was identified 
for each of them (Table 5.7). For each hazard, a hazardous event was identified which was 
created in the simulation environment and experienced by the participants during each of the 
driving scenarios in the experiment runs. Similar to study one, the choice of hazardous 
events was also influenced by the ability to create the events in the simulation environment 
of 3xD simulator. 
 
Table 5.7: Hazard and hazardous event description for study six 
Function Hazard Hazardous event description 
Object Detection 
(Camera + 
computation power) 
Late detection of obstacle 
w.r.t. speed and 
computation power 
Cyclist / Bike crosses a junction when he didn’t 
have the right of way. 
Object Detection 
(Radar) 
False detection at a curve in 
foggy weather 
Vehicle applying brakes when facing a curve as 
curve is misinterpreted as an obstacle in foggy 
weather 
Computation power 
Detection of obstacle w.r.t. 
speed and computation 
power 
Another vehicle cuts-in into the lane of the ego 
vehicle at high speed on a motorway 
Object detection 
(Camera) 
Compromised detection due 
to environmental factors 
In heavy rainy weather, vehicle is not able to detect 
traffic light or speed sign. 
Object Detection 
(Camera + 
computation power) 
Late detection of obstacle 
(as obstacle initially hidden 
behind other static objects) 
Pedestrian (child) jumps out on road suddenly. 
 
5.4.1.4.2. Automation capability 
Similar to study one (trust and static knowledge: section 5.3), two levels of automation 
capability were used in study six (trust and dynamic knowledge): 1) low capability 
automation 2) high capability automation. The difference between the two systems was 
based on the ability of the automated system to tackle the five hazardous events mentioned 
in section 5.4.1.4.1. Similar to the system capability in study one (section 5.3.1.3.2), low 
capability automated system was able to handle one out of the five hazardous events (Table 
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5.8), requiring the driver to transition to manual mode in four hazardous events to prevent an 
accident or traffic rule violation. High capability automated system was able to handle four 
out of the five hazardous events, requiring the driver to transition to manual mode in only 
one hazardous event situation to ensure safe performance. 
 
Table 5.8: Hazardous situations encountered by the autonomous vehicle during the study run 
Function Hazard 
Low Capability 
Automation 
High 
Capability 
Automation 
  Run 1 Run 2 Run 3 Run 1 Run 2 
Object Detection 
(Camera + 
computation power) 
Late detection of obstacle w.r.t. 
speed and computation power 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Object Detection 
(Radar) 
False detection at a curve in 
foggy weather 
No No No Yes Yes 
Computation power 
Detection of obstacle w.r.t. 
speed and computation power 
No No No Yes Yes 
Object detection 
(Camera) 
Compromised detection due to 
environmental factors 
No No No No No 
Object Detection 
(Camera + 
computation power) 
Late detection of obstacle (as 
obstacle initially hidden behind 
other static objects) 
No Yes No Yes Yes 
 
5.4.1.5. Procedure 
Similar to the procedure in study one (section 5.3.1.4), when participants arrived for the 
experiment, they were initially briefed about the experiment and informed consent and 
demography data was taken from each participant. In order to familiarize the participants 
with the simulator and the engagement/disengagement of automation, each participant was 
given a trial run on the driving simulator with the author seated next to the participant. 
Contrary to study one, participants sat in the driver’s seat and were able to adjust the seat 
and mirror positioning as per their comfort needs. The simulator was configured in SAE 
Level 3 mode. The trial run was on a prebuilt scenario that was visually similar to the study 
run, but replicated none of the hazardous events. Each trial run was of five minutes duration. 
Participants were told that they can ask for as many trial runs as they wish in order to make 
themselves comfortable with the simulator environment. After the trial runs, participants 
were asked whether they would like to continue the study. In the case that the participant 
agreed, participants in group L1a and L1b experienced three experiment runs of around 15 
minutes each, while participants in group L2 and group H experienced two experiment runs 
of around 15 minutes each. Participants were randomly assigned to the groups. Before the 
second run in all the groups, participants were informed that they would receive dynamic 
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knowledge about the automation system health via an HMI display. All participants 
experienced an additional demo run before the second run to familiarize themselves with the 
working of the HMI display and the scoring system. In order to examine the effects that 
static knowledge might have on trust ratings when provided along with real-time knowledge, 
group L1b received static knowledge about the capabilities of the automated system prior to 
the trial, in addition to the dynamic knowledge presented on the HMI display. This static 
knowledge was presented to the participants via a commentary that was read out to them via 
a prepared script, previously described in section 5.4.1.5.1. 
At the end of each experiment run, participants were asked to fill a trust rating questionnaire 
(discussed in chapter 4), Simulator Sickness Questionnaire (SSQ) (Kennedy et al., 1993), 
and NASA Task Load Index (TLX) questionnaire (Hart and Staveland, 1988). The NASA 
TLX was administered via the official NASA TLX App for an iPad (IOS) developed by 
NASA. 
5.4.1.5.1. Imparting Dynamic Knowledge 
Dynamic knowledge was imparted to the participants via a customised HMI display. The 
content of the dynamic knowledge was influenced by the qualitative comments received 
from the participants of study one (discussed in section 5.3.3). In order to meet the 
comments like “warnings from the car missing” and “no warnings & notification”, the 
HMI display provided information about the automation system health which had three 
states: 
 Green status: meant that the automated system is confident about its abilities to 
perceive the environment and to carry out the driving task. 
 Amber status: meant that the automated system can carry out the driving task 
however it is unsure about the sensing capabilities in the environment as the system 
is at its operational boundaries. 
 Red status: meant that the system is performing the driving task but doesn’t take any 
responsibility to ensure safety of the system as the system is working outside its 
operational capabilities. 
In order to instil knowledge-based behaviour, the HMI display also provided the reason for 
any change in the automation system health state to help participants calibrate their mental 
models. Providing the reason for the change in the automation system health was an 
important aspect of the imparted knowledge as it facilitated the participant’s understanding 
of the working of the system and ensured that they didn’t consider automation state changes 
as rules. In addition, the HMI display provided the participants with their real-time score, 
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any bonus/penalty received by them and the reason behind the bonus/penalty. Figure 5.12 
illustrates various modes of the HMI design’s display. Static knowledge was imparted via a 
prepared scripts as described in section 5.4.1.5.1. In manual mode, the automation health 
status was greyed out along with the text “Manual mode” being displayed on the HMI 
display, suggesting that the system was in manual mode. 
 
In automated mode, whenever the automation health status changed, the HMI display was 
updated along with an auditory feedback message e.g. “automation health is amber”. A 
second feedback modality was added in order to avoid the situation of the driver failing to 
notice the visual change in automation health. Multimodal feedback has been shown to have 
better driver performance (Biondi et al., 2017; Jakus et al., 2015; Wickens, 2008). While in 
manual mode, in case automation was not switched on for more than 10 seconds after 
automation was available, participants were prompted to engage automation via an audio 
message: “you may engage automation”. This was done to ensure the objective of the 
experiment was met and to prevent fully manual drive by the participants. However, 
participants didn’t receive any bonus after engaging automation due to the prompt and it was 
excluded from the counts for correct transitions. Additionally, participant scores were 
updated in real-time. One of the important aspects of the design of the HMI feedback was to 
provide the reason behind any status change to provide the participants with the context of 
the situation, enabling them to display knowledge based behaviour. 
Figure 5.12: Various HMI display messages 
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5.4.2. Results 
5.4.2.1. Trust levels 
As discussed in section 5.4.1.5.2, trust ratings were measured using a subjective rating scale 
and participants were asked to draw a line across a 100 mm box to indicate their level of 
trust (c.f. (Muir and Moray, 1996; Rajaonah et al., 2006)).  The average “trust in the 
system” for low-capability automation increased (which was statistically significant) with 
the introduction of dynamic knowledge about the automation system health from 37.28% 
(S.D. = 26.34%) to 60.89%. (S.D. = 23.18%) (Figure 5.13). Participants experiencing high 
capability automation also showed a similar trend for “trust in the system” which increased 
(which was statistically significant) from 54.03% (S.D. = 31.39%) to 80.89% (S.D. = 
14.96%) (Figure 5.13). In contrast to the findings of study one (section 5.3.2.1), it is 
interesting to note that with dynamic knowledge, both low and high-capability automation 
systems had relatively similar increase in trust ratings leading to different mean and median 
values for the run with dynamic knowledge (Figure 5.13). In both low-capability automation 
and high-capability automation group barring one participant, remaining 13 participants (in 
each group) showed an increase in trust-in the system ratings with the introduction of 
dynamic knowledge (Figure 5.14). 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for the “trust in the system” ratings with 
automation capability as a between factor variable and dynamic knowledge as the within 
factor variable. The introduction of dynamic knowledge about the automation system health 
and reasons behind it had a highly significant statistical effect on “trust in the system” 
ratings, F (1, 26) = 37.99, p = 0.000002 with a ηp2 = 0.594, suggesting 59.4% of the variance 
being associated with the introduction of dynamic knowledge via the HMI display. There 
was no interaction effect between the factors automation capability and dynamic knowledge 
for “trust in the system” ratings, F(1, 26) = 0.16, p = 0.695 (ηp2 = 0.006). 
The average “trust with the system” for low-capability automation increased with the 
introduction of dynamic knowledge from 48.14% (S.D. = 28.79) to 66.42% (S.D. = 29.53) 
(Figure 5.15). Similar trend was observed for the high-capability automation group in which 
“trust with the system” increased from 44.92% (S.D. = 33.27%) to 76.25% (S.D. = 19.76%), 
with the introduction of dynamic knowledge (Figure 5.15). In the low-capability automation 
group, similar to the trust-in the system ratings, barring one participant, remaining 13 
participants showed an increase in trust-with the system ratings with the introduction of the 
dynamic knowledge. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for the “trust with the 
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system” ratings with automation capability as a between factor variable and dynamic 
knowledge as the within factor variable. Providing dynamic knowledge via the HMI display 
had a statistically significant effect on “trust with the system”, F (1, 26) = 24.91, p = 
0.000034 with a ηp2 = 0.489. There was no interaction effect between the factors automation 
capability and dynamic knowledge for “trust with the system” ratings, F (1, 26) = 1.72, p = 
0.201 (ηp2 = 0.062). 
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Figure 5.14: Trust IN the system ratings (study six: effect of dynamic knowledge on trust) 
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Figure 5.13: Box-plots of Trust-In the system ratings (highlighting average trust ratings) (central dot represents 
average value) 
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5.4.1.5.1. Groups with three study runs (Group L1a and L1b): Evaluating learning effect 
In order to negate the possible argument that increase in trust levels occurred due to a 
learning experience irrespective of HMI display and knowledge type, groups L1a and L1b 
were designed in the study. In both the groups, participants experienced three runs with no 
(static or dynamic) knowledge being provided in run 1 and run 3 (first and last run). In run 2 
(second run), dynamic knowledge was provided to participants via HMI display in group 
L1a and dynamic knowledge along with static knowledge was provided in group L1b. The 
average ratings for “trust with the system” and “trust in the system” for group L1a and L1b 
are summarized in Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 respectively (and Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18). 
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Figure 5.16: Trust WITH the system ratings (study six: effect of dynamic knowledge on trust) 
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Figure 5.15: Box-plots of Trust-WITH the system ratings (highlighting average trust ratings) (central dot 
represents average value) 
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Table 5.9: Average ratings for Trust WITH the system for groups L1a and L1b 
Participant Group 
Trust WITH the System (out of 100) 
Run 1 
(no knowledge) 
Run 2 
(with knowledge) 
Run 3 
(no knowledge) 
Group L1a 
50.17 
(S.D. = 32.98) 
69.41 
(S.D. = 27.03) 
36.75  
(S.D. = 24.45) 
Group L1b 
41.58 
(S.D. = 26.21) 
77.58 
(S.D. = 23.07) 
34.67 
(S.D. = 22.50) 
 
Table 5.10: Average ratings for Trust IN the system for groups L1a and L1b 
Participant Group 
Trust IN the System (out of 100) 
Run 1 
(no knowledge) 
Run 2 
(with knowledge) 
Run 3 
(no knowledge)  
Group L1a 
32.91 
(S.D. = 28.83) 
53.58 
(S.D. = 25.52) 
30.75 
(S.D. = 19.37) 
Group L1b 
43.33 
(S.D. = 33.02) 
66.58 
(S.D. = 27.41) 
27.5 
(S.D. = 14.12) 
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Figure 5.17: Box-plots of Trust ratings for group L1a (highlighting average trust ratings) (central dot represents 
average value) 
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Figure 5.18: Box-plots of Trust ratings for group L1b (highlighting average trust ratings) (central dot 
represents average value) 
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It is interesting to note that the trust ratings in run 2 for both “trust in the system” and “trust 
with the system” were higher for group L1b as compared to group L1a, suggesting the 
combined effect of dynamic and static knowledge is higher than only dynamic knowledge. 
This further supports the finding discussed in study one (section 5.3) that static knowledge 
has a significant main effect on “trust in the system” rating. 
For both “trust with the system” and “trust in the system” ratings, trust level increased with 
the introduction of knowledge (in run 2) and decreased again in run 3, when no knowledge 
was provided. A pair-wise repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect of 
the introduction of knowledge and no effect (insignificant) due to experience. The results of 
the ANOVA have been summarized in Table 5.11. 
Figure 5.19: Trust ratings for groups L1a (run 2: only dynamic knowledge) 
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Figure 5.20: Trust ratings for groups L1b (run 2: both dynamic and static knowledge) 
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Table 5.11: Repeated Measures ANOVA on Trust ratings for L1a and L1b groups 
Trust type Participant Group Pair “p” value 
Trust WITH the system 
L1a 
Run 1 – Run 2 0.002 
Run 2 – Run 3 0.04 
Run 1 – Run 3 0.385 
L1b 
Run 1 – Run 2 0.001 
Run 2 – Run 3 0.01 
Run 1 – Run 3 0.618 
 
Trust IN the system 
L1a 
Run 1 – Run 2 0.018 
Run 2 – Run 3 0.037 
Run 1 – Run 3 0.809 
L1b 
Run 1 – Run 2 0.053 
Run 2 – Run 3 0.011 
Run 1 – Run 3 0.210 
 
 
5.4.2.2. Degree of Incorrect trust, Degree of Appropriate trust and the Trust 
Continuum 
While subjective ratings for trust have been discussed in section 5.4.2.1, it could be argued 
that they are prone to individual variations (even though statistical results suggest 
otherwise). Additionally, subjective rating scales are retrospective in nature (i.e. participants 
rate their experience after they have experienced the automated system). In this section, two 
concepts to objectively evaluate quality of trust in automation are introduced. These are 
Degree of Incorrect Trust (DoIT) and Degree of Appropriate Trust (DoAT). Both concepts 
build on the literature on distrust, mistrust and appropriate trust discussed in chapter 3. In 
the context of this study, distrust and mistrust could be evaluated in terms of the number of 
mismatching or matching interventions with respect to the number of correct human 
interventions required for safe completion of the experiment route. 
DoIT represents the driver’s unwillingness to trust the capability of the automated system 
leading to unnecessary interventions to disengage the automated system when it could have 
coped with a situation or to engage the automated system when it cannot cope with a 
situation. DoIT can have a value between 0 and 1. Higher the DoIT value, higher the 
incorrect trust of the driver. 
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 Incorrect Trust (DoIT) =  
𝑓
1 + 𝑓
 
Where, 
f = number of false transitions 
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The average values for Degree of Incorrect Trust (DoIT) have been summarized in Table 
5.12. While DoIT showed an increase for both low capability and high capability automation 
groups, none of the increases was statistically significant. However, DoIT increase with 
knowledge for high capability automation was nearly significant. A repeated measures 
ANOVA for DoIT with dynamic knowledge as the within subject factor showed that there 
was no significant difference with dynamic knowledge on DoIT for low capability 
automation group, F(1, 13) = 0.008, p = 0.538 and for high capability automation group, 
F(1,13) = 4.461, p = 0.055. 
 
Table 5.12: Average Degree of Incorrect Trust (DoIT) 
Group 
Average Degree of Incorrect Trust (DoIT) 
Without knowledge With knowledge 
Low capability automation 0.70 0.73 
High capability automation 0.487 0.697 
 
DoAT represents the appropriateness of the driver’s trust level, i.e, driver’s correct trust 
(trust in right situations). DoAT’s formulation implicitly incorporates over trust within its 
calculation. Over trust would result in a missed intervention which would mean that the 
number of correct interventions would be decreased. 
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 (𝐷𝑜𝐴𝑇) =  
𝑐 −  𝑓
𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑
 
Where, 
c = number of correct transitions 
f = number of false transitions 
crequired = number of required correct transitions 
 
The average values for Degree of Appropriate Trust (DoAT) have been summarized in Table 
5.13. With the introduction of dynamic knowledge, DoAT showed an increase for both low 
capability and high capability automation groups. For high capability automation increase in 
DoAT was statistically significant while for low capability automation the increase for 
nearly significant. A repeated measures ANOVA for DoAT with knowledge as the within 
subject variable for low capability automation group resulted in in no significant difference, 
F(1,13) = 3.976, p = 0.068 and for high capability automation group resulted in, F(1,13) = 
8.163, p = 0.013. 
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Table 5.13: Average Degree of Appropriate Trust (DoAT) values 
Group 
Average Degree of Appropriate Trust (DoAT) 
Without knowledge With knowledge 
Low capability automation 0.330 0.508 
High capability automation 0 0.321 
 
One of the participant’s data (participant # 4) was found to be an outlier (using boxplots) in 
various trust ratings and was removed from the analysis. 
5.4.2.3. Time spent in correct mode 
The introduction of dynamic knowledge had a positive effect on the percentage of time spent 
by the participants in the correct mode. For high capability automation, the average 
percentage of time spent in the correct mode for the vehicle showed an increase from 
82.39% (S.D. = 4.80) to 91.96% (S.D. = 2.39) with the introduction of dynamic knowledge 
via the HMI display.  A similar trend was observed for low capability automation, where the 
average time spent in correct mode by the participants increased from 79.05% (S.D. = 
6.93%) to 84.50% (S.D. = 4.77%) with the introduction of dynamic knowledge.  
A repeated measures ANOVA with dynamic knowledge as within subject variable showed a 
highly statistically significant main effect of the introduction of dynamic knowledge on 
percentage of time spent in correct mode, F(1,13) = 49.363, p = 0.000009 with a ηp2 = 0.792, 
suggesting 79.2% of the variance occurring due to the introduction of dynamic knowledge in 
run 2. Similar results were obtained for the low capability automation group, where a 
repeated measures ANOVA with dynamic knowledge as a within subject variable showed a 
significant main effect on the percentage of time spent in correct mode, F(1,13) = 11.227, p 
= 0.005 with a ηp2 = 0.463. 
5.4.2.4. Workload 
The average workload, as measured by the NASA TLX subjective questionnaire, for low 
capability automation showed a statistically insignificant change from 51.49 (S.D. = 12.08) 
to 46.79 (S.D. = 15.05) with the introduction of dynamic knowledge. Similarly, for high 
capability automation, the introduction of dynamic knowledge showed a statistically 
insignificant change from 43.27 (S.D. = 9.73) to 46.67 (S.D. = 16.03). A repeated measures 
ANOVA with dynamic knowledge as within subject variable showed a statistically 
insignificant main effect of the introduction of dynamic knowledge on workload for both 
low capability automation, F(1,12) = 1.856, p = 0.198 (ηp2 = 0.134); and high capability 
automation, F(1,13) = 0.875, p = 0.367 (ηp2 = 0.063). 
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This is in line with the hypothesis that dynamic knowledge will not have a significant effect 
on workload. Furthermore, dynamic knowledge (if designed optimally) has a potential to 
reduce workload, or at the very least not increase it, while offering the benefits of increased 
appropriate trust as shown in section 5.4.2.1 and 5.4.2.2. This is evident in the workload 
ratings where most participants (9 out of 12 in low capability automation and 6 out 14 in 
high capability automation) reported a decrease in workload with the introduction of 
dynamic knowledge for both low capability and high capability automation (Figure 5.21). 
This finding is in contrast to the finding in section 5.3.2.4, where introduction of static 
knowledge significantly increased workload experienced by the drivers (p = 0.003). 
However, when static knowledge was provided in conjunction with dynamic knowledge (run 
2 in group L1b), a non-significant decrease was observed in the workload ratings as 
compared to run 1 where no knowledge was provided, F (1, 5) = 2.342, p = 0.186 (ηp2 = 
0.319). 
 
 
5.4.3. Discussion 
This simulator study (study six: trust and dynamic knowledge) demonstrated the effect of 
dynamic knowledge of capabilities and limitations of the system on trust. The results show a 
statistically significant increase in both “trust in the system” and “trust with the system” 
ratings with the introduction of dynamic knowledge. Additionally, Degree of Appropriate 
Trust (DoAT) also significantly increased with introduction of dynamic knowledge, 
suggesting increased level of “correct” trust leading to correct use of the automated systems 
by the drivers. 
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Figure 5.21: Workload ratings (NASA TLX) for various participants 
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It is interesting to note that the introduction of dynamic knowledge had a similar effect for 
both low capability and high capability automation groups leading to different mean and 
median values for trust ratings in the two groups with the introduction of dynamic 
knowledge. In contrast, when only static knowledge was provided (in study one on trust and 
static knowledge: section 5.3), trust in the system ratings for both high and low capability 
automation were at similar levels (Figure 5.6). This suggests that dynamic knowledge 
potentially has a greater impact on trust ratings as compared to static knowledge. Some of 
the qualitative feedback from the participants support this inference. One of the participants 
(participant #5) commented, “I know when I have to be more alert”. A similar comment was 
made by another participant (participant #10) who commented “visual information (red, 
amber or green) provides a measure of how alert driver (I) should be”. 
In order to better understand the increase in workload reported by some of the participants in 
the high capability automation group, the author will discuss the qualitative feedback from 
the participants which explains their ratings. One of the participants who reported higher 
workload with the introduction of dynamic knowledge commented that the reason behind 
the increase was the position of the HMI display. The participant reported that he would 
expect the HMI display to be in front of the driver to avoid looking towards the display 
intermittently. While the comment was perfectly valid, study six was not designed to 
evaluate the effect of positioning of the HMI display. Moreover, only one of the participants 
(out of 35 participants) made such a comment. Another participant who reported higher 
workload with the introduction of dynamic knowledge (participant # 26) reported that their 
workload would decrease if they had more experience with the system (HMI display). The 
participant commented “I would prefer system 2 (run 2) but more time is needed to 
understand its limits because more information is given to the driver”.  
It is interesting to note that for high capability automation, both mean and median for “trust 
in the system” was higher than “trust with the system” in both no knowledge and with 
dynamic knowledge runs, while reverse was true for the low capability automation group. 
This can potentially be explained by some of the qualitative feedback received from the 
participants of the high capability automation group. One of the participants (participant # 
25) who experienced high capability system suggested the increase in workload and lower 
ability to work with the system when dynamic knowledge was introduced, was due to the 
difference in the nature of the workload required in run one and run two. According to the 
participant, “system 1 (run 1) (required) an effort to avoid switching off mentally” while 
“system 2 (run 2) (required) an effort to keep concentrating all the time for its limitations”. 
High capability automation kept the drivers out-of-the-loop, i.e. driving task, for a longer 
duration as the participants were required to make only one intervention. In contrast, for low 
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capability automation, participants were more involved in working with the system and 
therefore didn’t experience out-of-the-loop state for long durations. While the aim of 
manufacturers should always be to introduce automated systems with the highest possible 
capabilities, this is not always possible due to limitations in current sensing capabilities and 
lack of real-world testing. However, in order to have high trust with the system, it is 
important to have the driver engaged with the system either physically or in an interactive 
manner (e.g. intelligent tutoring (Beggiato et al., 2015; Beggiato and Krems, 2013)). 
5.5. Informed Safety 
The author introduces the concept of “informed safety”, as a means to increase trust on 
automated systems and calibrate it to appropriate levels. Informed safety means informing 
the driver (via static and dynamic knowledge) about the safety limits of the automated 
system and its intention. Foundations of informed safety lie in the Rasmussen’s Skills-Rules-
Knowledge (SRK) model and the abstraction hierarchy (discussed in section 5.1.1 and 
chapter three). Inspired by the SRK model, moving decision making by the drivers to a 
knowledge based level, enables the driven to understand the context of the decision ensuring 
correct use even in situations they have not experienced before. 
From the results of study one (discussed in section 5.3), it could be inferred that vehicle 
manufacturers may choose to introduce low-capability systems and provide static knowledge 
in order to deliver increased user trust and overall system performance. However, there is a 
caveat to this inference. For low capability automation, while introduction of static 
knowledge increased the level of “trust in the system” significantly (from 32.4% to 65.4%) 
and had a statistically significant main effect (p = 0.000002), it also increased the number of 
false presses significantly (from 0.476 to 2.67) and had a statistically significant main effect 
on workload (measured using OWS), suggesting an increase with the introduction of static 
knowledge (p = 0.003). Therefore, very low capability and too much knowledge is also not 
an appropriate solution. The author believes that there is an optimum level of system 
capability and knowledge to be imparted at which trust could be maximized, and false 
presses and workload could be minimized. Therefore, manufacturers may decide to enhance 
automation capability by providing knowledge. Until systems are fully (100%) capable, 
augmenting system capability with knowledge about the system’s true capabilities, could be 
a method to bridge the gap in trust. In other words, while manufacturers should aim to 
introduce high capability systems in the market, the gap in system capability (system 
limitations) should be provided as knowledge to the customers to ensure high and 
appropriate trust in the system. While providing dynamic knowledge could help reduce 
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workload, further research is required to establish the optimum level of system capability 
and knowledge to be provided to the driver. 
It is a well-known fact that users don't read manuals and that vehicle dealers/Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) rarely do a good job in sufficiently or appropriately 
informing customers about the system capabilities and limitations (Beggiato and Krems, 
2013; Eichelberger and McCartt, 2014; Larsson et al., 2014). As automated systems are 
introduced, innovative methods of informing the driver (customer) to create an “informed 
safety” level, need to be implemented. One potential solution could be providing a virtual 
tour of the vehicle at the dealership, which gives the customers an immersive experience of 
the various features and can help them calibrate their mental models and their expectations 
from the vehicle. Other means from providing “informed safety” may be short videos on the 
working of the Human Machine Interface (HMI) or specifically designed voice assistant 
features. All the discussed methods may form a part of the initial showroom briefing or a 
pre-sale briefing. However, these methods need to be evaluated to measure their 
effectiveness.  
It is important to appreciate the difference in the manner in which non-specialists (i.e. 
general public) would understand / interpret the knowledge imparted to them. As creators of 
the system, designers and engineers have an appreciation and inclination towards technical 
understanding and the technical feature explanation. Therefore, in study one (section 5.3) 
care was taken in the language used in the script used to impart knowledge to the 
participants. Use of technical jargon terms was avoided and illustrations were used as 
examples to help participants visualize the system. In real life, it is important that 
manufacturers explain the system capabilities and limitations in a non-technical manner in 
order to aid customer’s understanding by providing examples and ensuring the people read 
the provided information. 
In addition, study six (discussed in section 5.4) has shown that dynamic knowledge about 
the automation system capabilities and limitations is able to overcome some of the 
shortcomings of just providing static knowledge about the system. While introduction of 
dynamic knowledge had a significant main effect in the increase of the “trust in the system” 
and “trust with the system” ratings, contrary to the effect of static knowledge, it didn’t have 
significant effect on the number of false presses for both the low capability and high 
capability automation (p = 0.902 and p = 0.519 respectively). Introduction of dynamic 
knowledge has shown the potential to reduce the workload of the drivers too. 
Thus, the shortcomings of providing static knowledge can be overcome by augmenting it 
with dynamic knowledge about the capabilities and limitations of the automated system. 
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Hence, in order to create an informed safety level for customers, both static and dynamic 
knowledge needs to be provided. Therefore, manufacturers may decide to enhance 
automation capability by providing static and dynamic knowledge. However, until systems 
are fully (100%) capable, augmenting system capability with knowledge about the system’s 
true capabilities, could be a method to bridge the gap in trust. In other words, while 
manufacturers should aim to introduce high capability systems in the market, the gap in 
system capability (system limitations) should be provided as knowledge to the customers 
developing their informed safety level to ensure high trust in the system. 
This research introduces the concept of “informed safety”, as a means to calibrate trust to 
the appropriate levels, which may include increasing those with low trust in capabilities or 
even reducing trust in those with too much trust in what the system can achieve by making 
them aware of system boundaries. Informed safety means informing the driver (via static 
and/or dynamic knowledge) about the safety limits of the automated system and its 
intention. Informed safety provides the ability to display knowledge-based behaviour to shift 
the interpretation of a scenario to higher abstraction level or a lower abstraction level 
(Rasmussen, 1983). Informed safety aids the driver to interpret an unexpected situation to 
adopt an appropriate tactical or strategic manoeuvre to handle the situation safely. Informed 
safety is not just about providing rules of usage, it includes the background information, 
understanding and knowledge about how the system operates. 
5.6. Conclusion 
Study one (static knowledge) and study six (dynamic knowledge) have shown that trust on 
automated systems can be increased with increasing drivers’ informed safety by providing 
them static and dynamic knowledge about the automated system’s true capabilities and 
limitations. While static knowledge significantly increased “trust in the system” ratings (p = 
0.000002), dynamic knowledge had a significant increase on both “trust in the system” (p = 
0.000002) and “trust with the system” (p = 0.000034). However, when both static and 
dynamic knowledge is provided to the driver, the increase in trust is much higher than when 
only dynamic knowledge is provided. It is interesting to note that static knowledge caused a 
significant increase the workload levels in a low capability automation system. In contrast, 
dynamic knowledge had no such main effect on workload for either low capability or high 
capability automation. Additionally, when both static and dynamic knowledge was provided, 
the change in workload was statistically insignificant when compared to no knowledge.  
While the two studies have illustrated the potential benefits of providing static and dynamic 
knowledge to create an informed safety level for the driver which in turn has the potential of 
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increasing “trust in the system” and “trust with the system”, the way to create the 
knowledge for informed safety needs to be explored. While dynamic knowledge can be 
imparted using an in-vehicle HMI display, some of the potential ways of imparting static 
knowledge could include a virtual tour of the vehicle at the dealership or short videos on the 
system working. These could be a part of the pre-sale briefing at the car showroom. 
Having established the effect of knowledge (static and dynamic) on trust, the content of the 
knowledge is an important aspect of improving trust on automated systems. The two driving 
simulator studies in this chapter have shown that the importance of establishing the design 
limitations of the automated system and presenting these to the user in order to increase 
appropriate use of automated systems. Creating this knowledge requires a robust and a 
reliable verification and validation process which can identify and categorize various 
hazardous situations and test the systems in those situations. In the next chapters (chapter 6 
and chapter 7), the author will explore the creation of various test scenarios to establish the 
knowledge of design limitations of the automated systems and reliably characterize them to 
provide create drivers’ informed safety level. 
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AUTOMATED VEHICLES: DEMYSTIFYING THE 
CHALLENGES – PART 2 (TESTING)3  
Chapter 6  
Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
 
In chapter two, the author identified various opportunities and challenges associated with 
Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADASs) and Automated Driving Systems (ADSs). 
However, in order to reap the benefits of the ADAS and ADS, it is essential that drivers use 
the systems. Therefore, it becomes imperative that the solutions are found to the challenges 
offered by ADAS and ADS.  
In this chapter, one of the challenges is discussed in detail and subsequently associated 
research questions are identified, which will be tackled within the scope of this thesis. This 
chapter discusses the challenges associated with establishing the safety level of ADAS and 
ADS (which form the knowledge to be imparted to the drivers to create the state of informed 
safety). 
                                                     
3 Contents of this chapter have been published in the following publications: 
Khastgir, S., Dhadyalla, Gunwant, Birrell, S., Redmond, S., Addinall, R., et al. (2017) ‘Test Scenario 
Generation for Driving Simulators Using Constrained Randomization Technique’, in SAE Technical 
Paper# 2017-01-1672. doi: 10.4271/2017-01-1672. 
 
Khastgir, S. et al. (2018b) ‘The Science of Testing: An Automotive Perspective’, in SAE Technical 
Paper: 2018-01-1070. doi: 10.4271/2018-01-1070. 
 
Khastgir, S., Birrell, S., Dhadyalla, G., Sivencrona, H., et al. (2017) ‘Towards increased reliability by 
objectification of Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) of automated automotive systems’, 
Safety Science. Elsevier Ltd, 99, pp. 166–177. doi: 10.1016/j.ssci.2017.03.024. 
 
Khastgir, S., Sivencrona, H., et al. (2017) ‘Introducing ASIL inspired Dynamic Tactical Safety 
Decision Framework for Automated Vehicles’, in Proc. of the IEEE Conference on Intelligent 
Transportation Systems, Proceedings (ITSC) 2017. Yokohama. doi: 10.1109/ITSC.2017.8317868. 
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6.1. Part 2: Testing 
Chapter three proposes and chapter five demonstrates (via driving simulator studies) that 
knowledge can potentially be used as an intervention method to calibrate drivers’ trust to 
“correct” level to ensure safe use of the ADAS and ADS. To provide this knowledge, first it 
needs to be created and then imparted to the drivers to potentially enable them to have 
appropriate trust (discussed in chapter 5). It further discusses three types of knowledge based 
on their type of delivery: 1) static, 2) dynamic 3) internal mental model. This chapter 
focusses two aspects of knowledge that are common to each of the knowledge delivery 
types. These two aspects are: 
 Content of knowledge  
 Reliability of the content of knowledge 
Testing and certification are potential ways of creating the “knowledge” under discussion. It 
is equally important that the process of creation of knowledge is reliable, such that it 
generates the same results when the process is carried by different testers and at different 
points in time. Thus, this chapter discusses the process of creation of “reliable knowledge” 
that could be imparted to the drivers to increase their trust level and at the same time, 
calibrate it to the correct level. 
Before discussing the testing and certification process, it is important to define the two terms 
“testing” and “certification”. In order to define “testing”, the author adopts the definition 
from the international standard ISO 29119 – 1 (ISO, 2013) as “set of activities conducted to 
facilitate discovery and/or evaluation of properties of one or more test items”. While 
“testing” is defined in another international standard ISO 26262 – 2018 as “process of 
planning, preparing, and operating or exercising an item… to verify that it satisfies specified 
requirements…”,  it falls short in capturing the whole space of testing since it refers 
specifically only to requirements based testing. Thus, the ISO 26262 – 2018’s definition of 
testing has been discounted in this thesis. The composition of test space is discussed further 
in section 6.1.1. 
While discussing certification as a factor influencing trust (chapter three), the author 
mentioned the adoption of the definition of “certification” as “a written guarantee that a 
system or component complies with its specified requirements and is acceptable for 
operational use”. Definition for certification can be seen to have two distinct aspects to it. 
First being “complies with its specified requirements” and second being “acceptable for 
operational use”. While the former aspect suggests that the system meets a desired defined 
performance, the later suggests that level of performance requirements is open for subjective 
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interpretation. These two concepts will be discussed in further detail in sections 6.1.1 and 
6.1.2. 
From the definitions of certification and testing, it can be inferred that testing is a way of 
achieving certification. Testing has three constituting elements:  
 Test scenarios (discussed in section 6.1.1) 
 Safety analysis (discussed in section 6.1.2) 
 Test methods (overview in appendix two) 
While new research is being carried out to develop new test methods ((Bock and Maurer, 
2007; Huang et al., 2016; Ma et al., 2018; Rene et al., 2016; Schöner and Hurich, 2015)), 
detailed discussion on test methods remains out of scope of this thesis. An overview of the 
current methods and challenges is discussed in Appendix A2 in order to provide context to 
this research. However, test methods is not the focus of this research. While research on test 
methods improves on an aspect of existing test methods (e.g. improved representation of the 
environment, better reproducibility of tests, etc.), all test methods (discussed in appendix 
two) and the upcoming test methods have one important thing in common. All test methods 
need to identify test scenarios that they need to run using the developed test method. The 
next section (section 6.1.1), discusses test scenarios in greater detail, identifying the research 
gap and research questions associated with developing test scenarios. 
6.1.1. Test Scenarios 
6.1.1.1. Introduction 
In the automotive industry, many relatively advanced features, have caused vehicle re-calls 
due to buggy software, costing millions of dollars to the manufacturers; e.g. to fix the 
ignition switch issue, General Motors spent approximately $400 million for the 2.6 million 
affected vehicles (Malek, 2017). Fixing a bug during the development process costs an 
average of $25, while after release it increases to $16000 on an average (Altinger et al., 
2014). A bug in a released product could be caused due to: 1) release of untested code, 2) 
testing sequence differs from use sequence 3) user applied untested input values 4) untested 
operating conditions (Whittaker, 2000). The latter was illustrated in the Ariane 5 disaster 
(Lions, 1996), where software was reused from Ariane 4 software in the Ariane 5 system 
without enough testing (Weyuker, 1998). This importance of operating environment and 
potential consequence of untested inputs was also seen in the recent Tesla “Auto-pilot” 
system crash (NHTSA, 2017a). However, the Tesla “Auto-pilot” crash also had an improper 
human-computer interaction as a contributory factor. It has been suggested that majority of 
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the software related accidents are a result of the operation of the software rather than its lack 
of operation (Leveson, 2006). 
Therefore, in order to ensure that the systems have a safe and a robust functionality, it is 
important to be able to define test scenarios which are able to: 1) trigger real-world use 
sequence 2) represent user input values 3) define and identify “all” operating conditions. 
However, lack of standardized methods test scenario definition or classification, and the lack 
of international standards to define safety requirements for ADASs and ADSs, have led to a 
subjective interpretation of test scenarios and desired “safety” levels, particularly for ADASs 
and ADSs in vehicles.  
While the ISO 26262 standard (ISO, 2018b), provides some guidance for testing methods 
and approaches for a product development cycle, it too falls short to deal with the 
complexities of ADASs and ADSs. Furthermore, even with ISO 26262 been increasingly 
adopted in the industry, there is still a lack of a “quantified and rigorous process for 
automotive certification” (Yu et al., 2016). This is caused due to the lack of objective 
quantification of severity, exposure and controllability ratings which comprise the ASIL 
rating, causing inter- and intra-rater variation (Yu et al., 2016). 
Current luxury cars are a complex system with over 100 million lines of code as compared 
to 6.5 million in a Boeing 787 airplane (Charette, 2009; Strandberg et al., 2018). The 
introduction of ADASs and ADSs is going to further increase the complexity manifold. 
While a variety of ADASs and ADSs exist or are in development, each of them offers a 
different kind of a challenge for testing. The move towards higher levels of automation is 
coupled with the challenge of testing and safety analysis as it needs complex solutions to 
include interactions between a larger number of variables and the environment. It is 
suggested that in order to prove that automated vehicles are safer than human drivers, they 
will need to be driven for more than 11 billion miles (Kalra and Paddock, 2016b). Even after 
11 billion miles, such testing will “only assure safety but not always ensure it” (Transport 
Systems Catapult, 2017), thus suggesting vehicle level testing or real world testing before 
start of production (SOP) wouldn’t be enough to prove safety of the automated driving 
systems (Koopman and Wagner, 2016; Wachenfeld and Winner, 2017a). 
While software testing has been said to be the “least understood part of the (system) 
development process” (Whittaker, 2000), the author believes that a scientific approach needs 
to be adopted to solve the challenge of identifying scenarios that capture the complex 
interactions within systems and system-environment in an efficient manner. 
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6.1.1.2. Understanding scenarios 
Scenarios as a term has been widely used as a buzzword because of its vague interpretation 
and myriad of uses (Campbell, 1992). Before delving in deep discussion about scenarios, it 
is important to understand the meaning of use cases, scenarios and test cases in context of 
this thesis. 
A use case describes the system behaviour as a sequence of actions linking the result to a 
particular actor. A test scenario is a specific path through a use case, i.e., a specific sequence 
of actions. As illustrated in Figure 6.1, a use case can have many test scenarios which 
represent the system behaviour. Each test scenario can in turn have multiple test cases. A test 
case is a set of test case preconditions, inputs (including actions, where applicable), and 
expected results, developed to drive the execution of a test item to meet test objectives, 
including correct implementation, error identification, checking quality, and other valued 
information. Thus, a use case, test scenario and test case have a pyramid relationship, with 
the use case sitting at the top of the pyramid. 
 
These interactions can be captured as use cases which “describe the system behaviour as a 
sequence of actions linking the result to a particular actor” (e.g. driver). Subsequently, 
scenarios (a specific sequence of a use case) present possible ways in which a system may 
be used to accomplish a desired function. However, writing scenarios require detailed 
domain knowledge, which is only found with experts. Moreover, the term “use cases” and 
“scenarios” have been used with a fuzzy meaning (Campbell, 1992; Cockburn and Fowler, 
1998). A use case is a collection of scenarios bound together by a common goal (Cockburn 
and Fowler, 1998) and implies “the way in which a user uses a system” (Cockburn, 1997). 
Scenarios has been suggested to have at least four different meanings: 1) scenarios to 
illustrate the system 2) scenarios for evaluation 3) scenarios for design 4) scenarios to test 
theories (Campbell, 1992). It is worth elucidating that a scenario that is good for illustrating 
a system (demonstration) may not be good for evaluating the basic functions (requirement 
Figure 6.1: Schematic of pyramid relationship between use-case, scenario and test case 
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based testing), as the former only uses a limited number of examples. Similarly, scenarios to 
test theories establish the strengths and more importantly the weaknesses of a design. 
Therefore, they go beyond the traditional requirement based testing. 
6.1.1.3. Discussion: Identifying the research question and research objective 
It has been suggested that to prove the safety of a vehicle with an automated system, it is not 
about the number of miles that are driven by the vehicle but about what the vehicle 
experiences in those miles (Wachenfeld and Winner, 2017a). However, defining and 
identifying “relevant” miles or “good” miles remains a challenge for the research 
community and the industry. 
One of the reasons behind suggesting the requirement of 11 billion miles to prove the safety 
of the system is that it would cover all possible “black swan” and known unknown 
scenarios. However, “black swan” scenarios by its very definition may or may not be 
covered even with 11 billion miles. Therefore, rather than focussing on the number of miles, 
the focus of research should be on the identification of the “black swan” and “known 
unknown” scenarios. 
While requirements based testing captures the “known knowns” efficiently, the inability to 
ensure its completeness leads to the occurrence of “unknown knowns”, “known unknowns” 
and the “black swan” scenarios. The three later together could possibly be combined to form 
“good” scenarios and to define such scenarios should be the goal for testers. 
Considering in the context of the literature discussed on trust, the experience of an unknown 
failure by the driver has a potential of causing a large decrease in trust leading to disuse of 
the system. Additionally, as discussed in chapter three, recovery of trust (once lost) is a 
much slower process as compared to the initial development of trust. Therefore, the 
objective for the design of automated systems should be to inform the driver about the true 
capabilities and limitations, i.e., prevent the driver from experiencing “black swan” or 
“known unknown” or “unknown known” scenarios.  
While the aim of testing should be to increase the coverage of “known known” scenarios by 
better specification, one of the challenges of identifying “black swan” scenarios is their lack 
of correlation with time (Wachenfeld and Winner, 2017a). Interestingly, the lack of 
consensus in defining a “black swan” or a “known unknown” scenario leads to the 
presumption that there is a lack of understanding on the definition of a “good” test scenarios. 
Based on the review of the literature, the author identifies the following research question 
and research objectives: 
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Research Question 2 
How to create test scenarios to establish the limitations of the automated driving systems? 
In order to facilitate the process of answering research question 2, the following research 
objectives were identified: (in addition to the earlier two research objectives identified in 
chapter three (literature review on trust in automation) which are associated with research 
question 1) 
Research Objective 3 
“To develop an understanding about the characteristics of a test scenario (for ADAS and 
ADS)” 
In order to develop “good” test scenarios, the first step requires an understanding of what is 
meant by “good”. Is just defining the “known known” or having a structured approach to 
capture the “unknown knowns” is enough? Or is there a need to capture more of the “black 
swan” scenarios within the realms of a “good” test scenario description? Additionally, it is 
important to understand whether the characteristics differ for an automated system as 
compared to a traditional automotive system e.g. ECU (engine control unit), TCU 
(transmission control unit) etc. 
Research Objective 4 
“To develop a methodology for creating test scenarios” 
Once the characteristics of a “good” test scenario have been defined for ADAS and ADS, it 
is important that the methodology to create test scenarios incorporates the ability to generate 
test scenarios with the identified characteristics. 
6.1.1.3.1. Next research step 
Existing requirements based testing approach widely used in the industry, only ensures that 
the system meets its requirements while failing to identify the exceptions explicitly. Some 
exceptions may be covered sporadically due to the experience of historic failures rather than 
a scientific approach. Additionally, there is a known challenge to ensure completeness of 
requirements. Requirements reflect the expert’s view of system’s functionality and possible 
usage. The identification of the requirements has a degree of subjectivity associated with this 
(Flage and Aven, 2015). Different experts with different background knowledge analyse and 
classify systems differently, leading to inter-rater variation (Ergai et al., 2016). 
This is evident in the variation in the classification and identification of scenarios like the 
“Black Swan” scenarios or the “unknown unknowns” (scenarios that we don’t know that we 
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don’t know) associated with the functionality of the system (Aven, 2013) and the variation 
in the safety analysis associated with risks associated with those scenarios. While it is 
important to identify and classify scenarios as a part of testing, it is equally important to do 
so in a reliable manner. This aspect of testing is discussed in section 6.1.2. Reliability of 
knowledge becomes an influencing factor on the development of trust when dynamic (real-
time) knowledge is provided to the driver. As driver receives real-time knowledge 
continuously, differing information to same situations lead to the development of distrust 
causing the driver not to use (disuse) the automated system. 
6.1.2. Safety Analysis 
6.1.2.1. Reliability and validity of safety analysis 
Safety analysis can be divided into two-steps. First step involves the identification of the 
hazards on which the Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) will be performed. 
There exist many methods for identifying hazards like System Theoretic Process Analysis 
(STPA) / Systems Theoretic Accident Model & Processes (STAMP) (Leveson, 2004; Nancy 
G Leveson, 2011; Nancy G. Leveson, 2011), JANUS (Hoffman et al., 2004), Accimaps 
(Salmon et al., 2012), Event Tree Analysis (section 7.2.2), HFACS (Baysari et al., 2009; 
Chen et al., 2013; D. Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001b), Fault-tree analysis (Lee et al., 1985; 
Reay and Andrews, 2002), bow-tie analysis (Abimbola et al., 2016; Khakzad et al., 2012), 
FMEA (Stamatis, 2003), etc. Some of these methods were developed for simpler systems 
and fall short in their ability to meet the requirements for the analysis of modern systems 
which have multiple interactions between the system and software components and the 
human operator (Fleming et al., 2013). Another source of identifying hazards is from 
experience of previous accidents and their accident investigations. However, being 
retrospective in nature, they cannot be taken as the only source of possible hazards, but 
should influence future hazard identification process and safety management process (Stoop 
and Dekker, 2012). While accident investigations provide new knowledge about the possible 
avenues of system failures, they are never exhaustive. This is evident by the deja-vu 
experience of similar accidents repeating themselves in a 20-30 year cycle (Le Coze, 2013). 
Identifying hazards has its challenges and is a research question in its own right. While it is 
possible to identify hazards based on the “known knowns” and accommodate for the “known 
unknowns”, it is extremely difficulty to foresee the unknown knowns and even more so for 
the “unknown unknowns” which form the “Black Swan” category for hazards (Aven, 2013). 
Previous accidents, however, provide an insight to the occurrence of “Black Swan” type of 
accidents by increasing experts’ knowledge of possible factors for risk analysis (Khakzad et 
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al., 2014). Answering RQ2, the author discusses the procedure for identification of hazards 
and hazardous scenarios in chapter 7. 
The second step of the safety analysis process involves the analysis of the hazard and the 
corresponding risk assessment for the hazard. Risk in general has been suggested to be a 
construct and not an attribute of the system (Goerlandt and Montewka, 2015), due to the 
subjective nature of risk (Aven, 2010a; Tchiehe and Gauthier, 2017). However, in the 
automotive domain, a decomposition of risk provides a different insight. An Automotive 
Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) rating in automotive HARA comprises of a severity, exposure 
and a controllability rating. Controllability and Severity of any system are a system attribute. 
However, exposure for a system remains a construct and is open to subjective variation as it 
is influenced by the expert’s knowledge which governs the probability rating (Aven, 2010b; 
Aven and Reniers, 2013). Automotive HARA and ASIL will be discussed in detail in section 
6.1.2.2 and chapter eight. 
While HARA governs the risk management, i.e., the mitigation steps and the rigour required 
in the application of the steps; it is plagued by some fundamental challenges of its validity 
and reliability (Aven and Zio, 2014). One of the fundamental issues with risk assessment is 
the biases or assumptions made by stakeholders performing the assessment due to subjective 
interpretation of the underlying process or lack of knowledge of the underlying uncertainties 
or lack of knowledge of the system safety. Lack of knowledge or improper knowledge about 
the system may lead to either ignoring possible risk (which may lead to false negatives) or 
their exaggeration (which may lead to false positives). This introduces uncertainty in the risk 
analysis which is not taken into consideration while making decisions (Goerlandt and 
Reniers, 2016). Additionally, the knowledge of the hazards and possible failures helps guide 
the design process of the systems by providing the ability to make informed design decisions 
in the design phase of the product (Björnsson, 2017; Villa et al., 2016). 
Reliability refers to the “extent to which a framework, experiment, test, or measuring 
instrument yields the same results over repeated trials” (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). In a 
review of Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) method applications, (Goerlandt et al., 2016) 
found that significant differences existed in the results of QRA conducted by different 
teams/groups of experts. While mandating a specific QRA method could reduce variation 
(Van Xanten et al., 2013), they argued that this would not ascertain the accuracy of the 
results, but make results converge and more comparable. 
For HARA to be scientific, it needs to be reliable (Hansson and Aven, 2014). In this thesis, 
the author adopts the “reliability” definition and types of reliability as defined by Aven and 
Heide (2009) (pg. 1863): 
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 “The degree to which the risk analysis methods produce the same results at reruns 
of these methods (R1) 
 The degree to which the risk analysis produces identical results when conducted by 
different analysis teams, but using the same methods and data (R2) 
 The degree to which the risk analysis produces identical results when conducted by 
different analysis team with the same analysis scope and objectives, but no 
restrictions on methods and data (R3)” 
6.1.2.2. Automotive Functional Safety 
In the automotive domain, the ISO 26262 standard (automotive functional safety 
international standard) lacks a quantified and a robust process for automotive certification 
(Yu et al., 2016). Even the latest version (2018) of the standard suffers from the same issue. 
The standard refers to ASIL as a metric for hazard analysis which is influence by Severity 
(S), Exposure (E) and Controllability (C) rating. However, the methodology for determining 
these parameters and their quantification is not mentioned. Instead a set of sample tables 
have been provided (Ellims and Monkhouse, 2012). SAE J2980 provides some guidance to 
certain degree of objectivity to automotive HARA. But it too falls short in defining various 
aspects influencing severity, exposure and controllability rating (SAE International, 2015). 
SAE J2980 provides one table to parametrise severity using speed and collision type as 
parameters. It doesn’t provide any guidance for controllability and exposure ratings. Even 
for severity, the parameters used are not exhaustive enough. 
Thus, there is a need for creating a method for extracting patterns and creating templates for 
safety case development which would influence the HARA (Kelly, 2004).  While ISO 26262 
(2011) - Part 3 (ISO, 2011b) comprehensively describes the hazard analysis and 
identification of hazards using various methods like HAZOP (Cagno et al., 1960), FMEA 
etc.; it falls short of identifying an objective rating methodology for the hazardous events 
identified. This leaves the rating to the skills and the mental model of the domain technical 
experts performing the rating task. An expert’s mental model is created and influenced by 
their own knowledge, experience and environment, leading them to base their risk analysis 
on some underlying assumptions (Rosqvist, 2010). Any risk rating given by an expert is 
dependent on the expert’s interpretation of the background knowledge (based on their 
mental model) related to the hazard. This background knowledge may be incomplete in three 
specific areas: structure of the hazard, parameters responsible for the hazard and 
probabilities for the parameters (Aven and Heide, 2009). Thus, the mental model formed by 
the expert is a limited representation of the real world. In addition, the dominance of various 
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factors influencing expert’s mental model differ at different points in time for the same 
expert, leading to a varying decision making analysis. Thus, the following two types of 
variations exist in industry when hazard analysis and risk assessment is performed: 
 Inter-rateability variation: due to different mental models between different experts 
or different groups of experts 
 Intra-rateability variation: due variation in mental models of the same expert or same 
group of experts at different points in time 
In a study to evaluate the reliability of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS) (Shappell et al., 2007; D. A. Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001), which is a 
retrospective accident analysis framework, it was found that while training of experts 
improved reliability of the analysis, the results demonstrated significant inter- and intra-rater 
variation (Ergai et al., 2016). Even classification of a hazardous event as a “black swan” is 
of subjective nature and is prone to inter-rater variations. It is also influence by knowledge 
or beliefs of the experts which is based on their individual mental models (Aven, 2015; 
Flage and Aven, 2015). 
In order to overcome this challenge, an approach would be to increase focus on the 
knowledge aspect of HARA by having two teams independently performing the HARA. The 
role of the second team being to check the bias and the assumptions made by the first team 
(Veland and Aven, 2015). While such an approach has its merits, it is not practical to adopt 
this approach in the automotive industry due to the time and human resource required for the 
approach. The automotive industry is overwhelmed by time and cost constraints to meet 
production deadlines, therefore a novel approach is required for addressing the reliability 
issues of the automotive HARA process, while meeting constraints of the automotive 
industry. 
6.1.2.3. Discussion: Identifying Research Question and research objectives 
While existing literature acknowledges the reliability issues, a solution to tackle the inter- 
and intra-rater variation still evades the research community. The work presented in this 
thesis (chapter eight) focusses on increasing reliability of the automotive HARA process by 
objectivising the severity, exposure and controllability ratings by introducing a rule-set for 
both the ratings. This work is one of the first steps towards achieving reliable ratings through 
an objective decision making process for HARA in order to provide reliable dynamic 
knowledge to the drivers to calibrate their trust appropriately. The (third) research question 
(addressing the reliability issues of the automotive HARA) focussed in this thesis is: 
121 
 
Research Question 3 
“How to improve the inter- and intra-rater-reliability of the automotive HARA process?” 
In order to facilitate the process of answering research question 4, the following research 
objectives were identified (in addition to the four earlier research objectives identified in 
chapter 3 (RO 1 and RO 2) and section 6.1.1.3 (RO 3 and RO 4)): 
Research Objective five 
“To develop a rule-set for conducting automotive HARA” 
In order to improve the reliability of the automotive HARA, the author proposes to objectify 
the process to remove the variation caused by subjective interpretation of the process. 
Creation of the rule-set involved parametrization of the severity, exposure and controllability 
ratings.  
Research Objective six 
“To determine the ability of the developed rule-set for HARA in improving the reliability of 
the automotive HARA” 
After developing the rule-set for severity, exposure and controllability, the rule-set needs to 
be tested to evaluate its ability to improve the reliability of the automotive HARA process. 
Inter-rater reliability is discussed within the scope of this thesis. 
6.2. Summary 
The two driving simulator studies in chapter five demonstrated that by introducing 
knowledge (static and dynamic) it is possible to calibrate drivers’ trust to prevent disuse and 
misuse of automated systems. In order to create this knowledge in a reliable manner, 
automated systems need to be tested in a manner that generates reliable results. Testing of 
automated systems comprises of: 1) using test method(s) 2) identifying scenarios and 3) 
safety analysis (classifying the risk in the scenarios). The latter two have been discussed in 
this chapter. 
With the advent of ADAS and ADS in vehicles, the complexity of vehicles has increased 
tremendously. The number of lines of code in a modern luxury car is over 100 million as 
compared to a 6.5 million in a Boeing 787 airplane (Charette, 2009; Strandberg et al., 2018). 
This increased complexity has led to challenges in testing of the safety critical automotive 
systems (i.e., ADAS and ADS). Coupled with relatively short development cycles in the 
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automotive domain as compared to the aviation or rail, there is an urgent need to develop 
innovative methods to test ADASs and ADSs. 
Discussing test scenarios, it has been suggested that automated driving systems need to be 
driven for 11 billion miles in order to statistically prove that they are safer than human 
driving vehicles. While this is an infeasible proposition, the industry and the research 
community do not yet have a solution for identifying test scenarios. One school of thought 
suggests that even after 11 billions miles one cannot guarantee the identification of all 
possible “black swan” and known unknown scenarios. 
Automotive HARA which classifies risk in various hazardous scenarios suffers from 
reliability issues. This is due to the differing mental models of the safety experts, which is 
based on their assumptions, experience, culture and many other factors. Thus, the author has 
identified an unanswered question in current literature on test scenario creation and the 
research gap concerning the reliability of the current automotive risk analysis methods. 
6.2.1. Research Questions and Research Objectives 
Based on the review of the literature on test scenarios (in section 6.1.1) and reliability of 
HARA (in section 6.1.2), the following research questions (RQ) and their corresponding 
research objectives (RO) have been identified: 
RQ 2. How to create test scenarios to establish the limitations of automated driving 
systems? 
RO 3. To develop an understanding about the characteristics of a test scenario 
(especially for ADAS and ADS) 
RO 4. To develop a methodology for creating test scenarios (based on the 
identified characteristics) 
RQ 3. How to improve the inter- and intra-rater-reliability of the automotive HARA 
process? 
RO 5. To develop a rule-set for conducting automotive HARA 
RO 6. To determine the ability of the developed rule-set for HARA in improving 
the reliability of the automotive HARA 
In the next chapters (chapter seven and chapter eight), the author discusses the research 
methods and outcomes corresponding to the research questions and the research objectives 
identified in this chapter.  
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HOW TO CREATE THE CONTENT FOR INFORMED 
SAFETY?4 
Chapter 7  
 
 
 
 
The recent crashes involving Uber’s ADS equipped vehicle (NTSB, 2018) and Tesla’s 
Autopilot equipped vehicle (NHTSA, 2017b), demonstrate the need for a framework to test 
for the “black swan” scenarios and the “known unknown” scenarios. From a statistical point 
of view, in order to prove with 95% confidence that autonomous vehicles (AVs) are even 
20% safer than human driven vehicles, they need to be driven for over 11 billion miles 
(Kalra and Paddock, 2016a). While this seems unfeasible to achieve, it is important to 
understand what kind of miles should constitute these 11 billion miles. It is possible to make 
safety claim by driving 11 billion miles on a straight road on a sunny day in the middle of 
the desert. However, such testing may not be sufficient or even relevant for ADAS and ADS 
to be deployed in environments where Vulnerable Road Users (VRUs) are present, or where 
it rains/snows heavily. Therefore, the number of miles driven by the ADS or ADAS are not 
as important, as is what the ADAS or ADS experience in those miles. Additionally, it is 
important to test the ADAS or ADS in the operational design domain it has been designed 
for (e.g. a low-speed automated shuttle designed for urban environment should be tested in 
urban settings and not in the middle of a desert).  
In this chapter, research question 2 (RQ2: How to create test scenarios to establish the 
limitations of automated driving systems) is answered by meeting research objectives three 
and four (RO3 and RO4). 
                                                     
4 Contents of this chapter have been published in the following publication: 
 
Khastgir, S., Birrell, S., Dhadyalla, G. & Jennings, P. The Science of Testing: An Automotive 
Perspective. in SAE Technical Paper: 2018-01-1070 (2018). doi:10.4271/2018-01-1070 
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7.1. Understanding characteristics of test scenarios (for 
ADAS and ADS): A semi-structured interview study 
Answering RQ2, in order to understand the test scenario creation approach being undertaken 
by the automotive industry towards ADAS and ADS to uncover the “unknown unknown”, 
“unknown known” and “known unknown” scenarios, a semi-structured interview study 
involving verification and validation experts in the automotive domain was conducted. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted to understand the existing knowledge base for 
test scenario generation process in the automotive industry and their understanding and 
expectations from an ideal test scenario for ADAS and ADS. While it is impractical to test 
for 11 billion miles, it is important to identify an approach to create test scenarios for which 
the system needs to be tested 
Semi-structured interviews provide the ability to have richer data from the interviewees (as 
compared to surveys and questionnaires) (Louise Barriball and While, 1994). Additionally, 
they allow the flexibility to examine topics in different degrees of depth (as per 
interviewees’ interest and background) (Robson and McCartan, 2016). The interviews were 
transcribed and the text was sanitized to remove any proprietary mentions. A coding analysis 
was performed on the sanitized text and themes and categories were identified from the 
various interview answers. 
In order to prevent any bias, the interviewees were allowed to talk freely while answering 
the questions and were not prompted for any answers. Participant interviews were 
transcribed into text and were later coded to perform thematic analysis. Key themes were 
identified from the transcribed text.  
7.1.1. Method 
Ethical approval for the study was secured from the University of Warwick’s Biomedical & 
Scientific Research Ethics Committee (BSREC) (BSREC Application ID: REGO-2016-
1824). All interview transcripts were anonymized and stored in a secure location and 
University of Warwick’s data handling procedures were followed. 
 
7.1.1.1. Participants 
Twenty industry experts with each participant having over 10 years’ experience in the field 
of testing and development of systems in the automotive industry were recruited for this 
study. Participants were selected from a diverse demography cutting across the automotive 
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supply chain. Eleven participants represented OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers), 
eight participants represented Tier 1/2 suppliers and the remaining participant represented 
academic /research organizations /start-ups working in the area of automated driving. To 
ensure independence of the interviewees, participants were recruited from different countries 
including the UK, Germany, India, Sweden and USA. The interviews lasted between 28.63 
min and 103.15 min (average interview length: 48.25 min). Interviewees were also assured 
that any of the responses will not be identifiable to them as the transcripts would be 
anonymized before they were analysed. 
7.1.1.2. Interview questions design 
The interview was structured with six guiding questions, which were divided into two 
themes: 1) test methods (three questions) 2) test scenarios (three questions). Each guiding 
question had a set of follow-up questions, which were asked depending on the content of the 
answers. The six guiding questions were the following: 
Test Methods 
1. What test methods do you use for testing of automotive systems? 
2. What are the challenges for each test method that you have faced? 
3. What metric do you use to measure sign-off criteria for testing automated systems? 
Test Scenarios 
4. How do you ensure robust testing of automated automotive systems to various 
driving conditions? 
5. How do you develop test scenarios for testing automated systems? 
6. What criteria do you think makes a good quality test scenario? 
The set of follow-up (prompting) questions are described in Table 7.1. The follow-up 
questions were used to aid participants thought process and were designed to be minimally 
prescriptive to avoid biasing the answers. 
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Table 7.1: Interview follow-up questions 
Guiding 
question # 
Follow-up Question(s) 
1 
Reason for selecting a test method? What tools do you use as a part of 
your test setup? 
2 What is your biggest challenge? 
3 
How was the metric developed? Is it a standard metric? (Company 
internal or industry standard) 
4 What test scenarios do you use while doing real world / virtual testing? 
5 
What aspects are critical while developing a test scenario for autonomous 
system? 
6 How did you develop those (for good quality test scenario) criteria? 
 
7.1.2. Data Analysis 
As this study employed a semi-structured interview format, the analysis of the data was 
mostly qualitative. In order to structure the data analysis and identify trends in the collected 
data, a coding strategy was used. A code “is a word or short phrase that symbolically 
assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute to a portion of 
language-based or visual data” (Saldaña, 2016). By reading through the transcribed 
interview text, codes were assigned to the text which enabled conversion of the interview 
text into an easy to understand tabulated format. An example of a code and corresponding 
text is discussed here. One of the responses to the question on the biggest challenge in 
testing faced by the interviewee was, “it is difficult to create the specification to verify 
against and because of the lack of specification, it is difficult to put a criterion for 
completeness of testing”. The corresponding code assigned to the text was “how to ensure 
completeness of requirements” and “how to judge test completeness”. However, it is evident 
that such a coding process is subjective due to the understanding and biases of the coder. In 
order to overcome this, a two stage coding process was followed which was reviewed by an 
independent person. 
7.1.2.1. First cycle coding 
The first coding cycle involved reading through the interview transcript to assign codes. As 
the data in a semi-structured interview transcript can be varied, different methods of coding 
such as structural coding, descriptive coding, process and in-vivo coding, were used 
(Saldaña, 2016). 
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7.1.2.2. Second cycle coding 
Since different coding methods were used in the first coding cycle, some of the codes were 
similar or split. In order to synthesize the first cycle codes to develop a more cohesive 
understanding, axial coding was used in the second phase which led to the creation of 
categories for the first cycle codes. Table 7.2 illustrates the coding process for the answers 
received to question five. 
 
Table 7.2: Development of codes for question five 
Participant answers 1st cycle codes 2nd cycle codes 
“what kind of environmental influences could lead to 
an ill function” 
Environmental factors, 
failures 
- Identify failures, 
system limits, and 
hazards. 
 
- Using systematic 
method to identify 
failures, hazards 
“try to define a test to see the degradation of the 
performance” 
Degraded performance, faults 
“understand situation in which our system will reach 
any kind of limit ” 
System limits, degraded 
performance  
“fidelity of test scenario comes down to the FMEA. 
Because out of the FMEA there is possibility of a 
failure you need a control method for” 
Identify failures, systematic 
way, FMEA 
“we would engineer faults into the system…. Blocking 
the radar. Put radar absorbent material (RAM) for the 
radar.” 
Create faults, block sensors 
“it is currently done via FMEA, System FMEA and 
Hazard Analysis” 
Systematic way, FMEA, 
HARA 
- Using systematic 
method to create test 
scenario library 
“have a catalogue of tests” Test library 
“systematic way (of) what kind of influencer I have into 
the behaviour of the functionality…” 
Factors influencing 
functionality, systematic 
method 
“you can think about you have a matrix…then we look 
at what kind of combinations are possible” 
Test library 
 
7.1.3. Results 
While it was found that tools (software platforms) for test execution were not an issue for 
most organizations, the infrastructure requirement for such test platforms (hardware-in-the-
loop setup and instrumented test vehicles for real-world testing) had exponentially increased 
with ADASs and ADSs as compared to traditional automotive systems. In addition, the large 
amount of data handling required for sensors used in the ADASs and ADSs was another 
challenge. 
128 
 
In response to the first question on test methods used for testing, the participant responses 
could be grouped in two themes. One group of participants commented that they follow the 
software development V-cycle and implemented model-based design tools using simulation 
in a major part of their development process. On the contrary the other group was of the 
opinion that simulation is of limited use for ADASs and ADSs as it is “almost impossible” 
to model sensors, especially RADAR and LiDAR sensors and they mostly depended on real 
world testing. 
More importantly, the input to the test execution platform (test case vectors) was a common 
concern acknowledged by all participants. When asked about the biggest challenge faced by 
the participants while performing testing, two specific themes emerged. While the OEMs 
credited “test case generation and definition of pass/fail criteria” as their biggest challenge; 
tier 1/2 suppliers credited “quality of requirements (including completeness and 
consistency)” as their biggest challenge. This difference can be credited to the culture in the 
automotive supply chain where the suppliers develop individual systems and the 
responsibility for integration of these systems lies with the OEMs. However, both the groups 
failed to mention any solutions to the challenges faced by them during the testing phase; the 
ability to identify and define the “known unknown” and the “unknown unknown” scenario 
space. 
When asked about the parameters and criteria for “good” test scenarios, there seem to be an 
agreement on the ability to test “known unknown” and “unknown unknown” situations, as a 
key feature of a “good” test scenario. However, a deeper analysis of the responses revealed 
two distinct themes. Firstly, creating scenarios from requirements is dependent on the skill 
and experience of the test specifiers. Secondly, “good” scenarios should be able to test 
safety goals and ways in which the system may fail. This is generally not covered by system 
requirements. Moreover, the need for a systematic method of identifying the system limits or 
failure scenarios was highlighted by the participants. Most experts mentioned that 
Requirements Based Testing (RBT) is insufficient as there is a challenge in ensuring 
completeness of requirements. RBT captures the typical scenarios as suggested by the 
requirements and represent the most common real world scenarios. Such testing ensures that 
the most common bugs are identified (Whittaker, 2000). While approaches to improve 
requirement based testing have been discussed in literature (Robinson-mallett et al., 2010; 
Robinson-mallett, 2012), discussion on the ability to increase the “known known” by 
identifying the unknown space is limited. One of the reasons mentioned by experts about 
RBT was that it is impractical to have a requirements document capturing the multitude of 
scenarios an automated driving system might encounter, rendering the classical V-cycle for 
software development obsolete. 
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In the testing process, it is important to establish when to stop testing and sign-off the 
system-under-test. When the participants were asked about a metric used to measure the 
sign-off criteria, surprisingly the answers demonstrated the lack of any standard metric in 
place. Unfortunately, the sign-off point was dependent on the budget allocated and SOP 
time. However, all participants acknowledged that this wasn’t the ideal situation and needs 
to change for ADASs and ADSs. However, some participants did provide some insight into 
an ideal situation and using false positive and false negative rates as metric for sign-off. 
When asked about how participants ensured that the ADASs and ADSs were tested robustly, 
they mentioned using a test catalogue which was developed from experience. However, all 
participants agreed that for ADASs and ADSs, more real world testing is needed due to the  
challenges in simulation environment. On the time split between real-world and virtual 
testing, one of the participants commented: “95% is real world testing and 5% is simulation. 
But for me it should 50-50.  For the moment the robust model of the simulation is stopping 
(this to happen)”. 
7.1.4. Discussion 
One of the challenges of identifying “black swan” scenarios is their lack of correlation with 
time (Wachenfeld and Winner, 2017b). Based on the analysis of the interviews, to increase 
the area covered by the “known knowns” in the test scenario space, the author proposes a 
two-pronged approach to testing of ADASs and ADSs to create test scenarios and test cases 
(Figure 7.1). The first branch concerns using traditional RBT approach, while the second 
branch uses a Hazard Based Testing (HBT) approach for creating test scenarios. Traditional 
RBT method covers only a fraction of the possible test scenario space for the systems 
(Figure 7.1). The addition of the second testing branch (HBT) improves the coverage of the 
test scenario space by increasing the “known known” scenario space. However, it does not 
guarantee full coverage of the test space (Figure 7.1). While RBT checks the working of the 
system as per expectations (defined requirements), HBT explores how the system may fail 
by identifying possible failure scenarios.  
HBT draws its inspiration from the world of security analysis. In security analysis, the use of 
misuse cases has been suggested has a way of testing for security concerns (Alexander, 
2003). Misuse cases can “help document negative scenarios” (Alexander, 2003). The key to 
the success of HBT is to have a structured, robust and well-documented method of 
identifying hazards. This was also highlighted in the themes obtained from the analysis of 
the interview transcripts. The two themes were: “failure or hazard scenarios” and 
“systematic method (objective) to obtain them”. On being asked about how to develop test 
scenarios, one of the participants commented: “try to define a test to see the degradation of 
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the performance”, while another participant mentioned: “what kind of environmental 
influences could lead to an ill function”. 
In order to identify hazards, various methods like HAZOP , Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) (Lee 
et al., 1985; Reay and Andrews, 2002), FMEA (Stamatis, 2003), Event Tree Analysis 
(ETA), JANUS (Hoffman et al., 2004), Accimaps (Salmon et al., 2012), HFACS (Baysari et 
al., 2009; Chen et al., 2013; D. Wiegmann and Shappell, 2001b), bow-tie analysis 
(Abimbola et al., 2016), System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) / Systems Theoretic 
Accident Model & Processes (STAMP) (Leveson, 2004, 2012) etc. have been used in the 
industry and research community. Some of these methods were developed for simple 
systems and fall short in analysis when dealing with the complex nature of interactions 
between system, human operator and the software in modern ADAS and ADS (Fleming et 
al., 2013). As an example, in the case of an Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) system, rather 
than testing the functional requirements, more emphasis needs to be laid on identifying the 
hazards associated with the usage of an ACC system. An analysis of the ACC system using 
any of the earlier said methods to identify hazards would lead to one of the potential hazards 
as “unintended braking”. Some of the hazard identification methods developed specifically 
for ADAS and ADS (e.g. HFACS, JANUS, STPA) further analyse the system interactions to 
identify that one of the potential cause of an “unintended braking (hazard)” could be the 
“vehicle manoeuvring through a steep bend” causing the radar system to believe that there is 
an obstacle in front. Therefore, an HBT approach would identify such situations that would 
have been missed in a traditional RBT approach. 
In order to identify the safety goals and the hazards, a Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment 
(HARA) process needs to be conducted. The automotive HARA has its own issues like 
subjective variation due to skill and experience of the testers and completeness of the 
HARA, some of these issues have been answered in the literature (discussed in chapter six 
and eight). Once the systems have been tested, their capability and safe performance can be 
correctly established and can form part of the knowledge to be imparted to the drivers, in 
real time or before they start their usage, establishing their “informed safety” level to 
improve trust in ADAS and ADS (discussed in chapter 5). However, in order to create the 
“informed safety” level, a more systematic and structured process needs to be adopted to 
testing. As one of the interviewees mentioned, “Testing is a science”. 
Due to practical reasons, this study had a limited sample size for the interview pool. While a 
large number of practitioners are involved in the field of verification and validation, it would 
be a major challenge to interview a representative sample size. However, due to the expertise 
of the interviewees, current findings (Hazard Based Testing) provided an important insight 
131 
 
for this research and testing of ADAS and ADS. The proposed Hazard Based Testing 
approach comprises of three steps: 1) Identification of Hazards 2) Creating test scenarios for 
the identified hazards 3) Risk classification of the identified hazards. In this chapter, first 
two steps of HBT are discussed. The third step of HBT will be discussed in chapter eight. 
 
 
7.2. Identifying hazards 
Having determined that there is a need to identify hazards in order to conduct Hazard Based 
Testing (HBT), the author will now discuss various methods used to identify hazards and 
their causal scenarios. Hazard analysis methods help in identifying future causes of accidents 
for a system under analysis. While there are various hazard analysis methods, the author will 
discuss some of the more commonly used methods in the next sections. These methods 
include Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree 
Analysis (ETA), HAZOP and Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). This section 
provides a brief overview on each of these methods. While discussing these methods, the 
strengths and limitations of each of the methods will be highlighted, ultimately concluding 
with why STPA was chosen for the hazard identification process for the purpose of this 
thesis. 
Figure 7.1: Proposed testing approach for test-scenario generation 
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7.2.1. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a versatile method which was conceived in 1961 at Bell 
Laboratories by H.A. Watson to analyse the Minuteman missile launch control system, 
under a US Air Force contract. It was created as at that time there was no method to analyse 
electro-mechanical failures leading to hazardous situations e.g. accidental missile fire. Soon 
after its creation, it gained widespread adoption with Boeing adopting FTA as a part of its 
aircraft design process. As of today, FTA is one of the most popular methods used for 
hazard identification and hazard analysis. 
FTA is a deductive, top-down approach based on analysing chain of events, especially 
combination of events which could potentially cause a hazard, e.g. accidental missile launch. 
Based on reliability theory, Boolean algebra and probability theory, FTA translates system’s 
failure behaviour into a visual diagram. As the name suggests, FTA creates a tree-structure 
for events and failures (Figure 7.2). At top of the tree is an undesirable event or a fault 
condition identified by the person performing the FTA. Subsequently analysis progresses in 
a top-down manner applying Boolean logic (e.g. AND, OR etc.) to component failures and 
events.  
 
Figure 7.2: Example of a High Level Fault Tree 
(Image reference: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Example_of_High_Level_Fault_Tree.jpg) 
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As FTA gained popularity with its successful application in the missile program, FTA 
practitioners increased and further developed FTA with more formal rules and methodology 
(Kaiser et al., 2003; Vesely and Roberts, 1981).  FTA has been successfully applied to 
systems with well-defined failure modes which has meant that accidents caused by 
component failures have mostly been mitigated. One of the variations of FTA – Quantitative 
FTA, includes assigning probabilities to the occurrence of the failures and the events. Such 
probabilities are mostly done based on expert judgements with little or no objective data to 
back it (Aven, 2010b; Aven and Reniers, 2013; Mosleh et al., 1988; Rae and Alexander, 
2017). 
As systems become complex with more software component and increasing number of 
electro-mechanical components, new types of accidents have emerged which are caused due 
to: 1) component interactions 2) software errors/bugs.  While the former is driven by 
incomplete requirements and design errors, the latter can have infinite possibilities. Software 
bugs are interesting as software in itself never fails (Nancy G. Leveson, 2011). It does 
exactly as it has been implemented. It is the implementation that be incorrect or the 
requirements could be incorrect based on which the implementation is made. Both these 
situations are harder to illustrate in a fault tree as software failures can have infinite 
possibilities unlike physical components which have well defined failure modes.  
Additionally, for ADASs and ADSs, the human driver/passenger is in the loop and needs to 
be accounted as a possible cause of failure. Incorporating the complex nature of human 
behaviour and human-automation interaction in the FTA poses another limitation as human 
behaviour is adaptive and at times unpredictable. While the success of FTA concept depends 
on the knowledge of failure modes and effects of the systems, the changing nature of 
systems has meant that this knowledge is limited. As mentioned earlier, at the top of a FTA 
tree, is an undesirable event which needs to be identified using some other method. The 
analysis to identify lower level failures is generally a function of the experts’ (performing 
the FTA) expertise and experience. Due to the lack of any guidance from the FTA process 
on the system model, the analysis will be done based on the expert’s mental model leading 
to not only variation across individuals but also to missing failure identification. 
7.2.2. Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
Unlike FTA, Event Tree Analysis (ETA) method is a bottom-up approach which was first 
conceived during the study of WASH-1400 nuclear power plant in 1974. As FTA as a 
method was already in existence at that time, initially FTA was used for this purpose. 
However, performing FTA led to the creation of large fault trees and the team wanted an 
alternative, thus developing ETA. Like FTA, ETA is also based on analysing a chain of 
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events using Boolean logic and starts with an undesirable event or a hazardous situation. An 
ETA tree starts with the identification of an undesirable (failure) event and its subsequent 
events are evaluated in a binary manner (success or failure) (Figure 7.3). Like FTA, ETA 
can also be done in a quantitative manner. FTA is used to calculate the probabilities of 
failure and the mathematical formula (1 = 𝑝(𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒) + 𝑝(𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)) is used to calculate 
probabilities of success.  
 
 
In an ETA method, it is assumed that the individual subsequent events or barriers to stop 
propagation of an initial failure, occur independent of each other. This is fundamental to the 
final outcome probability calculation as it can be calculated by multiplying each individual 
event probability. However, there have been several examples of catastrophic accidents 
which have shown multiple failures/events been caused by the same factors (e.g. Three Mile 
Island accident (Perrow, 1981), Fukushima accident (Labib, 2015)). While ETA also starts 
with an undesirable (failure) event, it doesn’t provide a method to identify the undesirable 
events in a systematic manner. Thus, another method needs to be used to identify the 
undesirable event. Like FTA, ETA method, fails to capture issues due to design flaws or 
incorrect/missing requirements. This has been observed as one of the main reasons for 
accidents in ADAS and ADS, where assuring completeness of requirements remains a 
challenge. ETA method aims at mitigating the percolation of the initial failure event down 
Figure 7.3: Event Tree Diagram 
(Image courtesy: Wikimedia Commons) 
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the tree by evaluating subsequent events or barriers. However, it doesn’t focus on any 
preventive action to block the initiating failure event from occurring in the first place. While 
human-behaviour can be evaluated within an ETA diagram (in terms of an event or a 
barrier), it doesn’t provide rich analysis due to the binary nature (success or failure) of the 
event tree analysis. When it comes to human-automation interaction, analysing what caused 
the human to make that decision can be more important than if the decision was made or not. 
This granular level of analysis is not considered in ETA. 
As mentioned earlier, some industries use FTA in conjunction with ETA. While this 
provides some benefits in overcoming some of the limitations of either of the methods, it 
still fails to overcome some of the critical limitations which are common to both (e.g. 
software bugs/errors, human error). 
7.2.3. FMEA and FMECA 
In contrast to FTA, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is an inductive, bottom-up 
method based on analysing the effect of failures in a system/component in a systematic 
manner. FMEA was developed to systematically analyse component failures and its impact 
of system operations and is based on the assumption that accidents occur as a chain of 
events. An FMEA requires the person performing it to identify all possible failure modes of 
the components and its potential causes and then evaluate its effect on the system 
performance. Many a times, FMEA is supplemented by conducting a criticality analysis 
(CA), which is called as Failure Mode and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA). Often 
FMEA/FMECA is supported by a quantitative analysis where analysts add probabilities for 
occurrence of the failures into the FMEA/FMECA analysis. Initially introduced in the 1949 
in an US Armed Forces Military Procedures document MIL-P-1629 (now MIL-STD-1629A) 
(Department of Defence - US Govt., 1980), the method has been used extensively by NASA 
in their space programs including Apollo, Voyager, Viking and Galileo (Kelm, 2010). By 
the early 1970, FMEA gained traction in the automotive industry with Ford Motor Company 
introducing its use in its design processes, post the Pinto car recall. More recently, the 
method has been used widely in other industries like healthcare, food and process industries 
(Duckworth and Moore, 2010; Faiella et al., 2018; Pawlicki et al., 2016). With different 
applications, several types of FMEA have been used. These include: Functional FMEA, 
Design FMEA (DFMEA) and Process FMEA (PFMEA). 
In FMEA, the first step involves identifying various components of the system and their 
corresponding failure modes, where a failure mode is defined as the “manner in which an 
element or an item fails to provide the intended behaviour” (ISO, 2018b). Next, each failure 
mode is analysed to for its potential cause and effect. When FMECA process is followed, in 
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addition to the cause and effect identification, a severity and probability of occurrence is also 
identified for each failure mode. Figure 7.4 illustrates an extract from an example FMEA 
worksheet of a missile battery, which has been adapted from (Ericson II, 2005). 
 
 
Like other methods, FMEA/FMECA also has its limitations. As FMEA is a bottom-up 
approach, it identifies low-level failures. FMEA/FMECA focusses on single failure modes 
and doesn’t capture the effect of combination of failure modes or system interactions. 
Additionally, as the beginning of the analysis is with the identification of a failure mode, the 
method doesn’t identify hazards that are not related to the failure modes. It is important to 
note that not all hazardous scenarios are associated to failures and not all scenarios triggered 
by a failure are hazardous. The resulting scenarios from an FMEA can be both hazardous 
and non-hazardous. However, the method by its definition treats both types of scenarios 
equally, resulting in loss of valuable time in analysing non-safety critical scenarios. Similar 
to FTA, failure scenarios don’t capture hazardous scenarios due to missing or incorrect 
requirements or due to human error. With increasing complexity in automotive systems with 
ADAS and ADS introduction, such failures are more common and a hazard identification 
method is needed that can identify such failures.  
Human behaviour is adaptive in nature and driven by the goals for a task. Considering 
human errors as binary failures underplays many important factors that may lead to a hazard. 
These include: correct human behaviour as per procedural requirements but the procedural 
requirements themselves are unsafe; incorrect implementation of procedures due to incorrect 
understanding of them; human mental model conflicts with the defined procedures.  
The methods discussed until now assume an independence between failure events. While 
this assumption makes it easier to assign probabilities to the failure events, the assumption in 
itself is ill-informed and incorrect. The in-famous Challenge shuttle disaster report found out 
that the assumption of the failure modes of the primary and the back-up O-rings are 
Figure 7.4: FMEA Worksheet adapted from (Ericson II, 2005) 
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independent was incorrect when put under low temperature and mechanical pressures. Under 
these conditions, both the O-rings failed simultaneously (Presidential Commision, 1986).  
7.2.4. Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) 
Along with FTA and FMEA, Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP) is one of the most 
popular hazard identification methods used currently in the industry. HAZOP was developed 
in early 1960s by the chemical processing industry, but now has been adopted in various 
other industries like mining, nuclear, robotics and automotive.  
HAZOP is an organised and a methodical process used to review the design to identify risks 
that may not have been found by other methods. It is important to note that the full design is 
needed in order to perform the HAZOP. HAZOP analysis uses guide-words (Table 7.3) and 
system diagrams for identifying hazards and is carried out by an experienced group of 
multidisciplinary experts. A guide word is defined as “word or phrase which expresses and 
defines a specific type of deviation from a property’s design intent” (IEC, 2016). HAZOP 
analysis involves comparing the guidewords to a list of system specific parameters (or 
properties) (e.g. flow, temperature, pressure, speed etc.). The aim of the process is to find 
possible deviations which may result in a hazard as a result of the discussion between the 
analysis team. A deviation is formed when a guideword is applied to a parameter. Thus, 
system parameters (or properties) and guidewords are key to the success of the process. 
Once the hazards are identified from the deviations, quantitative analysis may be applied for 
risk assessment (similar to FMEA/FMECA). 
 
Table 7.3: Some Example HAZOP Guide Words (adapted from (IEC, 2016)) 
Guide Word Meaning 
No Complete negation of the design intent 
More Quantitative increase 
Less Quantitative decrease 
As well as Qualitative modification/increase 
Part of Qualitative modification/decrease 
Reverse Logical opposite of the design intent 
Other than Complete substitution 
Early Relative to the clock time 
Late Relative to the clock time 
Before Relating to order or sequence 
After Relating to order or sequence 
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The simplicity of the HAZOP method is one of its biggest advantages. It is easy to learn but 
the expertise of the facilitator is crucial for good results from the analysis. However, the 
concept of using deviations to identify hazards enables the method to identify a wider range 
of hazards (in addition to electromechanical failures). In order identify system parameters or 
properties and appropriate guidewords a detailed system design is necessary. This means 
that the HAZOP process will occur late in the development cycle. Thus major changes either 
will not be done or may be expensive to implement. HAZOP method does a better job of 
capturing human-errors as compared to earlier methods discussed in this section. However, 
it fails to capture some of non-trivial errors and the context associated with them. Software 
HAZOP is a promising technique, but has been criticised for its incompleteness. This stems 
from the fact that software HAZOP requires the analyst to have a complete understanding of 
the software interactions and its effects on the wider system, which can be challenging. 
HAZOP was initially conceived for simple systems like flow-pipes in a process industry 
which are vastly different in complexities when compared to today’s complex control 
systems in ADAS and ADS. Additionally, as the HAZOP analysis is driven by guidewords, 
there always exists a chance for some hazards to be missed as they were not associated with 
the identified guidewords. Lastly, among all the methods discussed until now, HAZOP 
analysis method takes a much longer time and can thus be expensive (in terms of time and 
resources). 
7.2.5. Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) 
Systems Theoretic Process Analysis or STPA is a hazardous event identification method 
which is grounded with systems theory and control theory (Leveson, 2004, 2012). It is 
designed to analyse safety in a socio-technical system with diverse interacting elements 
(Leveson, 2012). With foundations in systems based approach, STPA identifies a broader 
range of hazards which may occur due to a variety of reasons including component failures, 
component interactions, human-error, human-automation interaction, software issues, 
incorrect requirements and even socio-technical and organisational factors. STPA process is 
a four step process (Figure 7.5). One of the key benefits of the STPA allows the person 
performing the analysis to identify hazards and their corresponding requirements, that if 
implemented would prevent the hazard from occurring. Therefore, it supports to create the 
preventive action for a hazard and not just its downstream mitigation (as in other methods). 
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7.2.5.1. STPA Step 1: Defining the purpose of analysis 
Step one involves defining the purpose of the analysis. This step involves defining the 
system (at a higher level) that is to be analysed. It also involves identifying high level 
“losses” or accidents for the system, which need to be avoided along with potential 
hazardous states. These losses may include loss of human life or to loss of quality of service 
(longer trip journey or incomplete trip journey etc.) or may include security, privacy and 
performance concerns. As an example, for the Low-Speed Automated Driving (LSAD) 
system that has been analysed as part of this thesis (section 7.4), the following are the high 
level losses: 
1. Crash with a static object or a dynamic actor (L1) 
2. Not completing the journey with passenger and cargo (L2) 
3. Time of journey being too long, i.e., service target not met (L3) 
For ADASs and ADSs, step 1 also includes defining the Operational Design Domain (ODD) 
of the system. 
7.2.5.2. STPA Step 2: Creating system control structure 
In step 2 of the STPA method, a hierarchical control structure model of the system is 
created, capturing the functional interactions by creating a set of nested feedback control 
loops between the sub-systems. At the beginning, the control structure can be simplistic in 
nature with basic control actions and feedback loops. Figure 7.6 depicts a control diagram of 
a simple interlock system. A control diagram generally consists of a controller, actuator, 
Figure 7.5: Overview of the STPA method (Leveson & Thomas, 2018) 
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sensor, controlled process, other controllers, control action, feedback and data inputs. In a 
typical control structure, controller provides control actions to the actuators and receives 
feedback from the sensors. The control structure is refined with various iterations as the 
system requirements are defined and detail is added about the system. It is important to note 
that the control structure is a not an implementation specification or a detailed software 
architecture. The control structure is abstracted to a level of capturing functional 
interactions. 
 
 
The beauty of STPA method lies in the fact that the control structure (which forms the basis 
of the analysis) can be created at any level of abstraction and with as much detail as 
required. Figure 7.7 depicts a typical control structure of a sociotechnical system at the 
highest level of abstraction. It captures the influence of legislations on system development 
and system operations. Each level in Figure 7.7 can be further detailed into nested control 
loops with control actions and feedbacks. 
Figure 7.6: Control diagram of a simple interlock system (Leveson, 2012) 
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7.2.5.3. STPA Step 3: Identification of UCAs 
After the systems’ (of interest) system level hazards / losses are identified (in step 1), and the 
system control structure is defined (in step 2), STPA Step 3 can be performed. STPA Step 3 
identifies contextual deficiencies in control actions which can lead to a hazard or a loss. In 
order to identify these deficiencies, called as “Unsafe Control Action” (UCA), each control 
action (identified in the system control structure) is analysed in four general conditions: 
 Not providing a control action causes a loss 
 Providing a control action causes a loss 
 Providing a control action too late, too early or out of sequence causes a loss 
 Control action stopped too soon or applied too long causes a loss 
Figure 7.7: Sociotechnical control structure (Leveson, 2012) 
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In order to efficiently capture the above analysis to identify UCAs, a simple table (Table 7.4) 
can be used. Each element in the table is evaluated to against the system losses defined in 
step 1 (section 7.2.5.1), to determine whether it should be classified as a UCA. For instance, 
in the example discussed in Table 7.4, if the occupant doesn’t provide the occupant key 
“when the occupant doesn’t want to get inside the pod”, no loss is caused. On the other 
hand, when the context is changed to the occupant wanting to get inside the pod, not 
providing the occupant key will cause a loss, and is hence classified as a UCA. Each of the 
UCAs can then be separately analysed to create system safety requirements or identify 
missing requirements. Additionally, a UCA has a defined structure to it, i.e., actor, control 
action type, control action and context (Figure 7.8). It is important to maintain this structure 
as the proposed extension for test scenario generation (section 7.3) makes use of this UCA 
structure. 
 
 
Table 7.4: Table for identifying Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs) with example UCAs 
Control 
Action 
Not Providing 
causes a loss 
Providing causes 
a loss 
Too early, too 
late, out of 
sequence causes 
a loss 
Stopped too soon 
or applied too 
long causes a loss 
Occupant 
Key 
Occupant doesn’t 
provide occupant 
key when the 
occupant wants to 
get inside the 
pod.” [L2] 
“Occupant provides 
an incorrect key when 
the authorizer key is 
also incorrect and the 
remote operator key is 
also incorrect. - [L2] 
Occupant provides 
the Correct 
Occupant key 
outside the valid slot 
of the authorizer key 
and/or remote key. - 
[L2] 
Occupant provides 
occupant key for less 
than x seconds 
required to get into the 
vehicle when the 
person wants to get 
inside the pod. - [L2] 
Destination 
command 
Occupants doesn't 
provide destination 
command when 
they want to 
undertake a 
journey. - [L2] 
Occupant provides 
destination command 
when no global plan 
can be created for it. - 
[L2] 
  
Figure 7.8: Structure of an Unsafe Control Action (UCA) 
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Localized 
position 
Localizer doesn’t 
provide localized 
position when 
vehicle is moving 
as a part of global 
plan. - [L1] 
Localizer provides 
localized position 
with high covariance 
error. - [L2] 
 
Localizer provides the 
incorrect localized 
position when there is 
low covariance error. 
- [L2, L3] 
Localizer provides 
localized position 
which corresponds 
to old real position 
due to latency. - 
[L1] [L2] 
Localizer stops 
providing localized 
position while the 
vehicle is moving. - 
[L1] [L2] 
 
In Table 7.4, each UCA has been linked to its corresponding loss. It is important to note that 
UCAs identified in the table are only those which after analysis of a control action in either 
of the four general conditions lead to a loss as identified in step 1 of STPA. Linking UCAs 
to their corresponding loss also provides a degree of traceability in the analysis. 
7.2.5.4. STPA Step 4: Identifying why UCAs might occur 
After identifying Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs), STPA Step 4 involves identification of 
the causal reasons for the UCAs by analysing each control loop for each control action in the 
control structure created in step 2 (section 7.2.5.2). Causal scenarios are not fault states as 
identified in FMEAs. In an FMEA a known failure is analysed to understand the 
downstream effect and the question asked is “what failed”. However, in STPA step 4, the 
question asked is “why it occurred”. This can be explained by the fact that STPA offers a 
preventive outlook to failures whereas other methods like FMEAs look to mitigate the effect 
of the failure rather than to prevent it. For every UCA, two types of reasons must be 
considered (Leveson and Thomas, 2018) (Figure 7.9): 
 Why would Unsafe Control Actions occur? (type a) 
 Why would control actions be improperly executed or not executed, leading to 
hazards? (type b) 
The two types of reasons for loss can be further elaborated with a detailed analysis by asking 
“why”. A generic control loop is illustrated in Figure 7.10 which includes a controller, 
actuator, sensor and controlled process blocks. The detailed analysis of the scenarios can 
thus be split in four themes: 
1. Inappropriate decisions (type a causal reason) 
2. Inadequate feedback and other inputs (type a causal reason) 
3. Inadequate control execution (type b causal reason) 
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4. Inadequate process behaviour (type b causal reason) 
 
 
 
Inappropriate decisions can be made by the controller due to issues either with the 1) 
controller microprocessor 2) control algorithm or 3) the process model. Poorly designed or 
errors in control algorithms can lead to the inappropriate control action commanded by the 
controller. Also, the control algorithms make decisions based on the process model 
(including that of the world) it has. If the process model is invalid or obsolete, the decisions 
made by the control algorithm will inevitably be inadequate. Inadequate feedback can be of 
various types such as 1) loss of information due to input sampling frequency of the sensors 
or 2) due to conflicting feedback from different sensors (as experienced by the pilots in Air 
France 447 accident) or 3) incorrect feedback from the sensors.  Inadequate control 
execution on the part of the actuators could be due to actuators receiving conflicting 
commands from different controllers. A classic case of such a situation would be a system in 
which both Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) and Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) are 
sending different brake commands to the brake actuators in a car. Other reasons for 
inadequate control in the control system include, if the actuators do not execute the 
command or if the actuator response time is too large. Similarly, inadequate process 
behaviour could be caused due to a various reasons. These include 1) more than one actuator 
Figure 7.9: Two types of scenarios that must considered ((Leveson and Thomas, 2018) - page 43) 
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is trying to affect the controlled process or 2) if the controlled process doesn’t react to the 
actuator inputs or 3) if the controlled process doesn’t execute the control action correctly in 
response to the actuator input or 4) if the controlled process is missing some process 
elements required for its proper functioning. 
 
 
In order to efficiently capture the above analysis to identify UCAs, a simple table ( 
Table 7.5) can be used.  For a UCA to occur, the process model has a belief which is 
triggering a UCA from the control algorithm (assuming the control algorithm is correct). 
Thus, the first aspect to understand is the belief of the process model. Next, the reason(s) for 
this belief of the process model are identified. Finally, the situations for the corresponding 
reasons are identified or for control action being not followed as desired.  
Table 7.5 illustrates the Step 4 analysis for one UCA. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.10: Classification of control flaws in a control loop (Leveson, 2012) 
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Table 7.5: Table for conducting STPA Step 4 
Unsafe 
Control Action 
(UCA) 
Process Model: 
believes 
(B1) 
Process Model: 
believes that 
because 
(B2)) 
Potential control action not 
followed / How could this 
happen 
Occupant doesn’t 
provide occupant 
key when the 
occupant wants to 
get inside the pod. 
- (L2) 
Occupant believes 
occupant has 
provided occupant 
key. 
Occupant believes 
that because the HMI 
display says key has 
been provided. 
 
Occupant believes 
that because there is 
no confirmation 
feedback provided to 
the occupant 
HMI display’s algorithm is faulty. 
 
 
 
 
HMI feedback absent in design. 
 
Occupant believes 
occupant does not 
need to provide a 
key. 
Occupant believes 
that because they are 
unfamiliar with the 
technology. 
Incorrect marketing done. 
Lack of labelling outside the vehicle. 
 
7.2.5.5. STPA: Advantages and differentiators 
Unlike other methods like FMEA, FTA, ETA which are focussed on identifying a 
downstream effects of failures or chain of events, STPA enables the analyst to understand 
the reason behind the failures and identifies requirements to prevent the failure from re-
occurring. One of the significant benefits of using STPA is its capacity to identify diverse 
causal factors (component failures, component interactions, requirements flaws, human-
errors, design flaws, societal issues, organizational issues etc.) (France, 2017; Leveson, 
2012).   
While STPA has been used widely in aviation (Fleming et al., 2013), space industry 
(Ishimatsu et al., 2010), military applications, organisational studies, its application in the 
automotive domain has been comparitively limited. This is partly because there are other 
established methods (e.g. FMEA, FTA, HAZOP etc.) with their corresponding software 
tools which make applying them much less time consuming. While some attempts of 
formalising the STPA analysis have been made (Thomas et al., 2015), the process is still 
elaborate and time consuming. With the absence of software tools to aid the analysis, the 
process can be commercially expensive. However, as ADAS and ADS are complex systems 
in which hazards can occur due to a number of reasons (mentioned earlier), STPA offers the 
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most complete set of hazards (Sotomayor Martínez, 2015). Thus, STPA was chosen as the 
method for hazard identification which stage one of hazard based testing. 
7.3. Extending STPA to create test scenarios 
In this section, a methodology to create test scenarios from the STPA output (step 1-4) is 
introduced. This involves identifying parameters for parametrisation of various elements of 
STPA outputs. First, it is important to understand how a test scenario needs to be 
constructed, or in order words what are the components of a test scenario. It is suggested that 
a test scenario should consist of a world, actors and their behaviour (Ulbrich et al., 2015). 
However, it is the author’s understanding (based on prior-industrial experience in the 
automotive industry) that a complete test scenario definition should also contain the “pass 
criteria” for the corresponding test scenario. For a test scenario to be usable for testing, it is 
essential to know the criteria when the scenario is considered to be a pass. With this 
understanding, a complete test scenario description will have four components: 
1. Scenery  
2. Dynamic elements 
3. Pass criteria 
4. Additional context 
Scenery defines all geo-spatially stationary objects in the Operational Design Domain 
(ODD) of the vehicle (Ulbrich et al., 2015). It also includes environmental conditions such 
as weather, visibility etc., along with road layouts, road furniture (e.g. barricades), traffic 
lights etc. Thus, scenery can be sub-categorised into various parameters (with their sub-
parameters). However, selection of the scenery to be used for testing is influenced by the 
ODD of the Subject Under Test (SUT). While urban roads or city centres or motorway roads 
are part of scenery elements, if the ODD of a LSAD system is urban roads and city centres, 
then the scenery parameters will be selected accordingly.  
All moving objects and actors in the world comprise the dynamic elements category 
(Ulbrich et al., 2015). Dynamic elements are sub-categorised into various parameters. Like 
scenery elements, selection of dynamic element parameters is also dependent on the ODD of 
the SUT. For example, if the ODD of a system is only motorways, then pedestrians 
generally will not expected to be part of the dynamic elements on the motorway (as 
pedestrians are not allowed on motorways. Figure 7.11 illustrates the top-level scenery 
element parametrisation. At the top-level, scenery can be classified into “map” and 
“environmental” parameters. Figure 7.12 illustrates the top-level dynamic element 
parametrisation. At the top-level, dynamic elements can be classified into scripted traffic and 
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non-scripted traffic. Scripted traffic refers to non-SUT agents which have a pre-defined path 
in the scenario. Non-scripted traffic refers to agents which may be part of a traffic model or 
an actor model without predefine path. 
 
  
 
The scenery and the dynamic elements for the test scenario are selected from the library 
based on the defined Operational Design Domain (ODD) of the SUT (in STPA Step 1). The 
scenery and the dynamic elements together form the base world for the test scenario and 
Figure 7.11: Scenery element parametrisation (top level) 
Figure 7.12: Dynamic element parametrisation (top level) 
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their corresponding parameters depending upon the ODD form the base parameters for a 
scenario. The pass criterion defines the set of conditions (internal to SUT or external to 
SUT) for which the test scenario will be considered as a pass. Additional context refers to 
the context element of the UCA (STPA step three) and the reasons for “Potential control 
action not followed / How could this happen” in STPA step four.  
7.3.1.1. Additional Context scenario parameters 
As mentioned in section 7.2.5.2, an Unsafe Control Action (UCA) is structured into four 
components. As an example, let us consider the following UCA (Figure 7.13). 
Scenario parameters are identified for the scenery, dynamic elements (both as per the ODD 
defined in STPA step one) and the additional context. The additional context comes from 
both STPA step three (from the UCA) and STPA step four. 
One of the parameters identified for the additional context is the “context (C1)” of a UCA 
(Figure 7.13). In the example in Figure 7.13, the content element is “…when the pod is 
moving”. The corresponding parametrisation of “pod is moving” is done with respect to 
trajectory and speed, which form the additional context. 
In another UCA example (Figure 7.14), the “context element” of the UCA is: “doesn’t 
match the ground truth”. The corresponding parameter for “ground truth” is the base map, 
i.e., scenery element. In this case, the base map is a STPA specific parameter (in addition to 
creating the base world). The difference between an STPA specific parameter and a base 
Figure 7.14: Example 2: Unsafe Control Action from STPA of Low-Speed Automated Driving system [UCA# 8b] 
 
Figure 7.13: Example 1: Unsafe Control Action from STPA of Low-Speed Automated Driving system [UCA# 8c] 
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parameter is that in the execution of test cases for the test scenario, the STPA specific 
parameters will have a higher resolution when parameter values are chosen and base 
parameters will have a lower resolution (or random selection depending on the defined 
ODD). 
The second part of the “additional context” comes from STPA step four analysis. Table 7.6 
illustrates the STPA step four analysis identifying causal factors for UCA# 8c and UCA# 8b 
(Figure 7.13 and Figure 7.14).  
 
Table 7.6: STPA Step 4 analysis for LSAD system for UCA# 8b and 8c 
Unsafe 
Control Action 
(UCA) 
Process Model: 
believes 
(B1) 
Process Model: 
believes that 
because 
(B2)) 
Potential control action not 
followed / How could this 
happen (B3) 
[UCA# 8b] 
Localization 
provides pose 
which doesn’t 
match the ground 
truth. - [L2][L1] 
Obtaining Pose 
block believes it has 
the correct pose. 
Obtaining Pose block 
believes this because 
the Covariance Error 
is low (i.e., sensor 
data is coherent. (But 
actually sensor data is 
incorrect) 
This could be because sensor feed is 
delayed in time. 
[UCA# 8c] 
Localization 
provides pose at a 
delayed time 
when the pod is 
moving. – [L1] 
Obtaining Pose 
block believes there 
is no delay. 
Obtaining Pose block 
believe this because 
the data packets it 
receives matches the 
current time and 
subsequently stamps 
the sent data to the 
current time. 
This could be due to scheduling of the 
Obtaining pose block being delayed. 
 
This could be due to algorithm 
execution taking longer than expected, 
therefore the output data is based on 
processing of old data. 
 
This could be due to internal 
communications error (Bus overload or 
Bus packet data corruption) 
 
For the second part of the additional context, the “Potential control action not followed / 
how the situation could happen” B3 element of STPA step four is parametrised. E.g. if the 
“how” element is: “sensor feed was delayed” [UCA# 8b], then the parametrisation of “type 
of sensor feed” and “delay time” is done. UCA# 8c has various “how” elements. For the 
reason – “… due to scheduling of the Obtaining pose block being delayed”, the 
parametrisation is done for the delay time. For the reason – “Bus overload”, the 
parametrisation is done for the “amount of overload”. 
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7.3.1.2. Pass / fail criteria for the scenario 
The pass criteria are identified from STPA step four. The aim of the STPA process is to 
identify safety requirements to prevent a UCA from happening (if possible).  Consider a 
control loop (e.g. Figure 7.15), for a UCA to occur, the process model of the controller has a 
belief based on which it believes that the control action it is directing is safe (when actually 
it is unsafe, i.e. a UCA). Let us call this belief as B1. If B1 were not true, the controller 
would not direct the original control action (i.e., original UCA). Therefore, one of the pass 
criterion would be defined as the negation of the belief B1 (process model belief), i.e., B1´, 
as identified in STPA step four. Secondly, the process model has the belief (B1) because of 
some reasons. Let us call these reasons causing the process model belief B1 as B2. Once 
again, if these reasons B2 were not true, B1 would not be true (when treated recursively) and 
subsequently, the controller would not direct the UCA. Thus, the second pass criterion is the 
negation of the reasons for the process model belief, i.e., B2´. Thus, the two pass criteria 
coming out of STPA step four for each UCA are B1´ and B2´. Thus, the pass criteria for the 
scenarios is the negation of the “process model belief” and negation of the “reason for the 
process model belief”. It is possible that there could be multiple process model beliefs 
causing the UCA and multiple corresponding reasons for those beliefs. In such a situation, 
there will be more than one test scenario for a single UCA and each test scenario will have 
its corresponding pass criteria. Table 7.7 illustrates the pass criteria based on UCA# 8b.  
 
 
Figure 7.15: Generic control loop 
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Table 7.7: Pass criteria based on process model belief and reasons for the process model belief 
Unsafe Control Action (UCA) 
Process Model: belief and 
its reasons 
Pass criteria 
[UCA# 8b] 
Localization provides pose which doesn’t 
match the ground truth. - [L2][L1] 
B1 
Obtaining Pose block believes it 
has the correct pose. 
B1’ 
Obtaining Pose block 
shall believe it has the 
INCORRECT pose. 
B2 
Obtaining Pose block believes this 
because the Covariance Error is 
low (i.e., sensor data is coherent. 
(But actually sensor data is 
incorrect) 
B2’ 
Covariance Error shall 
be HIGH. 
 
The scenario description (based on UCA# 8b) can also be written in the following notation 
(Table 7.8): 
Table 7.8: Scenario based on UCA# 8b 
Scenery Urban areas 
Dynamic elements Pedestrians, vehicles (random selection) 
Context 
Base map (different types) 
Type of sensor feed 
Sensor feed delay time 
Pass criteria (PC) 
PC1: Obtaining Pose block shall believe it has the 
INCORRECT pose. 
PC2: Covariance Error shall be HIGH 
Number of Parameters 3 
Number of Scenarios 
(3C1 + 3C2 + 3C3 = 7) x 2 (number of pass criteria) = 14 or 
(2k – 1) x 2, where k is the number of parameters (for 
corresponding B1` and B2`) 
 
The scenario described in Table 7.8, involves adding delay in various sensor(s) feed(s). 
These scenarios evaluate if the covariance error detects the mismatch between the ground 
truth and the current pose calculated based on the sensor feed (which has been delayed). 
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7.4. Applying proposed test scenario generation method to a 
Low-Speed Automated Driving System: A Real-World 
Case Study 
In order to evaluate the applicability of the proposed method to create test scenarios, the 
method was applied to a real-world automated driving system as a case study. In this case-
study, Aurrigo Technology’s fully automated Low-Speed Automated Driving (LSAD) 
system similar to Figure 7.16, was the system under consideration or the system under test 
(SUT). As discussed in section 7.2.5, in order to apply the proposed method to create test 
scenarios using Hazard Based Testing, first STPA of the LSAD system was conducted. 
 
 
7.4.1. STPA Step 1: LSAD system 
The first step involves defining the system and the losses. The Aurrigo LSAD system is an 
SAE Level 4 system, i.e., it is fully autonomous in a dedicated Operational Design Domain 
(ODD). The dedicated ODD for the LSAD system was its predefined routes in an urban 
environment. Additionally, the larger mobility system (of which each LSAD system was a 
Figure 7.16: Low-Speed Automated Driving system (pod)  
(image courtesy: Aurrigo Technology) 
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part of) consisted of a dispatcher, web-server and a fleet supervisor. The LSAD system 
equipped vehicle had electric propulsion with break-by-wire and steer-by-wire functionality. 
It had a diverse range of sensors including multiple LiDAR and Cameras as a part of its 
sensor suite. For the Aurrigo LSAD system the following were identified as losses: 
1. Crash with a static object or a dynamic actor (L1) 
2. Not completing the journey with passenger and cargo (L2) 
3. Time of journey being too long, i.e., service target not met (L3) 
Loss 2 and Loss 3 were defined as losses as the Aurrigo LSAD system is a part of a larger 
mobility service system. An incomplete journey or if a journey takes too long would lead to 
loss of customer satisfaction which will ultimately lead to loss of revenue for the business 
(mobility service). This is an important aspect of STPA as it can capture analysis for social-
technical losses also.  
7.4.2. STPA Step 2: LSAD system 
STPA step 2 involves creating a control structure of the system under test (SUT), i.e., 
Aurrigo’s LSAD system. One of the most important aspect of the control structure 
development is the identification of the interactions (control commands and feedback) 
between the subsystems. The LSAD control structure can be classified into five different 
abstractions. The first abstraction consists of the “world” in which the LSAD is being 
deployed. The second abstraction is the “raw sensing” of the world in which the LSAD is 
being deployed. The third abstraction is the “autonomous control system” of the LSAD. The 
forth abstraction being the “LSAD actuation system” which responds to the autonomous 
control system to make the LSAD to move in the world. The fifth abstraction is the “human 
input” to the LSAD. 
In order to create the control structure for the pod system, first the various sub-systems 
needed to be identified. These subsystems are: 
 Customer 
 Sensors 
 Daily Authorizer 
 World 
 Autonomous Control System (ACS) 
o Remote Operator 
o SW Authorizer 
o Localization 
o Obstacle detection classifier 
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o Global path planner 
o Local path planner 
o Kinematic models 
 LSAD Actuation 
o Vehicle Management system 
o Steering sensor estimator 
o Braking pressure estimator 
o Motor torque estimator 
The control commands and feedback interaction between the LSAD sub-systems is captured 
in Figure 7.17. In Figure 7.17, red arrows indicate control actions and green arrows indicate 
feedback actions. The STPA analysis carried out as a part of this thesis involved the sensors, 
fleet supervisor, world and the autonomous control systems subsystems. The analysis 
discussed in this section is for a part of the autonomous control system as depicted in the 
highlighted region in Figure 7.18. 
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Figure 7.17: STPA control structure for LSAD system 
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7.4.3. STPA Step 3: LSAD system 
STPA step three involves analysing each control action to identify Unsafe Control Actions 
(UCAs). For the autonomous control system part of the LSAD system, analysis of 20 control 
actions (in Figure 7.17) resulted in 107 UCAs. For the purpose of this thesis (and due to 
confidentially reasons), only the UCAs for the control actions (highlighted in Figure 7.18) 
are discussed. Some of the identified UCAs are illustrated in Table 7.9. 
For the nine control actions identified in Figure 7.18, 45 Unsafe Control Actions were 
identified, with eleven UCAs being associated with a single control action – “requested 
kinematic command”. Other control actions like “occupancy map” had nine UCAs 
associated with it, while control actions “surface probability” and “fleet information” had 
five and seven UCAs associated with them respectively. 
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Figure 7.18: Highlighted Region of the LSAD system control structure 
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Table 7.9: UCA table with some of the UCAs identified for the LSAD system 
Control 
Action 
Not Providing 
causes a loss 
Providing causes a 
loss 
Too early, too 
late, out of 
sequence 
causes a loss 
Stopped too 
soon or applied 
too long causes 
a loss 
Destination 
command 
[UCA# 4a]  
Occupant doesn't 
provide destination 
command when 
occupant wants to 
undertake a 
journey. - [L2] 
[UCA# 4b]  
Occupant provides 
destination command 
when no global plan can 
be created for it. - [L2] 
- - 
Current 
pose 
(position) 
[UCA# 8a] 
Localization 
doesn’t provide 
updated pose when 
the vehicle is 
requested to move. - 
[L1][L2] 
[UCA# 8b] 
Localization provides 
pose which doesn’t 
match the ground truth. – 
[L1][L2] 
[UCA# 8c] 
Localization 
provides pose at a 
delayed time when 
the pod is moving. - 
[L1] [L2] 
[UCA# 8d] 
Localizer provides 
the current position 
for too long when 
vehicle in moving. - 
[L1] [L2] 
Surface 
probability 
[UCA# 10a] 
DPM doesn’t 
provide Surface 
probability when 
the pod is requested 
to move. – [L1] 
[UCA# 10b.1] 
DPM provides incorrect 
Surface probability when 
the Rolling velocity 
vector is correct. [L2] 
 
[UCA# 10b.2] 
DPM provide incorrect 
Surface probability when 
Odometry is also 
incorrect. [L1] 
[UCA# 10c] 
DPM provides 
correct surface 
probability but 
delayed while pod is 
moving. – [L1] 
[UCA# 10d] 
DPM provides 
same surface 
probability for 
more than 10ms 
while the pod is 
moving. – [L1] 
Detected 
obstacles 
vector 
[UCA# 12a] 
Classifier doesn’t 
provide Detected 
obstacles vector 
when obstacle is in 
vehicle trajectory. – 
[L1] 
[UCA# 12b] 
Classifier provides 
Detected obstacles vector 
when obstacle is not 
vehicle trajectory. – [L2] 
[L3] 
[UCA# 12c] 
Classifier provides 
Detected obstacles 
vector x seconds 
delayed when 
obstacle is vehicle 
trajectory. – [L1] 
- 
Way Points 
design 
area 
command 
[UCA# 14a] 
GPP doesn’t 
provide design area 
when there are 
obstacles on the 
path. – [L2] 
[UCA# 14b] 
GPP provide large 
design area when there 
are obstacles on the path 
and when design area is 
larger than operational 
design domain. – [L2] 
[L3] 
[UCA# 14c] 
GPP provides 
design area too 
early or late when 
design area is 
larger than true 
ODD in real time. – 
[L1, L2] 
[UCA# 14d] 
GPP stops 
providing design 
area when vehicle 
is moving and there 
is obstacle along 
the vehicle 
trajectory. – [L2] 
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7.4.4. STPA Step 4: LSAD system 
After identifying the UCAs (in the previous section), the reasons for the occurrence of the 
UCAs were identified as part of STPA Step four. Table 7.10 illustrates the causal reasons for 
some of the UCAs. 
 
Table 7.10: UCA Step 4 table for some of the UCAs for the LSAD system 
Unsafe 
Control Action 
(UCA) 
Process Model: 
believes 
(B1) 
Process Model: 
believes that 
because 
(B2)) 
Potential control action not 
followed / How could this 
happen 
(B3) 
[UCA# 4a] 
Occupants don't 
provide 
destination 
command when 
they want to 
undertake a 
journey. – [L2] 
Occupants believe 
they have provided 
the key. 
Occupants believe 
that because the HMI 
display says key has 
been provided. 
 
Occupants believe 
that because there is 
no confirmation 
feedback provided to 
the occupant 
HMI display’s algorithm is faulty. 
 
 
 
 
HMI feedback absent in design. 
 
Occupant believe 
they don’t need to 
provide a key. 
Occupants believe 
that because they are 
unfamiliar with the 
technology. 
Incorrect marketing done. 
Lack of labelling outside the vehicle. 
[UCA# 4b] 
Occupant 
provides 
destination 
command when 
no global plan 
can be created for 
it. – [L2] 
Occupant believes it 
is possible to create 
a global plan. 
Occupant believes 
that because the 
system has told 
implicitly (by 
acceptance of 
booking) or explicitly 
that it is possible. 
This could be because on the day of the 
trip there are not enough vehicles or 
supervisors or battery in the pods is not 
available. 
 
This could be because of an incorrect 
base map. 
[UCA# 8a] 
Localization 
doesn’t provide 
updated pose 
when the vehicle 
is requested to 
move. - [L1] [L2] 
Obtaining Pose 
block believes there 
is large Covariance 
error. 
Obtaining Pose 
blocked believes this 
because the sensor 
data provided is 
incoherent. 
This could be because processing of the 
internal filter is incorrect. 
Obtaining Pose 
believes it is 
providing. 
Obtaining pose block 
believes that because 
Covariance Error is 
low. 
This could be due to internal 
communications error (Bus overload or 
Bus packet data corruption) 
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[UCA# 8b] 
Localization 
provides pose 
which doesn’t 
match the ground 
truth. - [L2][L1] 
Obtaining Pose 
block believes it has 
the correct pose. 
Obtaining Pose block 
believes this because 
the Covariance Error 
is low (i.e., sensor 
data is coherent. (But 
actually sensor data is 
incorrect) 
This could be because sensor feed is 
delayed in time. 
[UCA# 8c] 
Localization 
provides pose at a 
delayed time 
when the pod is 
moving. – [L1] 
Obtaining Pose 
block believes there 
is no delay. 
Obtaining Pose block 
believe this because 
the data packets it 
receives matches the 
current time and 
subsequently stamps 
the sent data to the 
current time. 
This could be due to scheduling of the 
Obtaining pose block being delayed. 
 
This could be due to algorithm 
execution taking longer than expected, 
therefore the output data is based on 
processing of old data. 
 
This could be due to internal 
communications error (Bus overload or 
Bus packet data corruption) 
[UCA# 8d] 
Localizer 
provides the 
current position 
for too long when 
vehicle in moving. 
– [L1][L2] 
Obtaining Pose 
block believes the 
incoming sensor 
data shows no 
change in position. 
Obtaining pose block 
believes that because 
surface probability 
command doesn’t 
match rolling velocity 
vector and the 
Covariance Error is 
below the threshold. 
This could be because of a featureless 
or less features in environment (i.e., 
repetitive or empty - e.g. tunnel, 
airfield, ware-house bays)  
Obtaining Pose 
block believes it is 
sending the updated 
position. 
Obtaining pose block 
believes because it 
generates the data 
packets with the 
correct time stamp. 
This could be due to scheduling of the 
Obtaining pose block being delayed. 
 
This could be due to algorithm 
execution taking longer than expected, 
therefore the output data is based on 
processing of old data. 
 
This could be due to internal 
communications error (Bus overload or 
Bus packet data corruption) 
[UCA# 10a] 
DPM doesn’t 
provide Surface 
probability when 
the pod is 
requested to 
move. – [L1] 
DPM believes it is 
providing the 
surface probability. 
DPM believes that 
because it is 
generating the 
packets and trying to 
send them. 
This could be due to internal 
communications error (Bus overload or 
Bus packet data corruption). 
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[UCA# 10b.1] 
DPM provides 
incorrect Surface 
probability when 
the Rolling 
velocity vector is 
correct. - [L2] 
DPM believes it 
correctly quantified 
the surface 
probability when 
the all the sensor 
data was available 
and coherent. 
DPM believes that 
because the 
covariance error is 
low and sensor data is 
correct. 
 
DPM believes that 
because the 
covariance error is 
low but sensor data is 
incorrect. 
 
DPM believes that 
because the matching 
algorithm told it so. 
 
This could be because the base map is 
incorrect and doesn’t match with 
ground truth. 
 
 
 
This could be because the environment 
is not feature rich (i.e. repetitive or 
empty e.g. tunnel, airfield, ware house). 
 
 
This could be because the matching 
algorithm is incorrect. 
[UCA# 10b.2] 
DPM provides 
incorrect Surface 
probability when 
Odometry is also 
incorrect and 
both are coherent. 
- [L1] 
DPM believes it 
correctly quantified 
the surface 
probability when 
the all the sensor 
data was available 
and coherent 
DPM believes that 
because Covariance 
Error is low. 
This could be due to internal 
communications error (Bus overload or 
Bus packet data corruption). 
 
This could be due to DPM or OPM 
algorithm being incorrect. 
 
This could be due to a malicious attack. 
[UCA# 10c] 
DPM provides 
correct surface 
probability but 
delayed while pod 
is moving. – [L1] 
DPM believes it 
correctly quantified 
the surface 
probability when 
the all the sensor 
data was available 
and coherent 
DPM believes that 
because the matching 
algorithm was able to 
match the sensor data 
to the base match. 
This could be due to internal 
communications error (Bus overload or 
Bus packet data corruption). 
 
This could be because the matching 
algorithm is incorrect. 
DPM believes that 
because the 
Covariance Error is 
low. 
This could be due to delay in sensor(s) 
feed(s). 
 
This could be due to a malicious attack. 
[UCA# 10d] 
DPM provides 
same surface 
probability for 
more than 10ms 
while the pod is 
moving. – [L1] 
DPM believes that it 
is not providing the 
same surface 
probability 
DPM believes that 
because it is able to 
match the sensor data 
to the base match 
This could be because of the sensor 
output is stuck at a particular value. 
 
This could be because the matching 
algorithm is incorrect. 
 
This could be due to internal 
communications error (Bus overload or 
Bus packet data corruption). 
 
This could be due to a malicious attack. 
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DPM believes it is 
providing the 
correct surface 
probability based 
on the input sensor 
data 
DPM believes that 
because the matching 
algorithm was able to 
match the sensor data 
to the base match. 
This could be because the environment 
is not feature rich (i.e. repetitive or 
empty e.g. tunnel, airfield, ware house). 
 
This could be due to base map being 
incorrect. 
 
This could be due to internal 
communications error (Bus overload or 
Bus packet data corruption). 
 
This could be due to a malicious attack. 
 
 
7.4.5. Creating test scenarios and scenario parameters 
Once the UCAs and their corresponding causal reasons are identified, the next step involves 
parametrisation for scenario creation. As discussed in section 7.3, a test scenario comprises 
of scenery elements, dynamic elements, context and pass criteria. The base parameters are 
selected depending upon the ODD specification of the LSAD. In this case study, the 
LSAD’s ODD included urban areas with pre-determined routes only.  
Parametrisation for scenario generation involves parametrisation of the context element of 
the UCA and the parametrisation of the “Potential control action not followed / How could 
this happen” element. In this section, some of the UCAs identified in Table 7.9 with their 
corresponding causal reasons identified in Table 7.10 are parametrised for scenario creation. 
Additionally, the corresponding pass criteria are also identified by negating the process 
model belief and reasons for the belief as identified in Table 7.10. Table 7.11 captures the 
scenario parameters and their pass criteria. The scenario representation of the Table 7.11 
could also be made similar to Table 7.8.     
Based on the parameters identified for each of the scenarios, test cases can be created by 
assigning values to each of the parameters. While the parameter value selection process is 
out of scope of this thesis, some of the potential approaches are discussed in section 7.5. 
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Table 7.11: Scenarios based on STPA analysis of the LSAD system 
UCA 
Potential control 
action not 
followed / How 
could this happen 
(B3) 
UCA Specific 
context 
UCA context 
parameters 
UCA how 
parameters 
Pass Criterion 1 Pass Criterion 2 
[UCA# 8a] 
Localization doesn’t 
provide updated pose 
when the vehicle is 
requested to move. [L1] 
[L2] 
This could be because 
processing of the 
internal filter is 
incorrect 
when the vehicle is 
requested to move 
Velocity Error in internal filter 
Obtaining Pose block 
believes there is small 
Covariance error. 
Sensor data provided is 
coherent. 
[UCA# 8b] 
Localization provides 
pose which doesn’t 
match the ground truth. 
- [L2][L1] 
This could be because 
sensor feed is delayed in 
time. 
which doesn’t match the 
ground truth 
Scenery (map data) 
Delay time 
Type of sensor delayed 
Obtaining Pose block 
shall not believe it has 
the correct pose. 
Covariance Error shall 
be is high. 
[UCA# 8c] 
Localization provides 
pose at a delayed time 
when the pod is moving. 
– [L1] 
This could be due to 
scheduling of the 
Obtaining pose block 
being delayed. 
 
This could be due to 
algorithm execution 
taking longer than 
expected, therefore the 
output data is based on 
processing of old data. 
when the pod is moving Velocity 
 
 
Delay time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm execution 
time duration 
 
 
 
 
 
Obtaining Pose block 
shall believe there is 
delay in pose signal. 
Obtaining Pose block 
shall believe that the 
data packets it receives 
don’t match the current 
time. 
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This could be due to 
internal 
communications error 
(Bus overload or Bus 
packet data corruption) 
 
Type of communication 
error 
[UCA# 8d] 
Localizer provides the 
current position for too 
long when the pod in 
moving. – [L1][L2] 
This could be because 
of a featureless or less 
features in environment 
(i.e., repetitive or empty 
- e.g. tunnel, airfield, 
ware-house bays) 
when the pod in moving Velocity 
Number of features in 
base world 
Obtaining Pose block 
shall not believe the 
incoming sensor data 
shows no change in 
position 
Surface probability 
command shall match 
rolling velocity vector 
and the Covariance 
Error shall be below the 
threshold. 
 
Or  
 
Surface probability 
command shall not 
match rolling velocity 
vector and the 
Covariance Error shall 
not be below the 
threshold. 
 
[UCA# 8d] 
Localizer provides the 
current position for too 
long when the pod in 
moving. – [L1][L2] 
This could be due to 
scheduling of the 
Obtaining pose block 
being delayed. 
 
This could be due to 
algorithm execution 
taking longer than 
expected, therefore the 
output data is based on 
processing of old data. 
 
This could be due to 
internal 
when the pod in moving Velocity 
 
Delay time 
 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm execution 
time duration 
 
 
 
 
 
Obtaining Pose block 
shall not believe it is 
sending the updated 
position. 
Obtaining pose block 
shall not believe its data 
packets have correct 
time stamp. 
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communications error 
(Bus overload or Bus 
packet data corruption) 
Type of communication 
error 
[UCA# 10a] 
DPM doesn’t provide 
Surface probability 
when the pod is 
requested to move. – 
[L1] 
This could be due to 
internal 
communications error 
(Bus overload or Bus 
packet data corruption). 
when the pod is 
requested to move 
Velocity 
Type of communication 
error 
DPM shall not believe it 
is providing the surface 
probability. 
DPM shall not believe it 
is sending data packets. 
[UCA# 10b1] 
DPM provides incorrect 
Surface probability 
when the Rolling 
velocity vector is 
correct. [L2] 
This could be because 
the base map is 
incorrect and doesn’t 
match with ground 
truth. 
 
when the Rolling 
velocity vector is 
correct. 
Rolling velocity vector 
Type of base map 
Storage mechanism of 
base map (coordinate 
system, format etc.) 
DPM believes it has not 
correctly quantified the 
surface probability 
when the all the sensor 
data was available and 
coherent. 
DPM shall not believe 
that because the 
covariance error is low 
and sensor data is 
correct. 
This could be because 
the environment is not 
feature rich (i.e. 
repetitive or empty e.g. 
tunnel, airfield, ware 
house) 
when the Rolling 
velocity vector is 
correct. 
Rolling velocity vector 
Number of features in 
base world 
Covariance error shall 
be high. 
This could be because 
the matching algorithm 
is incorrect. 
when the Rolling 
velocity vector is 
correct. 
Rolling velocity vector 
Type of errors in 
matching algorithm 
The matching algorithm 
shall not say that the 
surface probability is 
correctly quantified. 
[UCA# 10b2] 
DPM provides incorrect 
Surface probability 
when Odometry is also 
incorrect and both 
(surface probability and 
odometry) are coherent. 
- [L1] 
This could be due to 
internal 
communications error 
(Bus overload or Bus 
packet data corruption). 
 
This could be due to 
DPM algorithm being 
incorrect. 
 
This could be due to a 
malicious attack. 
when Odometry is also 
incorrect and both 
(surface probability and 
odometry) are coherent 
Deviation in odometry 
data from ground truth 
 
Deviation in surface 
probability data from 
ground truth 
 
Coherency deviation 
between odometry and 
surface probability data 
Type of communication 
error 
 
 
Type of errors in 
matching algorithm 
 
 
Type of malicious 
attack 
DPM shall not believe 
that it correctly 
quantified the surface 
probability. 
DPM shall believe that 
because Covariance 
Error is high. 
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[UCA# 10c] 
DPM provides correct 
surface probability but 
delayed while pod is 
moving. – [L1, L3] 
This could be due to 
internal 
communications error 
(Bus overload or Bus 
packet data corruption). 
 
This could be because 
the matching algorithm 
is incorrect. 
while pod is moving Velocity 
Type of communication 
error 
 
 
Type of errors in 
matching algorithm 
DPM shall not believe 
that it correctly 
quantified the surface 
probability. 
Matching algorithm 
shall not be able to 
match the sensor data to 
the base map. 
This could be due to 
delay in sensor(s) 
feed(s). 
 
This could be due to a 
malicious attack. 
Delay time 
Type of sensor delayed 
 
Type of malicious 
attack 
DPM shall believe that 
the Covariance Error is 
high. 
UCA# 10d] 
DPM provides same 
surface probability for 
more than 10ms while 
the pod is moving. – 
[L1, L3] 
 
This could be because 
of the sensor output is 
stuck at a particular 
value. 
 
 
This could be because 
the matching algorithm 
is incorrect. 
 
This could be due to 
internal 
communications error 
(Bus overload or Bus 
packet data corruption). 
 
This could be due to a 
malicious attack. 
while the pod is moving Velocity 
Type of sensor(s) whose 
output is frozen 
 
Freeze duration of 
sensor(s) feed  
 
 
Type of errors in 
matching algorithm 
 
 
 
Type of communication 
error 
 
 
 
Type of malicious 
attack 
 
DPM believes that it is 
providing the same 
surface probability 
DPM shall not be able 
to match the sensor data 
to the base map. 
This could be because 
the environment is not 
feature rich (i.e. 
repetitive or empty e.g. 
 
 
Number of features in 
base world 
DPM shall not believe it 
is providing the correct 
surface probability. 
Matching algorithm 
shall not be able to 
match the sensor data to 
the base map. 
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tunnel, airfield, ware 
house). 
 
This could be due to 
base map being 
incorrect. 
 
This could be due to 
internal 
communications error 
(Bus overload or Bus 
packet data corruption). 
 
This could be due to a 
malicious attack. 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of base map 
Storage mechanism of 
base map (coordinate 
system, format etc.) 
 
 
 
Type of communication 
error 
 
 
 
Type of malicious 
attack 
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Table 7.8 illustrates the relation between number of parameters, pass criteria and number of 
generated scenarios. Applying the proposed extension method (discussed in section 7.3) to 
STPA of the LSAD system (Figure 7.18), for the nine control actions, 350 parameters were 
identified which lead to the creation of 3398 test scenarios. Table 7.12 illustrates the number 
scenarios corresponding to each of the UCAs associated with the nine control actions 
identified in Figure 7.18. 
Table 7.12: Number of scenarios for each UCA 
Control Action UCA# 
Number of 
Scenarios 
Destination command 
4a 28 
4b 30 
Current Pose 
8a 12 
8b 14 
8c 30 
8d 36 
Surface Probability 
10a 6 
10b1 18 
10b2 126 
10c 44 
10d 188 
Detected Obstacles Vector 
12a 104 
12b 260 
12c 126 
Way Points Path Command 
13a 206 
13b1 62 
13b2 14 
Way Points Design Area Command 
14a 28 
14b 14 
14c 6 
14d 50 
Requested Kinematic Command 
15a 76 
15b1 76 
15b2 30 
15b3 74 
15c1 44 
15c2 44 
15c3 62 
15c4 62 
15d1 38 
15d2 62 
15d3 602 
Known Obstacles 
16a 132 
16b 88 
16c 72 
16d 88 
Occupancy Map 
20a1 14 
20a2 62 
20b1 14 
20b2 126 
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20b3 14 
20c1 68 
20c2 68 
20d1 36 
20d2 44 
Total 3398 
 
7.5. Discussion 
In the beginning of the research discussed in this chapter, the aim was to understand ‘how to 
identify “good” test scenarios. However, it was not clear what “good” meant or the 
characteristics that defined a “good” test scenario in the context of ADAS and ADS. The 
semi-structured interview study of the verification and validation experts from the 
automotive industry helped to identify that one of the characteristics of a “good” test 
scenario would be one that exposes failures. Thus, the concept of Hazard Based Testing 
(HBT) proposed in this research focusses on exposing failures in ADAS and ADS by testing 
“how a system fails”. 
Hazard identification is the first stage of HBT. There are various methods for hazard 
identification (discussed in section 7.2). In this thesis, it is argued that STPA, which is 
inspired from systems engineering, is the most effective hazard identification method for 
complex systems like ADAS and ADS. While the argument in support of STPA is based on 
literature, a possible extension of the current research would be to compare the results of 
various hazard identification methods (FMEA, FTA, HAZOP etc.) on the same ADAS or 
and ADS. It is important to acknowledge that the quality of the STPA results is dependent 
on the input of the system knowledge. In order to conduct the STPA of the LSAD system, 
the LSAD manufacturer – Aurrigo provided the system knowledge. 
The proposed extension to STPA was helped by the existing structure of the Unsafe Control 
Actions identified in STPA. The UCA structure (“actor, control action type, control action 
and context”), aided the parametrisation by highlighting the “context” element clearly. 
A future research step would involve creating an algorithm to select parameter values for the 
scenario parameters so that the pass criteria is violated. Various white box and black box 
methods can be used for parameter selection. One of the promising techniques is Bayesian 
Optimisation (BO), which converts the parameter selection problem into an optimisation 
problem. 
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7.6. Conclusion 
It is suggested in literature that to test an ADS in order to prove that it is 20% better than 
human driven vehicle, they need to be driven for over 11 billion miles (Kalra and Paddock, 
2016a). Research discussed in this chapter found that the number of miles driven is not a 
meaningful metric for judging confidence in ADAS or ADS, rather the scenarios 
encountered by the systems are more important. It was suggested that for an ADAS or an 
ADS, we need to test “how a system fails” rather than “how a system works”. The concept 
of Hazard Based Testing (HBT) was proposed to create hazard based test scenarios. To 
identify hazards, Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) was used as it has been 
suggested in literature that it identifies more hazards as compared to other hazard 
identification methods like FMEA, FTA, HAZOP, ETA etc. especially for complex systems 
involving human-automation interaction. Grounded in systems engineering and controls 
engineering, STPA is a four step process which considers safety as a control problem and a 
breach of a control law causes an accident/loss. STPA identifies Unsafe Control Actions 
(UCA) and their causal reasons. This chapter proposes an extension to STPA to create test 
scenarios for each of the UCAs identified as a part of the STPA method. The proposed 
method also identifies pass criteria for the test scenarios. The proposed test scenario consists 
of 1) scenery 2) dynamic elements 3) additional context and 4) pass criteria. The scenery and 
dynamic elements are selected according the Operational Design Domain (ODD) of the 
vehicle. Additional context is selected from the STPA output. The proposed method was 
applied to a real-world case study of a Low-Speed Automated Driving (LSAD) system. The 
STPA analysis of a part of the Autonomous Control System of the LSAD system with nine 
control actions yielded 45 Unsafe Control Actions. This corresponded to the creation of 
3398 test scenarios with 350 parameters associated with them. 
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INCREASING THE RELIABILITY OF INFORMED 
SAFETY5 
Chapter 8  
 
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter (chapter 7), a methodology for generating test scenarios for testing 
automated driving systems in order to create the knowledge for “informed safety” was 
proposed. The two-pronged approach of the proposed methodology includes: requirement 
based testing (RBT) and hazard based testing (HBT). While the ability to generate the 
knowledge is an important aspect of “informed safety”, an equally important aspect is the 
ability to generate the knowledge reliably, where reliability refers to the “extent to which a 
framework, experiment, test, or measuring instrument yields the same results over repeated 
trials” (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). 
The dynamic component of “informed safety” in part depicts the risk associated with a 
particular situation. In the automotive industry, the risk associated with a hazard and the 
corresponding safety goal, determine the rigour in development process employed for the 
system. The link between the development process and the risk in the automotive industry is 
governed by an international standard ISO 26262 – 2018 that provides guidance to perform 
the automotive HARA to measure risk in terms of Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) 
(discussed in section 8.1). Therefore, it is essential that the ASIL ratings are reliable to 
ensure reliable knowledge of risk is conveyed to the drivers and also that the development 
process for the automated driving systems are consistent across the industry leading to 
establishment of true capabilities and limitations of the automated driving systems in a 
reliable manner. Thus, improving the reliability of drivers’ informed safety. This chapter 
                                                     
5 Contents of this chapter have been published in the following publication: 
Khastgir, S., Birrell, S., Dhadyalla, G., Sivencrona, H., et al. (2017) ‘Towards increased reliability by 
objectification of Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) of automated automotive systems’, 
Safety Science. Elsevier Ltd, 99, pp. 166–177. doi: 10.1016/j.ssci.2017.03.024. 
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discusses research question 3 (RQ3: How to improve the inter- and intra-rater-reliability of 
the automotive HARA process). 
8.1. Introduction 
As discussed in chapter 6, the ISO 26262 – 2018 standard is industry’s gold standard for 
functional safety. The standard refers to ASIL as a metric for analysing the risk. An ASIL 
rating comprises of three components: Severity (S), Exposure (E) and Controllability (C). 
However, the standard fails to provide objective guidance to evaluate the each of the three 
(S, E and C) ratings or identify the parameters influencing these ratings (Yu et al., 2016). 
The lack of objectivity leads to subjective interpretation of the standard by experts causing 
intra-rater and inter-rater variations leading to reduced reliability of the ratings (Ergai et al., 
2016). 
8.1.1. ASIL 
The ISO 26262 – 2018 defines Automotive Safety Integrity Level or ASIL as “one of four 
levels to specify the item's or element's necessary ISO 26262 requirements and safety 
measures to apply for avoiding an unreasonable risk with D representing the most stringent 
and A the least stringent level”. Various ASIL levels identified by ISO 26262-2018 are QM, 
ASIL A, ASIL B, ASIL C, and ASIL D, where QM (quality management) denotes the 
lowest integrity level with no requirements to comply with ISO 26262 and ASIL D applies 
the most stringent requirements on product development cycle to comply with ISO 26262. 
The difference in requirements is also evident in Table 8.2. Based on the severity, exposure 
and the controllability rating, an ASIL rating is determined using the ASIL determination 
table specified in the ISO 26262 – 2018 Part 3 (ISO, 2018c) (Table 8.1), which shows the 
relation between them. The ISO 26262 standard provides ASIL dependent requirements for 
the development process of safety functions involving hardware and software components. 
The level of rigour required for higher ASIL values is considerably high as compared to a 
lower ASIL value. Therefore, the automotive industry is always driven towards lower ASIL 
values in order to keep their development costs down. This inherent bias can also sometimes 
lead to an inconsistency in the ASIL ratings. 
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Table 8.1: ASIL determination table (adapted from ISO 26262 – 2018: Part 3 (ISO, 2018c)) 
Severity Class Exposure class 
Controllability class 
C1 C2 C3 
S1 
E1 QM QM QM 
E2 QM QM QM 
E3 QM QM A 
E4 QM A B 
S2 
E1 QM QM QM 
E2 QM QM A 
E3 QM A B 
E4 A B C 
S3 
E1 QM QM A 
E2 QM A B 
E3 A B C 
E4 B C D 
 
The difference in the requirements for development processes to be followed for various 
ASIL levels is mentioned in the standard via many tables. Table 8.2 illustrates the increased 
rigour required in the methods for software unit testing as the ASIL level increases. For an 
ASIL C and ASIL D system, back-to-back comparison test between model and code is 
highly recommended as per the standard which adds considerable cost to the product 
development cycle. 
Table 8.2: Methods for verification of software integration (adapted from ISO 26262-2018: Part 6 (ISO, 2018d)) 
 Method ASIL A ASIL B ASIL C ASIL D 
1a Requirements-based test ++ ++ ++ ++ 
1b Interface test ++ ++ ++ ++ 
1c Fault injection test + + ++ ++ 
1d Resource usage evaluation ++ ++ ++ ++ 
1e 
Back-to-back comparison test between model and code, 
if applicable 
+ + ++ ++ 
1f ….      
++ : highly recommended; + : recommended; o : no recommendation for or against 
 
8.1.2. Severity 
The ISO 26262 – 2018 defines “severity” as “estimate of the extent of harm to one or more 
individuals that can occur in a potentially hazardous situation”, for the driver or the 
passengers of the vehicle or other vulnerable road users like cyclists, pedestrians in the 
vicinity of the vehicle. The standard refers to the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) (Baker et 
al., 1974) as one of the methods for calculating the severity rating. The standard defines four 
classes for severity: 1) S0 (no injuries) 2) S1 (Light and moderate injuries) 3) S2 (severe and 
life threatening injuries) 4) S3 (life-threatening injuries, fatal injuries) 
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8.1.3. Exposure 
The ISO 26262 – 2018 defines “exposure” as “state of being in an operational situation that 
can be hazardous if coincident with the failure mode under analysis”. The standard defines 
five classes for exposure: 1) E0 incredible 2) E1 (very low probability: Occurs less often 
than once a year for the great majority of drivers) 3) E2 (low probability: Occurs a few times 
a year for the great majority of drivers) 4) E3 (medium probability: Occurs once a month or 
more often for an average driver) 5) E4 (high probability: occurs during almost every drive 
on average). 
8.1.4. Controllability 
The ISO 26262-2018 (ISO, 2018c) standard states that “The evaluation of the controllability 
is an estimate of the probability that someone is able to gain sufficient control of the 
hazardous event, such that they are able to avoid the specific harm.”. 
While the standard classifies controllability into four classes: 1) C0 (Controllable in general) 
2) C1 (simply controllable: 99 % or more of all drivers or other traffic participants are 
usually able to avoid harm) 3) C2 (normally controllable: 90 % or more of all drivers or 
other traffic participants are usually able to avoid harm) 4) C3 (difficult to control or 
uncontrollable: less than 90 % of all drivers or other traffic participants are usually able, or 
barely able, to avoid harm), it fails to elaborate on the criteria for the classification and 
defining the levels in a more objective manner. This introduces a degree of vagueness and 
subjectivity to the classification. To give a rating for controllability, the experts needs to 
understand how a driver/operator would react to a hazard caused by a failure for any given 
situation to have a valid rating. As discussed in chapter three, such an analysis will be based 
on the expert’s mental model and background knowledge leading to inter-rater variation, as 
the assumptions and mental models may differ significantly between experts. The two 
distinct short-comings of the current ISO 26262-2018 standard are guided by the subjective 
nature of the experts’ mental models leading to unreliable ratings and the inability to identify 
all hazards (including the black swan events). Additionally, controllability argument changes 
when an autonomous system is considered as the driver is no longer a fall-back option. 
8.1.5. Reliability through objectivity 
According to Cambridge English Dictionary (“Cambridge English Dictionary,” 2017), 
“objectivity” is defined as “the state or quality of being objective and fair”, where 
“objective” is defined as “based on real facts and not influenced by personal beliefs or 
feelings”.  
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In order to prevent the influence of personal beliefs and mental models of experts leading to 
varied and unreliable HARA ratings and to answer the research question three, the author 
proposes the creation of a rule-set to introduce objectivity in the process. Objectivity could 
potentially be a tool to help provide consistency and convergence of HARA ratings, thus 
providing increased reliability. 
8.2. Creating Rule-set 
To answer research question three, the author proposes objectivising severity and 
controllability ratings by introducing a rule-set for both the ratings. One of the first steps was 
to run a pilot study (discussed in Appendix A4) to evaluate the existence of reliability issues 
in HARA ratings in the automotive domain. This study was one of the first steps towards 
achieving reliable ratings through an objective decision making process for HARA.  
The initial rule-set (used in the pilot study) didn’t provide rules for exposure rating. The 
author in his analysis of hazards with a different set of experts had come to a conclusion that 
the exposure rating for the given hazardous events and the given system (discussed in 
section 8.3.3.2 and section 8.3.3.1) will most certainly be E4 (highly probable).  In order to 
objectify the HARA process, severity and controllability ratings’ rule-set were parametrized 
in terms of factors (parameters) identified by the author. While various hazards and 
hazardous events were identified, various parameters were used to classify a hazardous 
event. These included acceleration value, velocity etc. The first set of parameters were 
identified from this set. In addition, existing literature was reviewed for factors influencing 
severity and controllability (Baker et al., 1974; Ellims and Monkhouse, 2012; Green, 2000; 
Lortie and Rizzo, 1998; Monkhouse et al., 2015; Summala, 2000; Verma and Goertz, 2016). 
The parametrization of the HARA components should help meet the R1, R2 and R3 
reliability criteria defined by Aven and Heide (2009), by objectivising the decision making 
process involved in HARA ratings. Figure 8.1 depicts the process of development of the 
initial rule-set, along with stakeholder roles at each step. Feedback on the rule-set was 
received from independent functional safety experts. 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Process of developing initial rule-set with role description for each step 
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8.2.1. Severity rating rule-set 
The severity parameters were mainly influenced by impact energy, characteristics of impact 
and the environment (Johansson and Nilsson, 2016a). Therefore, the parameters identified 
for severity rating were: 1) vehicle velocity 2) oncoming object velocity 3) type of obstacle 
4) type of impact (side, head-on etc.) 5) gradient of slope 6) magnitude of delta torque 
(difference between required and provided torque) 7) maximum acceleration/deceleration 8) 
mass of vehicle. However, the severity rule-set depicted in Table 8.3 is a condensed version 
of the initial rule-set. A condensed version of the rule-set (prepared by the author) was used 
due to logistical reasons of conducting the validation of the rule-set. The condensed version 
of the rule-set was prepared by deleting some of the secondary parameters like type of 
collision (head-on, side, rear), gradient of slope, country/city for which the hazard was 
described for etc.  
Table 8.3: Initial Severity rule-set for US workshop (workshop 1) 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming 
Obj. Velocity 
Severity 
Rating 
 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming 
Obj. Velocity 
Severity 
Rating 
Pedestrian 
< 11 km/h 
< 2 km/h S0 
 
Infrastructure 
< 11 
km/h 
0 km/h 
S0 < 6 km/h S1 
 
0 km/h 
< 12km/h S1 
 
0 km/h 
11 - 16 
km/h 
< 2 km/h S1 
 
11 - 16 
km/h 
0 km/h 
S1 < 6 km/h S2 
 
0 km/h 
< 12km/h S2 
 
0 km/h 
> 16 km/h 
< 2 km/h S2 
 
> 16 
km/h 
0 km/h 
S2 < 6 km/h S3 
 
0 km/h 
< 12km/h S3 
 
0 km/h 
     
 
   
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming 
Obj. Velocity 
Severity 
Rating 
 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming 
Obj. Velocity 
Severity 
Rating 
Vehicle 
< 11 km/h 
< 10 km/h S0 
 
Cyclist 
< 11 
km/h 
< 8 km/h S0 
< 20km/h S1 
 
< 14km/h S1 
> 20 km/h S2 
 
< 20km/h S2 
11 - 16 
km/h 
< 10 km/h S1 
 
11 - 16 
km/h 
< 8 km/h S1 
< 20km/h S1 
 
< 14km/h S2 
> 20 km/h S2 
 
< 20km/h S2 
> 16 km/h 
< 10 km/h S1 
 
> 16 
km/h 
< 8 km/h S2 
< 20km/h S2 
 
< 14km/h S2 
> 20 km/h S3 
 
< 20km/h S3 
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8.2.2. Controllability rating rule-set 
One of the major factors influencing controllability of the hazardous situation is the speed of 
the vehicle. In order to evaluate the effect of speed on controllability of a vehicle, a driving 
simulator experiment was conducted. Details of the experiment are discussed in Appendix 
A4. The findings of the study two (controllability study) (discussed in Appendix A4) were 
incorporated in the controllability rating rule-set. The controllability parameters were mainly 
influenced by the vehicle’s ability to change trajectory and the environment affecting 
vehicle’s ability to make this change (McGehee et al., 2000; Rosén et al., 2011; Schaap et 
al., 2008; Young and Stanton, 2007). The parameters identified for controllability were: 1) 
vehicle velocity 2) time-to-collision (TTC) 3) distance to obstacle 3) maximum 
acceleration/deceleration 4) availability of safe area 5) road friction 6) gradient of slope. 
Time-to-collision (TTC) is defined as “the time taken by the trailing vehicle to crash into the 
front vehicle, if the vehicles continue in the same path without adjusting their speeds” (Chin 
and Quek, 1997). Similar to the severity rule-set, a condensed version of the controllability 
rule-set was used in the pilot study due to logistical reasons and is depicted in Table 8.5. The 
condensed version was prepared on similar basis as the severity rule-set (in addition to the 
results from controllability study (study two: discussed in Appendix A4)), and is illustrated 
in Table 8.4. 
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Table 8.4: Initial Controllability rule-set for US workshop (workshop 1) 
Emergency 
Deceleration Value 
Distance to 
Obstacle 
TTC 
Vehicle 
velocity 
Controllability 
Rating 
0.4g - 0.8g 
< 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C3 
1.0 - 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C2 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C0 
> 16 km/h C2 
> 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C2 
1.0 - 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C0 
11 - 16 km/h C0 
> 16 km/h C2 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C0 
> 16 km/h C1 
     
Emergency 
Deceleration Value 
Distance to 
Obstacle 
TTC 
Vehicle 
velocity 
Controllability 
Rating 
< 0.4g 
< 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C3 
11 - 16 km/h C2 
> 16 km/h C3 
1.0 - 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C2 
> 16 km/h C3 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C3 
> 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C3 
11 - 16 km/h C2 
> 16 km/h C3 
1.0 - 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C3 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C2 
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8.3. Method 
In order to answer the research question three (identified in chapter six) (“How to improve 
the inter- and intra-rater-reliability of the automotive HARA process?”), the author created 
rule-sets for severity, controllability ratings and subsequently for exposure ratings too. A 
hybrid approach was adopted for creating the rule-set. For creating the controllability 
ratings, a driving simulator study was conducted to evaluate the effect of vehicle speed on 
controllability. Additional parameters were identified based on literature review. The 
creation of the initial rule-set is discussed in section 8.2. 
Once the initial rule-set was created, to test the hypothesis that a rule-set could increase the 
objectivity of the automotive HARA process, potentially leading to convergence in ratings 
and thus improving the reliability of the automotive HARA, a series of workshops involving 
international functional safety experts were conducted (Figure 8.2). The workshop studies 
were conducted in US, Sweden, Germany and the UK.  
The first workshop study (pilot study) was conducted in United States at a conference to 
which the author was invited as an invited speaker. The first workshop was essentially a 
scoping workshop to understand two aspects of the study: 
 Do industry experts share the opinion on the reliability challenges of the automotive 
HARA? 
 Do industry experts believe that providing rules for automotive HARA can be 
beneficial to achieve increased reliability of the HARA process? 
While the industry experts appreciated the reliability challenges of the automotive HARA 
and the use of rules to overcome the challenges, it was mentioned that the rules needed to be 
more elaborate to avoid their misinterpretation. The detailed feedback and the results are 
discussed in section 8.4.3. Based on the results and participant feedback from the first 
workshop, the second workshop was conducted in Sweden. While better convergence in 
HARA ratings was achieved in the Sweden workshop, controllability ratings still showed 
variation which was also mentioned in the feedback from the experts. This feedback helped 
to further refine the workshop design and the rules. The penultimate workshop (workshop 3) 
was held in Germany on the side-lines of a conference where the author was invited as an 
invited speaker. After workshop 3, the rule-set was re-calibrated based on the feedback from 
the workshop 3 and independent functional safety experts who had not taken part in any of 
the workshops. With the final rule-set, the last workshop was conducted with a modified 
workshop design in the UK at WMG, University of Warwick’s premises with functional 
safety experts from the UK’s automotive industry. 
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8.3.1. Ethical Approval 
Ethical approval for the series of workshops was secured from the University of Warwick’s 
Biomedical & Scientific Research Ethics Committee (BSREC) (BSREC Ethical Application 
ID: REGO-2016-1845). All data gathered from the workshop was treated in a confidential 
manner, in accordance with the University of Warwick’s Data Protection Policy. Informed 
consent was obtained from all participants. 
8.3.2. Participants 
The number of participants in each of the workshops varied from 10 – 17. However, in each 
of the workshops, participants were divided into different groups. Depending on the number 
of participants taking part in the workshop, participants were arranged in either three groups 
(US and UK workshop), four groups (Germany workshop) or five groups (Sweden 
workshop). 
8.3.3. Workshop structure 
The workshop was modelled on the World Café method (Fouche and Light, 2011). Putting 
participants in a world café style workshop keeps them engaged in the given task. 
Additionally, it also allows participants to mix with each other which was an important 
reason for the choice (to evaluate inter-rater reliability variation).  
Figure 8.2: Timeline for HARA workshops and rules development 
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Workshop one (US workshop), two (Sweden workshop) and three (Germany workshop) had 
four rounds each, while workshop four (UK workshop) had two rounds only. Having already 
established the inter-rater variation caused by mixing participants in groups, the focus of 
workshop four was only on the impact of the rule-set and its potential to increase the 
reliability of the automotive HARA process, which meant that two of the rounds could be 
removed. The detailed structure for individual workshops is discussed in sections 8.4.2, 
Appendix A4, 8.6.2 and 8.7.2. 
8.3.3.1. System definition 
Participants were asked to perform a HARA for a given hazard and hazardous events for a 
Low Speed Autonomous Driving System (LSAD), i.e. a pod. Participants were asked to 
make the assumption that the current ISO 26262 Part 3, which is an automotive functional 
safety standard for passenger vehicles is applicable for the LSAD (pod). 
8.3.3.2. Hazard and hazardous event definition 
According the international standard ISO 26262 – 2018, hazard is defined as “potential 
source of harm caused by malfunctioning behaviour of the item”. In addition ISO 26262 – 
2018 defines hazardous event as “combination of a hazard and an operational situation”, 
where operational situation is defined as “scenario that can occur during a vehicle's life”.  
For the first workshop, the hazard provided was identified after conducting in-depth hazard 
analysis for a low-speed autonomous vehicle and a qualitative analysis was carried out on 
the explanation for the analysis. The in-depth hazard analysis was conducted by independent 
functional safety experts involved in the UK Autodrive6 project. The hazard and the 
hazardous events definition for the pod was a result of this HARA. Various functions like 
Torque management, braking and route planning could cause a given hazard. All functions 
causing the hazard (provided to the experts in the workshops) were related to vehicle’s 
movement. However, the hazard definition was modified to incorporate the feedback from 
the experts from each of the workshops. 
 
 
                                                     
6 http://www.ukautodrive.com/ 
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8.3.3.3. Qualitative feedback 
At the end of workshop rounds, each group was asked to provide feedback on the workshop 
by answering two questions:  
 (During the workshop) Have you experienced variation in hazard analysis 
discussions based on the group of people involved in the discussion? 
 Do you think by having rules by parametrizing hazard analysis, we can have a more 
objective approach? 
 
8.4. Workshop 1 (USA: Initial Scoping workshop) 
8.4.1. Participants 
Twelve participants were involved in the workshop, who had experience in automotive 
functional safety assessments. Eight out of the 12 participants identified themselves as 
automotive functional safety specialists and had taken part in international ISO 26262 
functional safety technical committee discussions. The remaining four participants identified 
themselves as development/systems engineers applying automotive functional safety 
principles in their function development process. Participants had diverse backgrounds 
representing different levels of supply chain across the automotive supply chain. Two 
participants were from OEM (original equipment manufacturer), seven were from Tier One 
suppliers, two were from Tier Two suppliers and remaining one participant was from 
academia/research organization background. All participants were from North America and 
Europe. 
8.4.2. Workshop 1 structure 
In workshop 1, participants were grouped into three groups of four participants each. The 
workshop consisted of an introduction which was followed by four rounds of 25 minutes 
each. Each group was provided with two different hazardous events and were asked to rate 
the two given hazardous events. The same hazardous events were given in each of the four 
rounds. Figure 8.3 shows the workshop 1 structure. Participants were informed about the 
system (section 8.3.3.1 and section 8.4.2.2) for which they were being asked to perform the 
HARA during the introduction stage.  
Before starting the rounds of discussion for HARA, each group (assigned a table) was asked 
to nominate one participant as the moderator for the group. In round one, each group was 
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supposed to discuss and come to a consensus for each of the two hazardous events, on a 
rating for Severity (S), Exposure (E) and Controllability (C) and subsequently for ASIL. 
After round one, the members of the groups were shuffled, but the moderator for each group 
remained same. The shuffling was done in a way that the table had at least two new 
participants as compared to the previous round. In round two, the new groups were asked to 
discuss and give ratings for S, E and C. After round two, participants were provided with a 
rule-set by the author for conducting HARA. The participants were instructed how to use the 
rule-set. Participants were instructed not to question the rules for their validity. However, 
they were given the freedom to interpret the rules as per their understanding. In round three, 
participants used the provided rule-set for HARA to complete the task of S, E and C ratings 
for the two hazardous events. The groups were same in round two and round three. After 
round three, the groups were again shuffled, but the moderators for the groups remained the 
same. In round four, the new groups were again tasked to use the rule-set for HARA 
(provided to them) to rate the two hazards for S, E and C. The mixing of groups after round 
one and round three helps address the research question of inter-rater variability (with and 
without the rule-set). Moderators were asked to provide a brief explanation of the discussion 
in each round and the reasoning behind the rating for each of the parameters (S, E and C). 
This provided a possibility to perform both quantitative and qualitative analysis on the 
gathered data which includes the ratings in each round (quantitative) and the moderators’ 
explanation in each round (qualitative). 
Figure 8.3: Workshop 1 structure 
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8.4.2.1. System definition 
Participants were asked to perform a HARA for the provided hazard and hazardous events 
for a Low Speed Automated Driving Vehicle (LSAD). The system features presented to the 
participants were: 
 Fully Autonomous in dedicated ODD (SAE Level 4) 
 Connected vehicle with Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) capability 
 Emergency stop button. No trained safety driver 
 No steering wheel or pedals 
 Top speed of 25 km per hour 
Participants were asked to make the assumption that the current ISO 26262-2011 (in 2016) 
Part 3 (2011 was the latest version of the standard at the time of the workshop), which is an 
automotive functional safety standard for passenger vehicles is applicable for LSAD system. 
Participants were advised to use the ASIL determination table, which was provided to them 
during the workshop from the mentioned standard. 
8.4.2.2. Hazard definition 
The hazard provided to the participants was “Collision (of pod) with static or dynamic 
obstacle due to stopping or accelerating to a vulnerable position”. Based on the hazard, 
participants were provided two hazardous events and were asked to discuss the HARA for 
the two given events to give S, E and C ratings. The two hazardous events provided were: 
 Pod travels into pedestrian / cyclist 
 Pod does unintended braking 
8.4.3. Results 
8.4.3.1. Quantitative Results 
Each group was asked to provide a rating for Severity, Exposure and Controllability for the 
two hazardous events for each round of their discussion. Figure 8.4 shows the ASIL ratings 
provided by the individual groups in different rounds. Different rounds have been plotted on 
the x-axis and the ASIL ratings have been plotted on the y-axis. Rules for HARA were 
provided only in round three and round four. In the first round, (when no rules were 
provided to the participants), each group came up with a different ASIL rating with 
significant differences. The difference between the groups were of the order of two for group 
1 and group 3 (ASIL A and ASIL C for first hazardous event) and group two and group 
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three (QM and ASIL B for second hazardous event). The difference with the other group 
was of the order of one. Round two proved to have some convergence in the ratings, 
however there were still significant differences in the ASIL ratings. For hazardous event 1, 
two groups converged to an ASIL rating of ASIL C, while the third group differed 
significantly with an ASIL rating of QM which means the difference was of the order three. 
For hazardous event 2, while two of the groups converged to an ASIL A rating, the third 
group gave a QM rating which meant a difference of the order of one. It is interesting to 
observe that the groups giving QM rating to hazard 1 and hazard 2 were different.  
The variation in the ASIL ratings provided by the groups in round one and round two, 
illustrates the low reliability (inter-rater) of the current automotive hazard analysis method, 
even when done by experts in the industry. While every group was provided with the same 
hazardous events to rate, each of them had a different justification for the ASIL rating 
provided by them. The difference demonstrates the inter-rater variability in automotive 
HARA due to presence of subjectivity which is caused by the experts’ mental models. This 
makes the HARA process unreliable as per the R2 and R3 criteria of reliability mentioned by 
Aven and Heide (2009). The variation in the HARA ratings will be discussed in more detail 
in the qualitative analysis section (section 8.4.3.2).  
Before round 3, rules for HARA were introduced to the participants and they were asked to 
use the rules to perform the HARA. It was expected that the introduction of the rule-set 
would introduce objectivity in the HARA process and potentially lead to a convergence in 
the ASIL ratings from the three groups of experts. However, the results (as depicted in 
Figure 8.4), illustrate the opposite. In round three, for both hazardous event 1 and hazardous 
event 2, the three groups provided three different ASIL ratings with a maximum difference 
of order two and the minimum difference of order one. This was contrary to the expectation 
of the author. However, the qualitative analysis of the round three results (section 8.4.3.2) 
provide a deeper insight on the cause of the variation. Round four provided an interesting set 
of results for hazardous event 1 and hazardous event 2, with convergence in ratings achieved 
for hazardous event 2.  
The ASIL ratings for hazardous event 1 between rounds 1-2 and rounds 3-4, show a visual 
decrease in variation (Figure 8.4), indicating shift towards convergence, potentially due to 
the introduction of rule-set. In an ideal situation, for a fully reliable HARA, the variation in 
ratings should be zero. While ASIL ratings for hazardous event 1 provided by different 
groups varied significantly (with a maximum variation of order 2 and a minimum variation 
of order 1), ASIL ratings for hazardous event 2 converged for all groups at ASIL A. At a 
higher level, it might seem that the convergence of the ASIL rating for hazardous event 2 is 
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a result of the introduction of the rule-set by the author. However, a more granular analysis 
of the components of ASIL provides a different view. As discussed in section 8.1.1, an ASIL 
rating is comprised of a severity rating (S), exposure rating (E) and a controllability rating 
(C). Figure 8.5 – 8.7 depict the severity, exposure and the controllability ratings respectively 
for hazard 1 and hazard 2. 
 
 
Severity 
 In round 1, while two groups agreed on the severity rating, the third group provided a rating 
with a difference of order two for hazardous event 1 (Figure 8.5). In round two, all the 
groups converged in their severity rating at S3 for hazardous event 1. With the introduction 
of rules in round three, while two of the groups converged in their severity rating at S2 
(which was different from their round two ratings), the third group gave a rating (S3) which 
differed in the rating of the other two groups by the order of one. In round four, after the 
groups were mixed, a similar spread was found with two groups agreeing in their severity 
rating at S2, while the third group gave a rating of S3. The group giving a diverging rating to 
the others was different in round three and round four. For hazardous event 2, two groups 
converged completely across all the rounds. However, the third group showed significant 
variation across the rounds. In round one, the severity rating of the third group was in 
agreement with the other groups at S1. However, in round two, the group gave a rating of 
Figure 8.4: ASIL ratings for hazard 1 and hazard 2 given by experts in different rounds 
(Round 1 and Round 2: without rule-set); (Round 3 and Round 4: with rule-set) 
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S2. With introduction of rules, the group gave a severity rating of S3 and S2 in round three 
and round four respectively. 
 
Exposure 
In the workshop experiment, no rules were provided for exposure rating. While this was due 
to the author’s understanding of exposure rating being almost certainly being constant, the 
experiment was also designed to see if there was any intra-rater variability, i.e., variation in 
the same group of people with experience. In case any intra-rater variance was present, this 
would be seen in the ratings of round 2 and round 3, as the groups in the two rounds were 
identical. While there was no evidence of intra-rater variability in the exposure ratings, a 
significant degree of inter-rater variability existed among the different groups across various 
rounds (Figure 8.6). Contrary to the author’s hypothesis, the variation in exposure ratings 
was high, as compared to the severity and the controllability ratings for hazardous event 1. 
While the same was true for rounds 1-2 for hazardous event 2, rounds 3-4 for hazardous 
event 2 showed the least variation for exposure rating. 
Controllability 
Controllability ratings for hazardous event 1 showed a similar variation as that of the 
severity ratings. However, the variation for controllability ratings rose for both the 
hazardous events, with the introduction of the rules. This could potentially be due to the 
interpretation of the rules provided to the participants.  
Figure 8.5: Severity ratings for hazard 1 and hazard 2 given by experts (in different rounds) 
Round 1 and Round 2: without rule-set; Round 3 and Round 4: with rule-set 
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Ideally, the introduction of the rule-set for HARA should have led to zero variation in the 
severity, exposure, controllability and ASIL ratings. While the reduction was observed in 
some of the ratings (Figure 8.7), it is important to analyse the results qualitatively (section 
8.4.3.2) to explain the deviation. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.6: Exposure ratings for hazard 1 and hazard 2 given by experts in different rounds. 
Round 1 and Round 2: without rule-set; Round 3 and Round 4: with rule-set 
Figure 8.7: Controllability ratings for hazard 1 and hazard 2 given by experts in different rounds).  
Round 1 and Round 2: without rule-set; Round 3 and Round 4: with rule-set 
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8.4.3.2. Qualitative Results 
Each of the three groups were asked to provide answers to the questions mentioned in 
section 8.3.3.3 about their experience of HARA in the different rounds of the workshop. 
While answering the first question about experiencing variation in hazard analysis 
discussions, all three groups mentioned that they had experienced variation in HARA 
discussions in different rounds. All three groups concurred that the source of variation was 
the different perspectives presented by different individuals present in the group. However, 
the reasons for varying perspectives differed between the groups. One of the groups 
mentioned that the HARA is dependent on persons’ experience and their previous 
training/understanding of the rating procedure in HARA. This coincides with the literature 
discussed earlier (in chapter 6) about the background knowledge of the experts being one of 
the reasons for subjectivity (Aven and Zio, 2014). Another group mentioned that experts 
from different cultures, perceived “severity” and “exposure” ratings differently and there is 
a need to provide context regarding the environment for which the product is being made. 
Although, limited literature exists to support the cultural factor as a source of subjectivity in 
HARA, recent studies in other domains like occupational health and safety (OHS) have 
indicated this trend (Aven and Zio, 2014; Tchiehe and Gauthier, 2017). Having participants 
from North America and different European countries was beneficial in observing this trend. 
Two out of the three groups agreed in their response to the second question by saying that 
the introduction of rules by parametrizing HARA made the process more objective. While 
the third group disagreed with the statement, but qualified their response by mentioning that 
the rules, the parameters and their relationship were open to subjective interpretation. The 
other two groups mentioned that the rules needed to be re-calibrated in certain areas (like 
introducing context for the rules) and more examples and instructions need to be provided 
before using the rules. This is further established by the fact that each of the groups in round 
three and four (while using the rules for HARA) made different initial assumptions about the 
system and the hazard due to which they came to a different severity and controllability 
rating. This emphasizes the importance of the initial assumptions made by the experts 
performing the HARA and was also highlighted by one of the groups in their feedback. 
Providing context to the rule-set could potentially help to remove the subjective nature of the 
initial assumptions and will be introduced in future workshop studies. 
8.4.4. Learnings from workshop 1: A discussion 
One of the aspects highlighted in the qualitative analysis of the feedback was on the need for 
a few example cases and training to use the provided rule-set. This would potentially aid the 
experts’ understanding on how to use the rule-set provided for performing HARA. In order 
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to overcome the challenge due to unclear understanding of the process, based on the 
feedback from workshop 1, the author extended the rule-set introduction time during future 
workshop (section 8.5 – 8.7) and also incorporated a few example cases.  The participants 
also suggested the inclusion of some of the assumptions about the crashworthiness of the 
vehicle and the operational design domain of the vehicle. 
Since, contrary to the author’s hypothesis, it was found that the exposure ratings were also 
subject to high degree of variation, an additional rule-set for exposure ratings was introduced 
in the next workshops (discussed in sections 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7). At the time, it was believed 
that an exposure rule-set along with the context definition should potentially be able to bring 
convergence in the exposure ratings and hence ASIL ratings too. 
The hazard and the hazardous events chosen for the workshop study were a small part of a 
larger collection of hazards and hazardous events. The full collection was created as a result 
of a safety analysis of the low-speed autonomous vehicle. While the independent group of 
experts who performed the safety analysis had full information about the system and the 
hazards, the expert participants in the workshop study had limited information about given 
hazard. In some of the qualitative feedback, participants mentioned the need for more 
information. However, it was also noticed from the discussion notes of the expert panels that 
they found it hard to implement the classification method. In order to mitigate such 
instances, hazard and hazardous events with more information about the situation and 
context were provided in future workshops 
8.5. Workshop 2 (Sweden) 
After the initial workshop in USA, the next workshop was conducted in Sweden. The 
workshop was attended by seventeen participants. All of the participants had prior 
experience in functional safety assessment. The workshop had a world café structure (similar 
to workshop one: section 8.4). However as the number of participants were larger than the 
first workshop, experts were divided into five groups. Detailed study methodology and 
results are discussed in Appendix A5. 
8.5.1. Learnings from workshop 2: A discussion 
Most of the participants in workshop 2 suggested incorporating an additional parameter of 
“type of collision (head-on, rear, side-on)” in the severity rule-set. Moreover, some 
suggested that the controllability rule-set was over dimensioned and “on-coming object 
velocity” could be removed as a parameter. These comments suggested that experts 
considered the validity of the rule-set of as an important part of the exercise, even though it 
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was clearly stated to participants that they should assume that the provided rule-set is valid. 
In a repeat from the first workshop, one of the participants commented that a user guidebook 
on how to use the rule-set would be helpful. For the next workshop, an even more elaborate 
introduction on how to use the rule-set was provided.  
Even though the hazard and hazardous event definitions were reviewed and agreed upon by 
independent functional safety experts, participants in the workshop raised questions about 
the definition and need for more specificity in the hazardous event definition. According to 
some of the participants, the lack of specificity (e.g. operational conditions) led to subjective 
assumptions on those parameters which decreased the reliability of the HARA process even 
with the use of the rule-set. 
8.6. Workshop 3 (Germany) 
8.6.1. Participants 
Twelve participants (including moderators) with experience in system safety took part in 
workshop three. The participants were from diverse backgrounds with two of participants 
identifying their affiliation to an OEM, five participants to a Tier 1 supplier, one to a Tier 2 
supplier and three to academia/research organization. The average work experience of the 
participants (including moderators) was more than 16 years. Eight out of the 12 participants 
identified themselves as functional safety specialists, one of them identified as Quality 
Assurance Manager and two others identified themselves as system engineers. Participants 
were from Europe, United States and Australia. 
8.6.2. Workshop structure 
The 12 participants were grouped into four groups (each group assigned a table) with each 
group having three participants. Each of the groups had a moderator who was the table 
owner and was decided prior to the start of the workshop. Similar to workshops one and two, 
workshop three also had four rounds.  Each round was of 25 minutes. As in workshop one 
and two, each group was provided with two different hazardous events and was asked to rate 
the two given hazardous events. The same hazardous events were given in each of the four 
rounds. In each round, the participants were asked to provide Severity (S), Exposure (E) and 
controllability (C) ratings for the two hazardous events. The workshop structure and 
participant shuffling was similar to workshop 1 (Figure 8.3), with participants being shuffled 
at the end of round 1 and round 3. Rules for HARA were introduced at the end of round 2 
and participants were asked to use the rules for assigning the S, E and C ratings in rounds 3 
and 4. 
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8.6.2.1. Additional System definition 
In addition, to the system definition for the SAE Level 4 Low-Speed Automated Driving 
system (LSAD) described in section 8.3.3.1, participants were also provided with the 
following description: 
 Vehicle crashworthy up to top speed 
 Driving domain: public roads in inner city in UK 
8.6.2.2. Hazard definition 
The hazard provided to the participants was “Unintended acceleration to a vulnerable 
position (in Germany)”. Based on the hazard, participants were provided two hazardous 
events and were asked to discuss the HARA for the two given events to give Severity, 
Exposure and Controllability ratings. The two hazardous events provided to the participants 
were: 
 Pod collides with pedestrian (child) in a side impact. 
 Pod is in roadway when vehicle approaches 
8.6.3. Rule-set 
8.6.3.1. Severity rule-set 
Based on the feedback from the Sweden workshop, “type of impact” was added as one of 
the parameters for severity rating. Table 8.5, Table 8.6 and Table 8.7 illustrate the modified 
severity rule-set. 
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Table 8.5: Severity rule-set (part 1) for Germany workshop (workshop 3) 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming Obj. 
Velocity 
Type of Impact 
Severity 
Rating 
Pedestrian 
(Adult) 
< 11 km/h 
< 2 km/h 
Head-on S0 
Rear S0 
Side S0 
< 6 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S0 
Side S1 
< 12km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S1 
Side S1 
11 - 16 
km/h 
< 2 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S0 
Side S1 
< 6 km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S1 
Side S1 
< 12km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S1 
Side S2 
> 16 km/h 
< 2 km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S1 
Side S2 
< 6 km/h 
Head-on S3 
Rear S2 
Side S2 
< 12km/h 
Head-on S3 
Rear S2 
Side S3 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming Obj. 
Velocity 
Type of Impact 
Severity 
Rating 
Pedestrian 
(Child) 
< 11 km/h 
< 2 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S0 
Side S1 
< 6 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S1 
Side S1 
< 12km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S1 
Side S1 
11 - 16 
km/h 
< 2 km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S1 
Side S2 
< 6 km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S2 
Side S2 
< 12km/h 
Head-on S3 
Rear S2 
Side S3 
> 16 km/h 
< 2 km/h 
Head-on S3 
Rear S2 
Side S2 
< 6 km/h 
Head-on S3 
Rear S2 
Side S3 
< 12km/h 
Head-on S3 
Rear S3 
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Table 8.6: Severity rule-set (part 2) for Germany workshop (workshop 3) 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming Obj. 
Velocity 
Type of Impact 
Severity 
Rating 
Infra-
structure 
< 11 
km/h 
0 km/h 
Head-on 
S0 
Rear 
Side 
0 km/h 
Head-on 
Rear 
Side 
0 km/h 
Head-on 
Rear 
Side 
11 - 16 
km/h 
0 km/h 
Head-on 
S1 
Rear 
Side 
0 km/h 
Head-on 
Rear 
Side 
0 km/h 
Head-on 
Rear 
Side 
> 16 
km/h 
0 km/h 
Head-on 
S2 
Rear 
Side 
0 km/h 
Head-on 
Rear 
Side 
0 km/h 
Head-on 
Rear 
Side 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming Obj. 
Velocity 
Type of Impact 
Severity 
Rating 
Cyclist 
< 11 
km/h 
< 8 km/h 
Head-on S0 
Rear S0 
Side S0 
< 14 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S0 
Side S1 
< 20km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S1 
Side S2 
11 - 16 
km/h 
< 8 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S0 
Side S1 
< 14 km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S1 
Side S2 
< 20km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S2 
Side S2 
> 16 
km/h 
< 8 km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S1 
Side S2 
< 14 km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S2 
Side S2 
< 20km/h 
Head-on S3 
Rear S2 
Side S3 
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Table 8.7: Severity rule-set (part 3) for Germany workshop (workshop 3) 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming Obj. 
Velocity 
Type of Impact 
Severity 
Rating 
Vehicle 
< 11 
km/h 
< 10 km/h 
Head-on S0 
Rear S0 
Side S0 
< 20 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S0 
Side S1 
> 20km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S1 
Side S2 
11 - 16 
km/h 
< 10 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S0 
Side S1 
< 20 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S1 
Side S1 
> 20km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S2 
Side S2 
> 16 
km/h 
< 10 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S1 
Side S1 
< 20 km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S2 
Side S2 
> 20km/h 
Head-on S3 
Rear S2 
Side S3 
 
 
8.6.3.2. Controllability rule-set 
Based on the feedback from the Sweden workshop, separate tables for acceleration and 
deceleration were created. Additionally, to address the comment about over dimensionality, 
“vehicle velocity” was removed as a parameter. Table 8.8 and Table 8.9 depict the modified 
controllability rule-set. 
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Table 8.8: Controllability rule-set (part 1) for Germany workshop (workshop 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.9: Controllability rule-set (part 2) for Germany workshop (workshop 3) 
Acceleration Value 
Distance to 
Obstacle 
TTC 
Controllability 
Rating 
< 0.1g 
< 6 m 
< 1.0 sec C2 
1.0 - 2.0 sec C1 
> 2.0 sec C0 
> 6 m 
< 1.0 sec C1 
1.0 - 2.0 sec C0 
> 2.0 sec C0 
Acceleration Value 
Distance to 
Obstacle 
TTC 
Controllability 
Rating 
0.1g - 0.4g 
< 6 m 
< 1.0 sec C3 
1.0 - 2.0 sec C2 
> 2.0 sec C1 
> 6 m 
< 1.0 sec C2 
1.0 - 2.0 sec C1 
> 2.0 sec C0 
 
 
 
 
Emergency 
Deceleration Value 
Distance to 
Obstacle 
TTC 
Controllability 
Rating 
< 0.4g 
< 6 m 
< 1.0 sec C3 
1.0 - 2.0 sec C2 
> 2.0 sec C1 
> 6 m 
< 1.0 sec C2 
1.0 - 2.0 sec C1 
> 2.0 sec C0 
Emergency 
Deceleration Value 
Distance to 
Obstacle 
TTC 
Controllability 
Rating 
0.4g - 0.8g 
< 6 m 
< 1.0 sec C2 
1.0 - 2.0 sec C1 
> 2.0 sec C0 
> 6 m 
< 1.0 sec C1 
1.0 - 2.0 sec C1 
> 2.0 sec C0 
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8.6.3.3. Exposure rule-set 
Exposure rule-set has been illustrated in Table 8.10 (same as the one used in Sweden 
workshop (workshop 2). 
Table 8.10: Exposure rule-set for Germany workshop (workshop 3) 
Area Driving Domain Country Exposure rating 
City Centre 
Pedestrian Pathways 
India E4 
Sweden E1 
UK E2 
Germany E0 
Normal road 
India E4 
Sweden E1 
UK E2 
Germany E1 
Area Driving Domain Country Exposure rating 
Sub-urban areas 
Pedestrian Pathways 
India E3 
Sweden E0 
UK E1 
Germany E0 
Normal road 
India E4 
Sweden E0 
UK E1 
Germany E0 
 
8.6.4. Results 
8.6.4.1. Quantitative results 
Similar to workshop two, for every round, each of the groups were asked to provide 
Severity, Exposure and Controllability ratings for the two hazardous events (discussed in 
section 8.6.2.2). The ASIL ratings given by the four groups in different rounds have been 
illustrated in Figure 8.8. Four groups provided three different ASIL ratings in the first and 
the second round for hazard 1. Similarly, the four groups provided three different ASIL 
ratings for first round and two different ASIL ratings for second round for hazard 2. It is 
worthwhile to note that the difference in the ASIL ratings provided by the groups for hazard 
1 was of the order of two (ASIL A – ASIL C) in both round one and round two. For hazard 
2, the difference in ASIL ratings for round one was of the order of three (QM – ASIL C) and 
of the order of one (ASIL C – ASIL D) in round two. With the introduction of rules in round 
three, all groups converged to a QM ASIL rating for hazard 1. However, for hazard 2, a 
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variation of the order of one existed (QM – ASIL A) with two groups agreeing at QM rating 
and two groups giving an ASIL A rating. In round four, for hazard 1, the mixing of groups 
introduced a slight variation with one of the three groups giving an ASIL A rating while 
other three groups gave a QM rating. A similar variation was observed for hazard 2. It is 
interesting to note that it was the same group which gave the ASIL A rating to both the 
hazards in round 4. 
Similar to workshops one and two, the large variation in the ASIL ratings given by the four 
groups in rounds one (order of 3 and order of 4 for hazard 1 and hazard 2 respectively) and 
round two (order of 3 and order of 1 for hazard 1 and hazard 2 respectively), emphasises the 
reliability challenges with automotive HARA process due to inter-rater variation (as 
discussed in chapter 3 and section 8.1.  
 
 
Severity 
Figure 8.9 illustrate the severity ratings. In the absence of rules in round one, severity ratings 
showed a significant variation for hazard 2 (order of three (S0 and S3) in round 1) and for 
hazard 1 (order of one (S2 – S3). While in round two, severity ratings for hazard 1 had a 
Figure 8.8: ASIL ratings for workshop 3 (Germany) 
Figure 8.9: Severity ratings for workshop 3 (Germany) 
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variation of the order of one (S2 – S3), the ratings converged to S3 for hazard 2. With the 
introduction of rules in round three, while three groups converged in their ratings for hazard 
1 (S2) and hazard 2 (S3), one group gave a different rating (S3 for hazard 1 and S2 for 
hazard 2). It is worthwhile to note that these were two different groups. The reasons for the 
variation even after the introduction of the rules are evident when the qualitative analysis of 
the results is considered which is discussed in section 8.6.4.2. 
Exposure 
In round one, exposure ratings for hazard one differed by the order of one between the 
groups (E3 – E4). Similar difference was observed in round two again for hazard 1. 
However, for hazard 2, a significant difference of the order of three was observed in round 
one (E1 – E4) with four groups giving three different ratings (E4, E3 and E1). In round two, 
a difference of the order of one (E3 – E4) was observed for hazard 2. With the introduction 
of rule-set, the exposure ratings for both round three and round four converged to E1 for 
hazard 1 and hazard 2 (Figure 8.10). 
 
 
Controllability 
As in the case with workshop 1 and workshop 2, controllability ratings observed the 
maximum variation, even with the introduction of the rule-set. In round one, controllability 
ratings provided by the groups differed by an order of two for both hazard 1 (C1 – C3) and 
hazard 2 (C0 – C2). For hazard 1, the three different ratings were observed (C1, C2 and C3). 
In round two, while the groups converged to C2 rating for hazard 1, a difference of the order 
of one (C2 – C3) was observed for hazard 2. The introduction of the rule-set in round three 
didn’t improve the convergence in ratings as a difference of the order of one was observed in 
the controllability rating for both hazard 1 and hazard 2, which increased to the order of 
three in round four (Figure 8.11). The cause of variation even with the introduction of rule-
Figure 8.10: Exposure ratings for workshop 3 (Germany) 
200 
 
set in round three and four can be better explained with the qualitative analysis of the 
feedback received by the safety experts who took part in the workshop. The qualitative 
analysis of the feedback and the notes made by the moderators has been discussed in section 
8.6.4.2. 
 
 
8.6.4.2. Qualitative results 
In response to the question on whether the groups experienced variation in HARA in the 
various rounds, all groups agreed on the existence of variation in the ratings in the different 
rounds. Like in earlier workshops, most of the groups mentioned that the variation was 
caused due to difference in assumptions. One of the groups commented: “variation with all 
assumption…no stats (statistics)”, while the other commented “high variation due to non-
normalised assumptions”. Interestingly, none of the groups mentioned that experience in 
conducting HARA was one of the causes. This is because the experience level of above the 
participants was over 10 years.  
When asked whether the introduction of rule-set by parametrising the HARA elements 
increased the reliability of the process, almost all the participants responded positively, with 
one of the participants suggesting: “yes, puts some better context of the situation”. Another 
participant mentioned: “Yes, I think so, otherwise the procedure is really subjective”.  
Interestingly, one of the participants commented: “(parametrisation of HARA increases 
reliability) perhaps for severity, and controllability: if we know more about the vehicles. For 
HE2, we don’t know about the vehicle, so had to go worst case. For exposure, I think this 
would help”. While one of the participants had reservations about the concept suggesting: 
“such an approach may lead to pseudo objectivity”. This concern resonates with one of the 
comments from workshop 2, which suggested the possibility of adapting the HARA ratings 
Figure 8.11: Controllability ratings for workshop 3 (Germany) 
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to fit the rule-set. This comment re-emphasizes the need to have an exhaustive rule-set in 
order to allay such fears. 
8.6.5. Learnings from workshop 3: A discussion 
While good convergence was reached for exposure ratings with the introduction of the 
exposure rule-set, participants mentioned the need to introduce an additional parameter for 
“time of the day” to make the rule-set more exhaustive. In workshop three, the reliability of 
the controllability ratings continued to be low (even with the introduction of the rule-set).  
One of the main reasons suggested by participants for the lack of convergence on the 
controllability ratings was the definition of the hazard and the hazardous events. Therefore, 
for the workshop four (final workshop), an even more detailed description of the hazard and 
hazardous event was used. 
8.7. Workshop 4 (U.K.) 
8.7.1. Participants 
Eleven participants with extensive functional safety experience were recruited for the final 
workshop study. Each participant had over 5 years experience in safety analysis, with some 
having over 20 years experience. All participants were based in the UK. In addition to the 11 
participants, three moderators were also recruited from the author’s research group. Out of 
the 11 participants, four participants were from Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), 
six were from Tier 1 suppliers and one participant was from an engineering consultancy. 
Except one, all participants identified themselves as either functional safety specialists or 
functional safety engineers.  
8.7.2. Workshop structure 
Eleven participants were grouped into three groups with two groups having four participants 
and one group having three participants. In addition to the eleven participants, each group 
was assigned a moderator. Like in earlier workshops (discussed in sections 8.4 (USA), 8.5 
(Sweden) and 8.6 (Germany)) each group was provided with two different hazardous events 
and were asked rate the severity, exposure and controllability for the two given hazardous 
events. 
Workshop four had a different structure to the earlier workshops. As workshops one, two 
and three had already established the existence of the inter-rater variation in automotive 
HARA, the author wanted to focus workshop 4 solely on the impact of the introduction of 
the rule-set in the automotive HARA process. Additionally, unlike other workshops where a 
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conference or a meeting gathering was used as a platform to gather various functional safety 
experts, workshop four involved inviting functional safety experts to the University of 
Warwick for the purpose of the workshop only. In order to make best use of the time 
provided by the experts, the author had only two rounds in workshop four. An extended 
feedback session was designed for workshop four, as it was the final workshop of the series. 
It was expected that the feedback session would provide additional insights into the 
challenges of the automotive HARA, the proposed process and the utility of the proposed 
process in an industrial context. The workshop structure for workshop four has been 
illustrated in Figure 8.12. 
 
 
8.7.2.1. Additional System definition 
In addition to the system definition for the SAE Level 4 Low-Speed Automated Automated 
Driving system (LSAD) described in section 8.3.3.1, participants were also provided with 
the following description: 
 Maximum acceleration of the LSAD = 0.4g 
 LSAD equiped vehicle dimensions: 2m x 2.5m x 2.5m 
 Vehicle crashworthy upto top speed 
 Driving domain: public roads in inner city in UK 
Figure 8.12: Structure for workshop 4 
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The additional information was provided as it was received as a part of the feedback from 
workshop one, workshop two and workshop three. 
8.7.2.2. Hazard and hazardous event definition 
The hazard provided to the participants was “unintended acceleration”. Based on the 
hazard, participants were provided two hazardous events and were asked to discuss the 
HARA for the two given events to give Severity, Exposure and Controllability ratings. The 
two hazardous events provided to the participants were: 
 Pod travelling around a corner at 15 kmph towards a pedestrian (child running) in an 
urban environment 
 Pod crossing a junction at 15 kmph which is in the path of an oncoming vehicle 
8.7.3. Rule-set 
8.7.3.1. Severity rule-set 
Severity rule-set has been depicted in Table 8.11, Table 8.12 and Table 8.13 (same as the 
one used in Sweden and Germany workshops (workshop 2 and 3). 
Table 8.11: Severity rule-set (part 1) for UK workshop (workshop 4) 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming Obj. 
Velocity 
Type of Impact 
Severity 
Rating 
Pedestrian 
(Adult) 
< 11 km/h 
< 2 km/h 
Head-on S0 
Rear S0 
Side S0 
< 6 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S0 
Side S1 
< 12km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S1 
Side S1 
11 - 16 
km/h 
< 2 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S0 
Side S1 
< 6 km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S1 
Side S1 
< 12km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S1 
Side S2 
> 16 km/h 
< 2 km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S1 
Side S2 
< 6 km/h 
Head-on S3 
Rear S2 
Side S2 
< 12km/h 
Head-on S3 
Rear S2 
Side S3 
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Table 8.12: Severity rule-set (part 2) for UK workshop (workshop 4) 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming Obj. 
Velocity 
Type of Impact 
Severity 
Rating 
Pedestrian 
(Child) 
< 11 km/h 
< 2 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S0 
Side S1 
< 6 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S1 
Side S1 
< 12km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S1 
Side S1 
11 - 16 
km/h 
< 2 km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S1 
Side S2 
< 6 km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S2 
Side S2 
< 12km/h 
Head-on S3 
Rear S2 
Side S3 
> 16 km/h 
< 2 km/h 
Head-on S3 
Rear S2 
Side S2 
< 6 km/h 
Head-on S3 
Rear S2 
Side S3 
< 12km/h 
Head-on S3 
Rear S3 
Side S3 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming Obj. 
Velocity 
Type of Impact 
Severity 
Rating 
Infra-
structure 
< 11 km/h 
0 km/h 
Head-on 
S0 
Rear 
Side 
0 km/h 
Head-on 
Rear 
Side 
0 km/h 
Head-on 
Rear 
Side 
11 - 16 
km/h 
0 km/h 
Head-on 
S1 
Rear 
Side 
0 km/h 
Head-on 
Rear 
Side 
0 km/h 
Head-on 
Rear 
Side 
> 16 km/h 
0 km/h 
Head-on 
S2 
Rear 
Side 
0 km/h 
Head-on 
Rear 
Side 
0 km/h 
Head-on 
Rear 
Side 
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Table 8.13: Severity rule-set (part 3) for UK workshop (workshop 4) 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming Obj. 
Velocity 
Type of Impact 
Severity 
Rating 
Cyclist 
< 11 
km/h 
< 8 km/h 
Head-on S0 
Rear S0 
Side S0 
< 14 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S0 
Side S1 
< 20km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S1 
Side S2 
11 - 16 
km/h 
< 8 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S0 
Side S1 
< 14 km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S1 
Side S2 
< 20km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S2 
Side S2 
> 16 
km/h 
< 8 km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S1 
Side S2 
< 14 km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S2 
Side S2 
< 20km/h 
Head-on S3 
Rear S2 
Side S3 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming Obj. 
Velocity 
Type of Impact 
Severity 
Rating 
Vehicle 
< 11 
km/h 
< 10 km/h 
Head-on S0 
Rear S0 
Side S0 
< 20 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S0 
Side S1 
> 20km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S1 
Side S2 
11 - 16 
km/h 
< 10 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S0 
Side S1 
< 20 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S1 
Side S1 
> 20km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S2 
Side S2 
> 16 
km/h 
< 10 km/h 
Head-on S1 
Rear S1 
Side S1 
< 20 km/h 
Head-on S2 
Rear S2 
Side S2 
> 20km/h 
Head-on S3 
Rear S2 
Side S3 
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8.7.3.2. Controllability rule-set 
Controllability rule-set has been depicted in Table 8.14 and Table 8.15 (same as the one used 
in Germany workshop (workshop three). 
Table 8.14: Controllability rule-set (part 1) for UK workshop (workshop 4) 
Emergency 
Deceleration Value 
Distance to 
Obstacle 
TTC 
Controllability 
Rating 
< 0.4g 
< 6 m 
< 1.0 sec C3 
1.0 - 2.0 sec C2 
> 2.0 sec C1 
> 6 m 
< 1.0 sec C2 
1.0 - 2.0 sec C1 
> 2.0 sec C0 
Emergency 
Deceleration Value 
Distance to 
Obstacle 
TTC 
Controllability 
Rating 
0.4g - 0.8g 
< 6 m 
< 1.0 sec C2 
1.0 - 2.0 sec C1 
> 2.0 sec C0 
> 6 m 
< 1.0 sec C1 
1.0 - 2.0 sec C1 
> 2.0 sec C0 
 
Table 8.15: Controllability rule-set (part 2) for UK workshop (workshop 4) 
Acceleration Value 
Distance to 
Obstacle 
TTC 
Controllability 
Rating 
< 0.1g 
< 6 m 
< 1.0 sec C2 
1.0 - 2.0 sec C1 
> 2.0 sec C0 
> 6 m 
< 1.0 sec C1 
1.0 - 2.0 sec C0 
> 2.0 sec C0 
Acceleration Value 
Distance to 
Obstacle 
TTC 
Controllability 
Rating 
0.1g - 0.4g 
< 6 m 
< 1.0 sec C3 
1.0 - 2.0 sec C2 
> 2.0 sec C1 
> 6 m 
< 1.0 sec C2 
1.0 - 2.0 sec C1 
> 2.0 sec C0 
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8.7.3.3. Exposure rule-set 
Based on the feedback received during the Germany workshop, an additional parameter of 
“time of day” was added to the exposure ratings. Table 8.16 illustrates the modified 
exposure rule-set. 
Table 8.16: Exposure rule-set for UK workshop (workshop 4) 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Area Driving Domain Country Time of Day 
Exposure 
rating 
Pedestrians 
City Centre 
Pedestrian 
Pathways 
India 
Day E4 
Night E1 
Sweden 
Day E3 
Night E1 
UK 
Day E3 
Night E2 
Normal road 
India 
Day E2 
Night E1 
Sweden 
Day E3 
Night E1 
UK 
Day E3 
Night E1 
Sub-urban 
areas 
Pedestrian 
Pathways 
India 
Day E3 
Night E2 
Sweden 
Day E2 
Night E1 
UK 
Day E2 
Night E1 
Normal road 
India 
Day E4 
Night E3 
Sweden 
Day E2 
Night E1 
UK 
Day E2 
Night E1 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Area Driving Domain Country Time of Day 
Exposure 
rating 
Vehicle 
City Centre 
Pedestrian 
Pathways 
India 
Day E3 
Night E1 
Sweden 
Day E4 
Night E1 
UK 
Day E4 
Night E1 
Normal road 
India 
Day E4 
Night E4 
Sweden 
Day E4 
Night E2 
UK 
Day E4 
Night E2 
Sub-urban 
areas 
Pedestrian 
Pathways 
India 
Day E4 
Night E2 
Sweden 
Day E3 
Night E1 
UK 
Day E3 
Night E1 
Normal road 
India 
Day E4 
Night E4 
Sweden 
Day E4 
Night E2 
UK 
Day E4 
Night E2 
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8.7.4. Results 
8.7.4.1. Quantitative results 
For the hazardous event 1, the three groups came up with three different ASIL ratings in 
round 1 (without rule-set) after the discussion, once again suggesting the existence of intra-
rater variation. The ratings differed by an order of two (ASIL B – ASIL D). With the 
introduction of the rule-set in round two, the ASIL ratings for the three groups converged to 
ASIL C for hazardous event 1(Figure 8.13). While the convergence in ASIL ratings might 
indicate increased reliability due to the introduction of the rule-set, a deeper analysis of the 
severity, exposure and controllability ratings (discussed later in this section) is required 
before drawing such a conclusion.  
For hazardous event 2, the groups vary in their ASIL rating by an order of two (ASIL C – 
ASIL D) in round one. However, the variation increased to the order of two (ASIL B – ASIL 
D) in round two (with the rule-set). It is interesting to note that the results for the two 
hazardous events differed from each other (convergence for hazardous event 1 and 
divergence for hazardous event 2) (Figure 8.13). The observed difference is better 
understood once the individual S, E and C components are discussed and with the qualitative 
analysis of the moderators’ notes (discussed in section 8.7.4.2). 
 
Severity 
For round one, the severity rating differed by an order of one (S2 – S3) between the three 
groups for hazardous event 1. With the introduction of the rule-set in round two, the severity 
ratings showed a convergence to S3, indicating higher reliability due to the introduction of 
Figure 8.13: ASIL ratings for hazardous events 1 and 2 (workshop 4) 
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the rule-set (Figure 8.14). However, the trend was different for hazardous event two. In both 
round one and round two (with the rule-set), the severity ratings showed a variation of the 
order of one for the hazardous event 2 (Figure 8.14). 
 
 
Exposure 
For hazardous event 1, exposure ratings showed a variation of the order of one (E3 – E4) in 
round one. With the introduction of the rule-set, the ratings converged to E3, indicating 
increased reliability with the introduction of the rule-set (Figure 8.15). For hazardous event 
2, the exposure ratings were consistent at E4 between round one and round two (Figure 
8.15). 
 
 
Figure 8.14: Severity ratings for hazardous event 1 and 2 (workshop 4) 
Figure 8.15: Exposure ratings for hazardous event 1 and 2 (workshop 4) 
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Controllability 
Controllability ratings in workshop 4 showed a different trend as compared to the earlier 
workshops. Interestingly, UK experts seem to have been much more conservative in 
controllability ratings as compared with experts in earlier workshops. For hazardous event 1, 
the controllability ratings were consistent at C3 among all three groups for both round one 
and round two (Figure 8.16). However, for hazardous event 2, the controllability ratings for 
round one converged at C3, but showed a variation of the order of one (C3 – C2) in round 
two (Figure 8.16). 
 
 
8.7.4.2. Qualitative results 
Since in workshop four there were only two rounds and groups were not mixed, participants 
were not asked if they had experienced variation in the HARA ratings as it was not 
applicable. However, participants were asked to answer the second question (mentioned in 
section 8.3.3.3), about whether the introduction of rule-set by parametrising the HARA 
elements had increased the reliability of the process. The participants unanimously agreed 
that it would be possible to parametrise severity and controllability. However, they had their 
reservations about the ability to parametrise exposure ratings. One of the participants 
commented: “this is possible and could be used. (But) rationale behind the table is very 
important”. Another participant mentioned: “(this process) could be used for new engineer 
for training”. The participants suggested that the parametrised approach could be used to 
create a tool which aids the HARA process and the rationale could be incorporated within 
the tool. 
Figure 8.16: Controllability ratings for hazardous event 1 and 2 (workshop 4) 
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Interestingly, it was observed that functional safety experts in the UK were conservative in 
their ratings, especially for controllability rating as it was always C3. 
8.7.5. Learnings from workshop 4: A discussion 
When asked about the challenges of the proposed approach (i.e. parametrisation of HARA 
elements to create a rule-set), the participants (like earlier workshops) mentioned that the 
rule-set needs to be exhaustive. The participants suggested adding more granularity to the 
rule-set by incorporating new parameters like “shared space” for controllability, 
“population density” for exposure and “kinetic energy” for severity. Some of the variation 
in ratings experienced even with the introduction of the rule-set could be attributed to these 
missing parameters and different groups making different assumptions, which can be seen in 
the variation in severity and controllability ratings (Figure 8.14 and Figure 8.16). In addition, 
they mentioned that one of the major challenges with HARA of ADAS or ADS is item 
definition.  
8.8. Learnings from the workshop series: A discussion 
One of the potential future benefits of having an objective rule-set is that it paves the way for 
dynamic HARA. With the introduction of automated systems, a concept of dynamic HARA 
has been introduced recently to enable the automated system to determine its ASIL rating 
based on the situational health of the sensors and the automated system and the 
environmental conditions (Johansson and Nilsson, 2016a; Villa et al., 2016). The approach 
presented in this chapter constitutes one of the blocks of a dynamic HARA and may aid in a 
reliable hazardous event rating in the dynamic HARA process (Johansson and Nilsson, 
2016b). Additionally, it can potentially allow relatively unskilled practitioners with less 
experience, to perform HARA to a reliable degree as the need for highly specialized 
knowledge is reduced to a great extent. This could ease the process in terms of time and 
resources required for the HARA. 
An objective approach to the decision making process involved in an automotive HARA has 
many potential benefits. Not only does it have the potential to increase the inter-rater 
reliability of the process, it provides the ability to automate the HARA process which in turn 
can save precious time in the automotive product life-cycle. Moreover, it can potentially 
provide a degree of consistency across the automotive supply chain (i.e., OEMs, Tier 1 
suppliers, Tier 2 suppliers etc.). While some of the results suggest positive results towards 
increased reliability through convergence of HARA ratings, it is not known that full 
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convergence would ever occur but this work has shown that introduction of an objective 
rule-set has a potential to increase the reliability of HARA ratings. 
When considered in the context of “informed safety” for the user of ADAS and ADS, the 
proposed objective HARA approach increases the reliability of the risk conveyed to the 
drivers which forms their “informed safety” level. It aids in the development of trust with 
the system as reliability of risk ratings increases predictability and increases drivers’ ability 
to work with the system.  
8.9. Conclusion 
A novel approach to improve the reliability of the automotive HARA process has been 
proposed by creating a rule-set for each of the three HARA elements (severity, exposure and 
controllability). The proposed objective HARA approach has a potential to mitigate inter-
rater variations caused by subjective nature of the functional safety experts’ mental models 
and background knowledge. 
The rule-set for HARA involves parametrization of the HARA parameters elements, i.e., 
severity, exposure and controllability. While discussing some of the benefits of the proposed 
objective HARA approach, the low reliability, i.e. intra-rater variation, of the current 
automotive HARA process has also been demonstrated in the four workshop studies 
discussed in this chapter. 
Based on the feedback from participants and the qualitative analysis of results in each 
workshop, the rule-set was re-calibrated and the hazardous event definition was modified. 
One of the themes that was observed in the qualitative analysis of the feedback was the need 
to put a context to the hazard in the HARA. The perception of severity, exposure and 
controllability varies in different contexts. Additionally, it was also observed that there is a 
need to provide a user guidebook / user training on how to use the rule-set. The introduction 
of rule-set did suggest increased convergence, especially for severity and exposure ratings. 
Although, introduction of the rule-set also suggested increased reliability of controllability 
ratings, the effect was limited in comparison to severity and exposure. 
The four workshops provided some positive results along with some mixed results. One of 
the reasons for the mixed results could be the need for more elaborate rule-set incorporating 
more parameters for severity, exposure and controllability. Future research may be carried 
out to extend the rule-set by incorporating more parameters and also experimentally 
validating the rule-set itself. 
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While full convergence in ratings between groups wasn’t achieved at the end of four 
workshops, the participants in the workshop acknowledged that the proposed method could 
be used but a rationale for the rule-set needs to be provided to the experts. Additionally, in 
one of the workshops (workshop four), it was suggested that the objective HARA method 
would be useful to train new engineers. Participants in all the workshops felt that the 
introduction of the rule-set helped remove subjectivity of the HARA process and thus 
making the process more objective. 
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UNDERSTANDING RESULTS: A DISCUSSION 
Chapter 9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In chapter 2, the author discussed that the adoption of ADASs and ADSs could offer many 
potential benefits like improved safety by reducing human error, lower emissions, increased 
traffic through-put, providing more productive time to the drivers, among many others. 
However, also introduced were some of challenges that need to be overcome in order to 
realise the benefits of ADASs and ADSs. In this thesis, two of the challenges highlighted in 
chapter 2 have been discussed in detail. These being: 1) reaping the safety benefits and 2) 
establishing the safety level. 
Based on the two challenges, three specific research questions were identified based on the 
review of literature in chapter 3 and chapter 6. This chapter discusses the results from the 
research presented in this thesis and their wider contribution and highlights some of the 
solutions to the challenges mentioned above. This chapter is structured in three sections. 
Section 9.1 reflects on the research conducted to answer the three research questions, section 
9.2 discusses the potential impact of the results in a wider research and industrial context, 
and finally, section 9.3 discusses the limitations of the research presented in this thesis and 
the potential for future work. 
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9.1. Reflection on the research 
9.1.1. Reflection on the two themes of this thesis 
This thesis has been structured under two main themes: 1) trust (chapter 3 and chapter 5) 2) 
testing (test scenarios and risk classification) (chapter 6, chapter 7 and chapter 8). While the 
two distinct themes exist in this thesis, they are brought together by the need for creating the 
“content of knowledge” in order to create a state of “informed safety”. This is required to 
calibrate trust to appropriately high levels. In order to calibrate trust to high levels, 
knowledge about the true capabilities and limitations needs to be provided to the driver. 
However, in order to create this knowledge, ADASs and ADSs need to be tested to establish 
their limitations and capabilities. This subtle but important link has been shown to be crucial 
in recent accidents involving the Tesla Model S (NHTSA, 2017a).  
In one of the fatal accidents, the driver of the Tesla Model S assumed the “Autopilot” feature 
to be a fully-automated system and didn’t monitor the system and the road, leading to the 
system colliding with a rear end of a truck. In the other accident, the Tesla Model S collided 
with a parked fire-truck with the driver once again expecting the “Autopilot” system to 
behave as a fully automated system. While in the former, the situation encountered by the 
Model S was one that wasn’t tested (i.e., the limitation of the system wasn’t established), the 
driver was either misinformed about the true capabilities and limitations of the system or had 
over-trust in the system’s capabilities. In the case of the latter accident, the radar sensors on 
the Tesla were not able to detect the stationary fire truck (another case where the limitation 
of the system wasn’t established). Both these incidents demonstrate the need to calibrate the 
trust level of the driver to prevent disuse or misuse of automation, to ensure safe use of 
ADASs and ADSs.  
9.1.2. Reflection on the results 
9.1.2.1. Reaping the safety benefits 
Chapter two discusses that in order to realise the benefits offered by ADASs and ADSs, it is 
essential to ensure that drivers use such systems in their daily commutes. In chapter 3, the 
review of literature suggested that drivers’ use of ADASs and ADSs is influenced by their 
trust in such systems. Trust is classified into: “trust in the system” which refers to the 
capability of the system and “trust with the system” which refers to the ability of the driver 
to work with the system. 
Various peer-review comments were received on the concept “trust in the system” and “trust 
with the system” when the research from study 1 (trust and static knowledge) was submitted 
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for journal publication (Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies). It was 
evident from the peer review comments that there was a need for a greater understanding of 
the concepts of two types of trust and the distinction between them. In order to address the 
review comments and to add clarity to the difference between the two forms of trust, the 
definitions were improved. This was also the case for other concepts like “static knowledge” 
and “internal mental model”.  The peer review process achieved two main objectives. 
Firstly, it ensured that the new concepts like “trust in the system”, “trust with the system” 
and “static knowledge”, and their subtle differences was understandable to others. Secondly, 
it also highlighted the need for clear definitions for concepts.  
In order to increase drivers’ use of ADASs and ADSs, the author proposed to increase 
drivers’ trust (both trust-in and trust-with) in ADASs and ADSs. In this thesis, it has been 
experimentally demonstrated that by providing knowledge to the drivers about the true 
(experimentally validated) capabilities and limitations of the system, their trust is calibrated 
to high levels, to increase the use of ADASs and ADSs, while also preventing disuse and 
misuse of the systems.  
In chapter five, while discussing study 1 (where static knowledge about the true capabilities 
and limitations of the system was provided), it was concluded that “trust in the system” 
could be increased (p < 0.001) by introducing static knowledge. Interestingly, providing 
static knowledge about the true capabilities and limitations of the system didn’t have any 
effect on “trust with the system” ratings (p > 0.05). This finding is especially interesting, 
considering some of the post-study run feedback received from the participants. One of the 
participants mentioned: “warnings from the car missing”, while another participant 
mentioned: “no warnings & notification”. The feedback suggested that the lack of real-time 
(dynamic) knowledge led to participants’ inability to work with the system, thus causing no 
change in their “trust with the system” ratings. 
Subsequently, study 6 in which dynamic knowledge about the true capabilities and 
limitations of the ADASs and ADSs was provided to the drivers (via HMI display), 
demonstrated that dynamic knowledge indeed has a larger positive effect on trust ratings 
(both “trust in the system” and “trust with the system”) (p < 0.001). Some of the qualitative 
feedback was contrary to the feedback received in study 1. One of the participants 
mentioned: “I know when I have to be more alert”, while another participant mentioned: 
“visual information (red, amber or green) provides a measure of how alert driver (I) should 
be”. The feedback suggests higher ability of the participants to work with the system with 
the introduction of dynamic knowledge. 
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For low capability automation, introduction of static knowledge led to a significant increase 
in workload experienced by the participants. However, introduction of dynamic knowledge 
negated this effect. Moreover, introduction of knowledge (static or dynamic) showed no 
significant change in workload for high-capability automation.  
Effect of automation capability (low or high) in trust ratings in run 1 (no knowledge) and run 
2 (with knowledge) provided another interesting insight. When static knowledge was 
introduced in study 1 (run 2), automation capability didn’t have any significant effect on 
“trust in the system” ratings, suggesting similar trust ratings irrespective of the automation 
capability. Similar effect was noticed when dynamic knowledge was introduced in study 6 
(run 2), automation capability had no interaction effect with dynamic knowledge for both 
“trust in the system” ratings and “trust with the system” ratings. 
The two studies (in chapter 5), when considered together help establish that dynamic 
knowledge has a higher ability to positively affect trust (trust in the system and trust with the 
system) as compared to static knowledge.  
Answering the Research Question (RQ) 1 (“How to increase “trust in/with” automation in 
vehicles”) (identified in chapter 3), has helped to provide an interesting avenue for 
increasing drivers’ use of ADSs (preventing misuse and disuse) and thus potentially reaping 
the safety benefits offered by such systems. Furthermore, answering RQ 1 (in chapter 5), 
also suggests that it is possible to calibrate trust with the introduction of knowledge, even in 
a low capability automation system. Thus, suggesting that it is not essential to have a 100% 
full-proof ADASs or ADSs in order to have high or appropriate trust. However, it is 
important to create a state of “informed safety” where the drivers are aware of the true 
capabilities and limitations of the systems and hence prepared to work with the system to 
optimise performance. It is important to appreciate that the drivers’ capability to overcome 
the limitations of the automated systems (even when they know about them) may differ 
based on the skill-set of the drivers. Their skill-set will decide the actions they take in a 
situation. While the research discussed in this thesis doesn’t claim to have explored a 
representative sample of the population to capture relative differences in skills and attitude 
of people, this research discusses the relative difference in trust levels for an individual in 
the presence and absence of the state of “informed safety”. Section 9.3 on future work 
discusses the subject of differences between people and its implication on the results.  
The state of “informed safety” will aid drivers’ actions and which could potentially mean 
reduced use of automation (depending on situations) based on their own skill-set and their 
informed safety level. State of “informed safety” enables drivers to display knowledge-
based behaviour by developing a high-level understanding of the working of the system. The 
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implication of this conclusion has potentially a larger impact on the speed of commercial 
introduction of ADSs (discussed in section 9.2.1). 
It is worthwhile to note that the measure of trust is dependent on individuals and the 
difference between trust ratings observed in study 1 (trust and static knowledge) and study 6 
(trust and dynamic knowledge) is a relative difference for each individual participant. While 
same research methodology was used for all experiment participants, the measure of trust 
was a subjective scale. While an objective measure of trust was not a part of the research in 
this thesis, the effect of knowledge (static and dynamic) on the relative difference in trust 
ratings and the concept of “informed safety” established by the work in this thesis, provides 
an answer to RQ 1: how to increase trust “in/with” automation in vehicles. 
9.1.2.2. Establishing safety level 
In chapter 5, it was established that by providing knowledge (static or dynamic) about the 
true capabilities and limitations of the system, drivers’ trust could be calibrated to the 
appropriate levels by creating a state of “informed safety”. However, it is worthwhile to 
emphasize that the automated systems used in chapter 5 were dummy systems with known 
capabilities and limitations which were designed into the experimental setup.  
For real-world systems, there is a need to create the knowledge of the true capabilities and 
limitations of ADASs and ADSs. This knowledge can be created by evaluating such systems 
in various test scenarios to establish their capability to tackle them. The author explored the 
process of how to create this knowledge (to be imparted to the driver) in chapter 6 by 
creating a method to identify test scenarios for testing. 
Introduction of ADASs and ADSs in cars is turning them into complex systems with 
millions of lines of code. It is said that today’s cars (even with limited automation) have over 
100 million lines of code as compared to 6.5 million lines of code in a Boeing 787 airplane  
(Charette, 2009; Strandberg et al., 2018). As the complexity increases, the testing 
(verification and validation) processes to ensure the product is safe (both from a 
functionality perspective and consumer trust perspective), become more challenging, both 
from an engineering perspective and also consumer confidence point of view. To prove that 
ADASs and ADSs are safer than humans, it has been suggested that the vehicles need to be 
driven for a cumulative of 11 billion miles (Kalra and Paddock, 2016b). While it is evident 
that this number is infeasible, it is suggested that instead of focussing on the number of 
miles, testing needs to focus on scenarios experienced by the ADASs and ADSs in those 
miles (Wachenfeld and Winner, 2017a). Thus, research question 2 was identified as: “How 
to create test scenarios to establish the limitations of the automated driving systems?” 
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In chapter 7, analysis of a series of semi-structured interviews with automotive verification 
and validation experts from different countries (Germany, Sweden, USA, UK and India) 
conducted as a part of this thesis, concluded that for ADASs and ADSs, one needs to test 
“how a system fails” rather than “how a system works”. Thus, suggesting that confidence in 
testing should be obtained not by the number of miles driven but the quality of miles driven. 
Based on these findings, a two-branched approach to testing was proposed, 1) Requirement 
Based Testing (RBT) and 2) Hazard Based Testing (HBT). While requirement based testing 
has been an integral part of the automotive development process, hazard based testing 
approach is a new addition to the testing methodologies within the automotive domain. The 
proposed hazard based testing comprises of three aspects, 1) hazard identification, 2) 
creating test scenarios from the identified hazards and 3) risk analysis for the identified 
hazards.  
In chapter 7, for hazard identification, Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) method 
has been chosen as it identifies more hazards as compared to other hazard identification 
methods. Inspired by a systems’ engineering approach, STPA captures sub-system 
interactions and identifies the hazards associated with it. For creating test scenarios from 
hazards, the author proposed an extension to STPA. In order to create test scenarios: two 
levels of parametrisation are performed. Firstly, base parametrisation is conducted to create 
the scenery and the dynamic elements of a test scenario. Secondly, parametrisation of the 
elements of STPA output is done to create hazard based scenarios. In order to evaluate the 
applicability of the proposed method, it was then applied to a real-world system (low-speed 
automated driving system) and the results were discussed and presented in chapter 7. 
Answering RQ 2 (“How to create test scenarios to establish the limitations of the automated 
driving systems?”) mentioned in chapter 1, provides a potential method for establishing the 
true capabilities and (more importantly) limitations of the ADASs and ADSs. As shown in 
chapter 5, failures during operation of ADSs have a detrimental effect on drivers’ trust in 
such systems. Therefore, being able to identify “how the systems fail” not only helps 
establish the true performance capabilities of ADASs and ADSs, it also helps to create a 
state of “informed safety” for the drivers leading to high degree of appropriate trust. At the 
same time, “informed safety” enables to be better prepared to deal with the limitations of the 
ADASs and ADSs. While traditional RBT method covers only a fraction of the possible test 
scenario space for the systems, the second testing branch (HBT) improves the coverage of 
the test scenario space which can be considered as “negative scenarios” (Alexander, 2003). 
Thus HBT, by providing a structured method to test “how a system fails”, is able to meet 
two of the qualities suggested by the automotive verification and validation experts in their 
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interviews: 1) ability to test safety goals and ways in which the system may fail or reach 
system limits 2) structured method of identifying the system limits or failure scenarios. 
In chapter 8, the author discusses the reliability of the risk classification associated with the 
identified scenarios. Through a series of workshops involving functional safety experts from 
different countries, it was demonstrated that the current automotive Hazard Analysis and 
Risk Assessment (HARA) process suffers from inter-rater variation, lowering the reliability 
of the ratings. It is important to have reliable risk classification as it is part of the dynamic 
knowledge imparted to the drivers to calibrate their trust levels. One method to ensure that 
more reliable risk classification (i.e. convergence in risk ratings) is given for the same 
scenarios by different experts is to provide a set of rules for the HARA components 
(severity, exposure and controllability) leading to the objectification of the HARA ratings 
(proposed in chapter 8). However, full convergence was not achieved. Interestingly, while 
some of the qualitative feedback from the experts mentioned that full convergence may 
never be achieved, they suggested that an objective approach to the HARA process via the 
parametrisation of the HARA components is a good starting point for engineers who are new 
to the HARA process, or when classification for relatively less complex hazardous scenarios 
(in terms of number of actors and ODD) is to be done, or indeed can be used as a check list 
for things that should be considered. While this meant that RQ 3 (“How to improve the 
inter- and intra-rater-reliability of the automotive HARA process”) identified in chapter 6, 
wasn’t fully answered, the results of the workshop studies in chapter 8 did suggest that the 
objective approach (with a more elaborate rule-set) could potentially improve inter-rater 
reliability of the automotive HARA process. Thus, opening avenues for future research. 
The key contributions of this research in terms of knowledge are: 
 Trust in ADASs and ADSs can be increased by creating a state of “informed 
safety”. The state of informed safety is created by conveying the true capabilities 
and limitations of the system to the driver. This can be done by providing “static 
knowledge” (e.g. through feature training at the time) or “dynamic knowledge” (e.g. 
through a HMI interface).  The state of informed safety also prevents misuse and 
disuse of the automated systems. 
 By creating a state of “informed safety”, it is possible to introduce imperfect 
automation as long as the imperfections are conveyed to the drivers. This will enable 
early realisation of the benefits of automated technologies, e.g. increased safety, 
lowered emissions etc. 
 Hazard Based Testing (HBT) can be used to establish the knowledge of the true 
capabilities and limitations of ADASs and ADSs. HBT focuses on how a system 
221 
 
fails rather than how a system works. HBT can be performed by using Systems 
Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) along with an extension to create test scenarios. 
 Automotive Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) suffer from reliability 
issues. The reliability of automotive HARA can be improved by objectification of 
the severity, exposure and controllability ratings. 
9.2. Potential Impact of the results 
9.2.1. Reaping the safety benefits 
One of the on-going debates in the research community and the industry about safety of 
ADASs and ADSs is “how safe is safe enough” to reap the benefits of the ADASs and 
ADSs. Kalra and Groves (2017) via a Model for Automated Vehicle Safety (MAVS) argue 
that a 10% safety performance improvement (in terms of number of fatalities per 100 million 
vehicle miles travelled) over human drivers can have a much larger benefit (both in short 
term and long term) in saving lives as compared to more stringent technical requirements of 
75% safety performance improvement or 90% safety performance improvement over human 
drivers, due to the delayed introduction of the latter two levels of safety performance. This is 
inspired by the idea that it will take a much longer time to prove that the performance of 
ADASs and ADSs is 75% or 90% better than human drivers. 
The results of study 1 (static knowledge and trust) and study 6 (dynamic knowledge and 
trust) (in chapter five) lend more support to the introduction of limited capability ADSs, 
provided that the knowledge about the true capability and limitations of the systems are 
conveyed effectively to the driver. A prompt introduction of ADASs and ADSs whose true 
capabilities and limitations having been established and conveyed to the drivers, could help 
realise some of the benefits that ADASs and ADSs have to offer at a much earlier stage.  
In modern ADASs and ADSs the capabilities and limitations might change during the 
lifecycle of use due to Over The Air (OTA) upgrades. In such instances, it is essential to 
inform the driver of the new capabilities and limitations.  It can also be suggested that the 
drivers might need to provide a confirmation that they have understood the new capabilities 
and limitations. The subject of how to convey the knowledge of the capabilities and 
limitations to the driver remains out of scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, the results from 
studies in chapter five also suggested that with the introduction of knowledge (static) about 
the capabilities and limitations of the automated system, the workload increases for a low-
capability automated system. However, such an effect wasn’t noticed for high capability 
automation or when dynamic (real-time) knowledge was provided to the participants. Thus, 
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lending support to the idea of introducing high capability automated system with knowledge 
about the capabilities and limitations being conveyed effectively to the driver via static and 
dynamic knowledge. Section 9.3.2 discusses some of the ways the research question about 
how to impart knowledge could be answered. 
The concept of “informed safety” discussed in chapter five provides an interesting insight 
into the responsibility of manufacturers and engineers developing ADASs and ADSs. To 
convey true capabilities of the systems, it is essential that manufacturers and engineers 
provide an honest insight into the state of the current technology and honest predictions for 
future deployment to avoid creating media hype associated with automated driving 
technology. At the same time, by creating a state of “informed safety”, we can also achieve 
early adoption of ADASs and ADSs, allowing the society to reap benefits of the technology. 
9.2.2. Establishing safety level 
Another challenge in understanding “how safe is safe enough”, lies in identifying scenarios 
which illustrate the limitations of the ADASs and ADSs. It is interesting to note that the 
answer to this challenge has evaded both the research community (as shown in chapter 6) 
and the industry (as shown in chapter 7 via the semi-structured interview study). In 
answering RQ2, the author has created a method which can identify the limitations of a 
system and thus highlight its true capabilities. The proposed approach of hazard based 
testing made use of the STPA method for hazard identification (which has been proven to be 
superior to other hazard identification methods in the literature). The evaluation of the 
proposed method wasn’t the explicit aim of this thesis. However, the research work in this  
thesis contributes towards the research gap of understanding how to create test scenarios for 
ADASs and ADSs efficiently (i.e. identifying the unknown knowns and the black swan 
scenarios), and overcoming the 11-billion mile challenge (Kalra and Paddock, 2016a). As 
discussed in section 9.2.1, knowledge of the limitations can potentially help reap the benefits 
of the ADASs and ADSs with their quicker commercial introduction. 
The key contribution of this research is to move the focus away from the number of miles 
required to drive ADASs or ADSs, to focussing on the quality of miles – miles which uncover 
failures in the systems. This is achieved with the concept of Hazard Based Testing (HBT). 
The implementation of HBT in this thesis uses STPA as the hazard identification method. 
While there are other hazard identification methods such as FTA, FMEA, HAZOP etc., the 
results of STPA haven’t been compared with these methods for the case study as a part of 
this thesis. Future work would potentially involve comparing the results of the various 
hazard identification methods. 
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9.2.2.1. Influencing ISO standards 
While the research conducted in this thesis has been published in peer-reviewed journals and 
conference proceedings, some of the results are also influencing international standards. The 
research conducted in this thesis (on test scenario development) is influencing the content of 
a new international (ISO) standard on Low-Speed Automated Driving (LSAD) system (ISO 
NP 22737). In chapter 7, a novel method for test scenario identification was proposed. The 
case study for the proposal was an LSAD system. Some of the results from the case study, 
i.e., test scenarios identified from the proposed STPA inspired process have been 
incorporated in the LSAD ISO standard draft. In addition, the STPA process also led to 
identification of safety requirements which have informed discussions of the LSAD draft 
standard. The author is the work item leader for the proposed standard on LSAD and 
represents the UK on the ISO Technical Committee 204 Working Group (WG) 14. The 
LSAD work item currently includes functional requirements, performance requirements and 
test procedures for LSAD systems.  
9.3. Future work 
9.3.1. Limitations of the research presented 
In this section, before discussing the potential avenues for future work, the author discusses 
some of the limitations of the research presented in this thesis which potentially could 
influence future work.  
In the studies discussed in chapter 5 (study 1 and study 6: effect of knowledge on trust) and 
chapter 7 (study 3: controllability study), a driving simulator was used as an experimental 
setup. Driving simulators offer many advantages but at the same time have some 
disadvantages too. One of the benefits of a driving simulator is that it allows participants to 
be put in an immersive environment while letting them experience hazardous situations 
without any physical harm (Winter et al., 2012). Also, since there are no known SAE Level 
4/5 and few SAE level 3 automated driving systems in market, a driving simulator 
environment enables us to create a setup that potentially resembles future systems. Literature 
suggests that driver behaviour in a manually driven car in a driving simulator environment is 
predictive for real-world environment. However, transferability of results on driver 
behaviour in automated driving systems in driving simulator to real-world is unclear. Driver 
behaviour using automated driving systems will potentially be influenced by their 
experience with such systems and may also be affected by the interaction with other road 
users. Therefore, transferability of the results to real world needs to be evaluated separately.  
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Driving simulator fidelity plays a key role in stimulating drivers’ behaviour that is 
representative or predictive of their real world behaviour. Low fidelity simulators can 
potentially invoke unrealistic driving behaviour and thus invalidate the study results (Winter 
et al., 2012). While it is suggested that safety of the participants in a driving simulator 
experiment is one of the major benefits of driving simulators, it may also potentially prove 
to be a disadvantage. Since participants are not exposed to real danger or do not face the real 
consequences of their actions (e.g. accidents, near misses, vehicle damage etc.), there is a 
possibility that it gives them a false sense of safety or competence. In an attempt to add a 
sense of risk and consequence to the experiments conducted in chapter 5 and chapter 8, 
scoring criteria was used with participants being given bonuses and penalties on “good” and 
“bad” behaviour.  
The three driving simulator studies (in this research) were conducted at WMG, University of 
Warwick. A higher proportion of the study participants were from the university who were 
either more inclined to accept new technology or familiar with new technology. While the 
participants represented a wide age group (23 – 65 years), being close to research and 
technology development at the university, would mean they are more aware of the 
technology. Future work could potentially involve repeating the studies (similar to study 1, 
study 2 and study 6) with participant demography who would be least likely to accept new 
technology. This could provide an interesting insight in the transferability and generalisation 
of the results presented in this thesis. 
In this research, WMG’s 3xD Simulator for Intelligent Vehicles was used. While, the 3xD 
simulator provides a 360° Field of View immersive environment, it provides limited motion 
feedback. Due to lack of representative motion feedback, there is a potential for the onset of 
simulator sickness symptoms amongst the participants. This effect was especially noticed in 
study 1 (trust and static knowledge) where the scenario design included roundabout and 
steep turns. The lack of realistic motion feedback around roundabouts and steep turns led to 
the onset of simulator sickness for some of the participants (leading to 9 out of 57 (15.78%) 
participant dropouts in study 1 and 3). While results from the participants who felt simulator 
sickness were removed from the analysis, this learning influenced the simulator scenario 
design in for study 6, which included only sweeping bends. Thus, minimizing the effect of 
lack of motion feedback in the 3xD simulator. Incorporating the learning in study 6 resulted 
in a reduction in the participant dropout rate due to simulator sickness from 15.78% to 5.4% 
(2 out 37 participants in study 6). Moreover, literature suggests that short sessions with rest 
breaks help evade simulator sickness (Winter et al., 2012). All driving simulator experiments 
conducted in this research followed this protocol to prevent the onset of simulator sickness. 
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In chapter 5, it was concluded that providing dynamic knowledge about the true capabilities 
and limitations of the system can lead to a positive effect on calibration of trust to 
appropriate levels. However, the manner of imparting knowledge (i.e., audio, audio-visual, 
haptic etc.) has not been discussed in this thesis. While existing research (Biondi et al., 2017; 
Dambock et al., 2013; Petermeijer et al., 2017) suggests multi-modal feedback is the most 
effective in order to increase drivers’ awareness, its effect on trust, or use in automated 
vehicles, hasn’t been evaluated.  
In chapter 8, the author discussed the objectification of the automotive HARA in order to 
improve the reliability of the HARA process. The author created rule-sets for severity, 
exposure and controllability ratings by parametrising each of the aspects. While the results 
discussed in chapter 8 show increased convergence (with respect to inter-rater variations) in 
ratings (between different groups of experts), full convergence was not reached. The size of 
the parametrised rule-set to cover complex scenarios was limited. This was also noticed in 
the feedback from the experts who suggested addition of more parameters to the rule-set to 
further improve reliability of the process. 
9.3.2. Potential next research steps 
In chapter 5, the author evaluated the effect of knowledge on the development of trust. 
Prospective next research steps could include the evaluation of some of the other factors 
identified in chapter 3 (literature review on trust) on the development of trust and 
development of an objective measure of trust. 
In chapter 7, the proposed method for test scenario creation using hazard based testing, was 
applied to an example real-world system and the scenario creation process was discussed via 
an example sub-system of the LSAD. Prospective next research steps could include for the 
proposed method to be applied to other types of ADASs and ADSs to further evaluate its 
effectiveness. 
The following are the potential next research questions (as a result of the work presented in 
this thesis) that could be evaluated: 
In the trust theme: 
 How to objectively measure trust of an individual in/with automation? 
 How to impart knowledge about the automation capability to the drivers to calibrate 
trust to appropriate high levels? 
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 How much knowledge (and in which form) about automation capability is the 
optimum level to be provided to the drivers to calibrate trust to appropriate high 
levels? How is this affected by the drivers’ capabilities/skills? 
Some research areas to objectively measure trust have been linked with biometric 
correlation. The link (or correlation if any) between biometric indicators like galvanic skin 
response, pupil dilation, heartrate etc. and subjective trust ratings could help establish a more 
objective way of measuring trust. One of the major challenges in using biometric indicators 
is around the reliability of the measurement devices. Another avenue of potential research 
for objective measure of trust is to use a hybrid metric combining different biometric 
indicators.  
Knowledge to create an informed safety state, can be imparted to drivers/users of ADASs 
and ADSs in various ways. As discussed in chapter six and in section 9.2.1, static knowledge 
and dynamic knowledge can have potentially different effects on trust and workload. As 
suggested by study six (dynamic knowledge and trust), dynamic knowledge can have a 
substantial effect in increasing trust and reducing workload. Dynamic knowledge can be 
imparted using different modalities (e.g. visual cues, audio cues, haptic cues or multi-modal 
cues). Furthermore, each of the modalities can have different levels of aggressiveness. This 
area of research will require carefully designed driving simulator or real world experiments 
tacking one modality at a time with a good control for the experiment to evaluate the effects.      
In the testing theme: 
 Which parameters should be added (to proposed rule-set) to achieve full 
convergence of the HARA ratings? 
 How to quantify the benefit of Hazard Based Testing over other existing testing 
methodologies? 
To identify the parameters for the rule-set for severity, controllability and exposure ratings, 
the identified hazards need to be parametrised. The parameters influencing the hazards will 
then need to be incorporated in the rule-set. This suggests that the rule-set for the HARA 
will be hazard dependent. In order to create a robust rule-set, future workshop studies 
(similar to study 3 and 4) will need to be conducted using different hazards. Additionally, 
before the workshops, the hazards will need to be parametrised. This could potentially be 
done using the STPA method and the extension suggested in chapter 7.  
In order to quantify the benefit of Hazard Based Testing, a case study needs to be conducted 
to apply STPA inspired HBT and traditional Requirements Based Testing. A comparison of 
the difference in the number and the types of scenarios will provide an insight in to the 
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benefit of HBT over traditional methods. Additionally, another area of future research would 
be to establish the most effective hazard identification method (among STPA, FTA, FMEA 
and HAZOP) for HBT through a real-world case study. 
9.4. Summary 
The research discussed in this thesis provides an insight in the process of development of 
trust in ADASs and ADSs. The results suggest that by providing knowledge (in real-time) 
about the true capabilities and limitations of the ADASs and ADSs, drivers’ trust can be 
calibrated to high levels. This also prevents drivers’ misuse or disuse of these systems, and 
thus enabling the society at large to reap the benefits of ADASs and ADSs in a safe manner. 
Additionally, this thesis also presents a novel method to create the knowledge (which can be 
used to calibrate trust) about the true capabilities and limitations of the systems by testing 
“how the systems (ADAS and ADS) fail” rather than “how the systems work”. Some of the 
research contributions of this thesis have influenced the development of future international 
standards, demonstrating the impact of the presented work. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
Chapter 10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, the findings and conclusions from the research work discussed in this thesis 
are summarised. Review of literature (in chapter 3 and chapter 6) led to the creation of the 
three research questions explored and answered in part in this thesis. While Advanced 
Driver Assistance Systems (ADASs) and Automated Driving Systems (ADSs) offer many 
benefits, their benefits can only be realised if drivers use such systems. In order to increase 
drivers’ use of such systems, the following conclusions were reached from the review of the 
literature: 
 Trust is a key factor influencing drivers’ use of automated features like ADAS and 
ADS. 
 It is essential to calibrate trust to the appropriate level to avoid misuse (due to over-
trust) or disuse (due to under-trust) 
 Trust can be quantitatively classified as “trust in the system” and “trust with the 
system”. This is an important distinction as both the constructs represent different 
aspects of trust development and are influenced differently by various factors 
influencing development of trust. 
In order to answer research question 1 (How to calibrate “trust in/with” automation in 
vehicles?), firstly it was established that trust is influenced by many factors like knowledge, 
certification, workload, situation awareness, self-confidence, experience and consequence. 
Subsequently, Research Objective 1 (“To develop a conceptual model for development of 
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drivers’ trust in automated driving systems”), was met by creating a conceptual model for 
development of drivers’ trust in automated driving systems (in chapter 3).  
In the conceptual model created, trust could potentially be increased by a variety of factors 
using many intervention methods. In this thesis, knowledge as a factor was the focus of the 
research. In chapter 3, knowledge has been classified into three aspects: 1) static knowledge 
2) dynamic (real-time) knowledge 3) internal mental model. The two former types of 
knowledge (static and dynamic) have been discussed in this thesis as it is possible to impart 
them as a part of system design. 
In chapter 5, it was demonstrated “knowledge” can be used as an intervention method to 
calibrate (increase or decrease) drivers’ trust. Research objective two (“To evaluate the 
effect of knowledge (static and dynamic) on calibration of trust”), was met via two driving 
simulator studies that were conducted to evaluate the effect of knowledge (static and 
dynamic) on trust. 
In chapter 5, results from two driving simulator studies led to many conclusions. Firstly, 
“Trust in the system” ratings can be increased (statistically significantly) by providing static 
knowledge about the automated system’s capabilities and the limitations. Secondly, with 
introduction of static knowledge, the difference in “trust in the system” ratings between low 
capability and high capability automation was statistically insignificant, suggesting that 
introduction of static knowledge leads to similar trust levels for both automation capabilities. 
However, the introduction of static knowledge caused a significant increase in the workload 
for low capability automation. For high capability automation, static knowledge didn’t have 
any such effect. Thirdly, the introduction of static knowledge didn’t have any significant 
effect on “trust with the system”. Fourthly, dynamic (real-time) knowledge about the system 
capabilities and limitations, significantly increases both “trust in the system” and “trust with 
the system” ratings for both high capability and low capability automation. Interestingly, 
providing dynamic knowledge had an insignificant effect on workload ratings for both types 
of automation. Moreover, contrary to static knowledge, with the introduction of dynamic 
knowledge, difference in trust ratings (trust in the system and trust with the system) between 
low capability and high capability automation was statistically significant. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that dynamic knowledge is more beneficial and has a larger effect on trust 
ratings. 
Thus, research question 1 was answered by establishing that introduction of knowledge 
(static or dynamic) helps calibrate “trust in the system” and “trust with the system” to 
appropriate levels by creating a state of “informed safety”. Moreover, providing dynamic 
knowledge had a larger influence on trust as compared to static knowledge. Informed safety 
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means informing the driver (via static and dynamic knowledge) about the true capabilities 
and limitations of the ADASs or Automated Driving Systems (ADSs) and the real-time state 
of the ADASs and/or ADSs. By creating a state of “informed safety” there is a potential to 
achieve early adoption of ADASs and ADSs enabling the society to reap the benefits of the 
technology rather than waiting for perfect automation. 
Once it was established that providing knowledge to drivers about the true capabilities of the 
ADASs and ADSs helps to calibrate trust to appropriate levels, the process of creation of 
knowledge was subsequently explored. Literature suggested that testing is a potential 
method of establishing the true capabilities and limitations of the ADASs and ADSs, which 
form the content of the knowledge to be imparted to the drivers. Testing comprises of test 
methods, test scenarios and safety analysis. In chapter 6, the challenges associated with the 
creation of test scenarios and safety analysis were identified from the literature review. The 
following conclusions were made from the literature regarding test scenarios and safety 
analysis: 
 There is lack of a structured approach in the process of creation of test scenarios. 
 There is a lack of understanding in defining the content and objective of test 
scenarios to identify the true capabilities and limitations of ADAS and ADS. 
 Classification of risk associated with a scenario suffers from reliability challenges 
(both inter-rater and intra-rater reliability). 
This lead to the creation of two research questions (RQ2 and RQ3): 
 How to create test scenarios to establish the limitations of automated driving 
systems? (RQ2) 
 How to improve the inter- and intra-rater-reliability of the automotive HARA 
process? (RQ3) 
In chapter seven, research question two (How to create test scenarios to establish the 
limitations of automated driving systems?) was answered by meeting the two associated 
research objectives. Firstly, in order to meet research objective three (“To develop an 
understanding about the characteristics of a test scenario (especially for ADAS and ADS)”), 
a semi-structured interview study of experts was conducted. It was concluded that for 
ADASs and ADSs, it is necessary to test “how the system fails” in addition to “how the 
system works”. Thus, research objective three was met and “hazard based testing” (HBT) as 
a new approach to testing was created as a proposal for creating test scenarios. 
Once hazard based testing was proposed to test “how a system fails”, the research objective 
four (“To develop a methodology for creating test scenarios (based on the identified 
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characteristics)”), was met by creating a methodology for generating test scenarios. To 
create test scenarios via HBT, firstly hazards need to be identified and secondly test 
scenarios need to be created for the identified hazards. In order to identify hazards, Systems 
Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) was used as it can analyse the sub-system interactions 
and capture hazards associated with them in a more efficient manner as compared to other 
hazard identification processes. In order to generate test scenarios, elements of the STPA 
output were parametrised. The proposed process was applied to a real-world case study of a 
low-speed automated driving system (pod) and test scenarios based on the proposed 
approach were created. 
Thus, research question two was answered by establishing the characteristics of a test 
scenario to establish the limitations of ADAS and ADS and creating a methodology for 
creating test scenarios which possess the identified characteristics. 
In chapter eight, research question three (How to improve the inter- and intra-rater-
reliability of the automotive HARA process?) was answered. In order to address the 
reliability challenges associated with automotive Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment 
(HARA), the author created an objective approach to HARA. A set of rules for severity, 
exposure and controllability ratings was created which guide the HARA process. The rule-
set introduces parametrisation of the severity, exposure and controllability ratings. Thus, 
research objective five (“To develop a rule-set for conducting automotive HARA”) was met. 
In a series of workshops involving international functional safety experts, it was 
demonstrated that the introduction of the rule-set led to improved convergence in HARA 
ratings. However, further work is required on the rule-set by introducing more parameters to 
further increase convergence in the HARA ratings. Therefore, research objective six (“To 
determine the ability of the developed rule-set for HARA in improving the reliability of the 
automotive HARA”), was partially met as the rule-set needs further re-calibration. 
Thus, research question three was partially answered by creating an objective approach to 
automotive HARA by parametrising the severity, exposure and controllability ratings to 
create a rule-set for each of them which led to a partial convergence in the HARA ratings. 
However, further work is needed on the rule-set as more parameters need to be included in 
the rule-set for full convergence. Subsequently, the effect of the rule-set needs to be 
evaluated again. 
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In conclusion, this thesis presents a number of contributions to the research community on 
increasing trust in ADASs and ADSs and how to test ADASs and ADSs. Some of the larger 
contributions to research and industrial community are as follows: 
 It is not essential to have perfect automation which is 100% capable in order to have 
high trust. However, to develop high trust, it is essential that the driver has the 
knowledge about the true capabilities and limitations of systems. 
 Moreover, the knowledge of true capabilities and limitations needs to be imparted to 
the driver in a manner that enables them to display Knowledge Based (KB) 
behaviour. In KB behaviour, the drivers have an understanding of the high-level 
working of the system, and understand the reasons for the limitations and their role 
in how to overcome the limitations. 
 Many studies have suggested that there is a need to drive over 11 billion miles to 
establish the true capabilities and limitations (safety) of the ADASs and ADSs. In a 
departure from traditional way of testing where “how a system works” is tested, for 
ADAS and ADS it is more important to test “how a system fails”. Hazard Based 
Testing (HBT) has the potential of identifying scenarios where the system would 
fail. 
 The knowledge about system limitations created through HBT can be imparted to 
drivers to create a state of “informed safety” allowing them to adapt their usage of 
the system to work with the system by overcoming its limitations. 
 Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) inspired hazard based testing identifies 
hazards especially in complex systems like ADASs and ADSs which involve 
human-automation interaction. The proposed extension to STPA (parametrisation of 
STPA outputs) provides a structured approach to define test scenarios to establish 
the limitations of ADASs and ADSs. 
 Having identified various scenarios, the next step in safety analysis is the 
classification of risk associated with the scenarios. The objective approach to hazard 
analysis and risk assessment (proposed in this research) has a potential to decrease 
the inter-rater and intra-rater variation in the risk ratings and also help train new 
engineers in the hazard analysis process by aiding their thought process on the 
parameters to be considered for risk analysis. 
 From an industrial impact perspective, the STPA inspired hazard based testing has 
received interest from various industrial partners. Test scenarios resulting from the 
233 
 
proposed process are being considered for incorporation in international standard on 
Low-Speed Automated Driving (LSAD) systems. In addition, the proposed process 
is being considered for incorporation in an industry “recommended practice” 
document.
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TRUST CALIBRATION: CASE EXAMPLE7 
Appendix A1 
Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In chapter three, the concept of calibration of trust was introduced. Calibration of trust is 
defined as “the process of adjusting trust to correspond to an objective measure of 
trustworthiness” (Muir, 1994). It has been suggested in chapter three that calibration of trust 
is a multi-stage process (Figure 3.2): 
 Stage A: Initial phase: Influenced by static knowledge and an internal mental model 
of the driver 
 Stage B: Loss phase: Influenced by failures (frequency and severity). The rate of 
decrease is influenced by the consequences of these failures 
 Stage C: Distrust phase. 
 Stage D and stage E: Recovery phase. 
                                                     
7 Contents of this chapter have been published in the following publication: 
 
Khastgir, S., Birrell, S., Dhadyalla, G. and Jennings, P. (2017) ‘Calibrating Trust to Increase the Use 
of Automated Systems in a Vehicle’, in Stanton, N. et al. (eds) Advances in Human Aspects of 
Transportation. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing. Springer, Cham, pp. 535–546. 
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Chapter three also introduces the concept of Trust Calibration Number (TCN). TCN has 
three aspects: 1) Area enclosed by the trust calibration graph, referred to as Area of 
uncertainty 2) Slope of stage B 3) slope of stages C, D and E. 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡
𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟
  =  Area of uncertainty + Fcn1(slope of stage B) – Fcn2(slope of stages C,D, E) 
𝑫𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏 𝑮𝒐𝒂𝒍: 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟) 
 
The area enclosed in the graph (Figure 3.2) is defined as the area of uncertainty. This 
chapter explains the calibration of trust using a case study of driver-take over in an 
automated vehicle. 
A1.1. Take-over process with knowledge as intervention 
method 
One of the open research questions in the area of driver-automation interaction is the take-
over process which has been widely discussed in literature (Eriksson et al., 2017; Eriksson 
and Stanton, 2017a; Gold et al., 2013; Hergeth et al., 2017; Lorenz et al., 2014; Louw et al., 
2016; Radlmayr et al., 2014). A take-over process is when the responsibility for the driving 
task shifts from the driver to the automated system or vice-versa. In this case study, the 
author discusses the latter. A take-over process is said to have various phases: 1) stable 
performance phase 2) event/condition state change phase or change in driver intent 3) take-
over request phase 4) transfer phase and 5) receipt and recovery phase (Figure A1.2). 
Figure A1.1: Trust calibration graph: Representing trust hysteresis 
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A take-over response is defined as “the specific, measurable action taken by the human user 
or the system to partially or fully resume the Dynamic Driving Task (DDT)” (SAE 
International, 2016a), where DDT is defined as “All of the real-time operational and tactical 
functions required to operate a vehicle in on-road traffic, excluding the strategic functions 
such as trip scheduling and selection of destinations and waypoints, and including without 
limitation…(tactical)” (SAE International, 2016b). 
It is said that cognitive tasks as compared to motor tasks have more influence on take-over 
time (Zeeb et al., 2015). A study comparing the effect of different types of distraction on 
quality of take-over time showed that a cognitive distraction task resulted in a poorer quality 
of take-over as compared to motor distraction tasks (Zeeb et al., 2016). This emphasizes the 
need for increased SA2 for drivers to have better interaction with the automation and to react 
to take-over situations (Radlmayr et al., 2014). SA3 is needed to predict take-over situations 
which would result from a knowledge-based behaviour. While SA1 could mean eyes on the 
road, it doesn’t guarantee SA2 (which requires cognition) (Radlmayr et al., 2014). Motor 
reactions could possibly occur as a result of intuitive actions due to drivers’ skill-based 
behaviour, e.g. driving on the same route every day. However, the quality of a take-over 
manoeuvre depends on the driver’s SA2 and SA3 which are a result of both rule-based and 
knowledge-based behaviour. Therefore, while considering takeover scenarios, it is important 
to consider both response times and the quality of take-over.  
 
 
Depending on whether the take-over process has been initiated by the automated system or 
the driver, the take-over request phase may or may not occur (Figure A1.3). For a particular 
Figure A1.2: Different phases of take-over process (system-initiated). Adopted from SAE J3114 (SAE 
International, 2016a) which has been adapted from (Seppelt and Victor, 2016) and (Damböck et al., 2012). 
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trip, the driver is responsible for making the strategic decision about when to initiate the AD 
mode or drive in manual mode. Automated Driving mode can perform both tactical and 
operational driving tasks. However, the decision to disengage AD mode based on contextual 
parameters is a tactical decision which the driver is supposed to make in order to ensure safe 
manoeuvring of the vehicle to achieve the strategic goals of the driving task. Irrespective of 
whether the take-over process has been initiated by the driver or the system, the driver has to 
perform the take-over response in order to take control back.   
 
 
The quality of the take-over process is dependent on the driver’s understanding of the state 
of the system and the environment (SA2) (Radlmayr et al., 2014). The quality of the take-
over process would appreciably be better if the driver has a high level of SA3 and could 
predict a possible take-over process situation by making knowledge-based decisions 
(Rasmussen, 1983). Based on evidence from literature, the quality of take-over processes 
and their corresponding relationships was analysed with the calibration of trust. Similar to 
the stages of calibration of trust, Figure A1.4 has five points of interest (A-E). At point A, 
the automated system detects a situation to which it cannot respond appropriately or safely. 
At point B, urgent intervention is required from the driver in order to ensure the safety of the 
vehicle. At point C, the driver performs the intervention (take-over response). The driver 
tries to understand the current system state and decides on the appropriate intervention 
manoeuvre (e.g. applying the brakes, steering to an adjacent lane, applying acceleration etc.) 
Figure A1.3: Different phases of take-over process (driver-initiated). Adopted from SAE J3114 (SAE 
International, 2016a) which has been adapted from (Seppelt and Victor, 2016) and (Damböck et al., 2012). 
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in the duration between points B and C. By the time the driver has reached point D, the 
driver has regained stable manual control of the vehicle.  
The author will now discuss the described take-over process in two different contexts: 1) 
with no dynamic knowledge feedback provided by the automated system versus 2) with 
dynamic knowledge feedback provided by the automated system to the driver. In the 
absence of any dynamic knowledge (feedback) of the failure or a request for take-over, as 
the failure starts to occur at point A, trust on the system decreases gradually (Chavaillaz et 
al., 2016b) as it is not yet a critical situation, and the driver’s workload increases. Due to 
highly critical nature of the stage between point B and point C, drivers’ trust plummets to a 
low level as they find it hard to gain enough situational awareness to understand the required 
intervention and are caught by surprise. At the same time, drivers’ workload increases 
rapidly due to the requirement of a high level of cognition. While the drivers’ workload level 
stabilizes and decreases after point D (once stable manual control is achieved), drivers’ trust 
level remains low as it is difficult for the drivers to recover trust quickly. However, the 
driving simulator studies (in chapter five) demonstrated that with the introduction of 
knowledge, trust levels can be calibrated to an appropriate level even with an imperfect 
Figure A1.4: Calibration of trust with intervention methods in a take-over scenario (system-initiated) 
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automation. They argued that introduction of (static) knowledge increased drivers’ workload 
as it increased their cognitive workload. However, providing dynamic knowledge only or in 
conjunction with static knowledge overcame this effect, suggesting that drivers require real-
time feedback on the automation system status in order to calibrate their trust. 
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TEST METHODS8 
Appendix A2 
Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter six introduced three constituting elements of testing: 
 Test scenarios 
 Safety analysis 
 Test methods 
Test scenarios and safety analysis have been discussed in detail in chapter six – eight. This 
chapter provides an overview of the various test methods being used for Advanced Driver 
Assistance System (ADAS) and Automated Driving System (ADS). Furthermore, this 
chapter highlights some of the challenges in test methods for ADASs and ADSs, while 
introducing WMG’s 3xD Simulator for Intelligent Vehicles which was created with a vision 
to answer some of these challenges. 
                                                     
8 Contents of this chapter have been published in the following publications: 
Khastgir, S., Birrell, S., Dhadyalla, G. and Jennings, P. (2015b) ‘Identifying a gap in existing 
validation methodologies for intelligent automotive systems: Introducing the 3xD simulator’, in Proc. 
of the IEEE Intelligent Vehicles Symposium 2015. Seoul, South Korea, pp. 648–653. 
Khastgir, S., Birrell, S., Dhadyalla, G., Fulker, D., et al. (2015) ‘A Drive-in, Driver-in-the-Loop 
Simulator for Testing Autonomous Vehicles’, Proc. of the Driving Simulation Conference Europe 
2015, pp. 117–122. 
Khastgir, S., Birrell, S., Dhadyalla, G. and Jennings, P. (2015a) ‘Development of a drive-in driver-in-
the-loop fully immersive driving simulator for virtual validation of automotive systems’, in Proc. of 
the IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference Spring 2015. Glasgow. doi: 
10.1109/VTCSpring.2015.7145775. 
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Due to the safety critical nature of ADASs like collision avoidance, and lane keeping assist 
systems and ADS, testing methodologies which enable exhaustive testing need to be adopted 
for their validation to ensure their safe performance in all conditions. Moreover, these test 
methods require precise measurements, high reproducibility and test scenarios that are 
representative of the real world. However, the test scenarios used in the test methods include 
manoeuvres which are hard to reproduce, too expensive and potentially unsafe for human 
drivers (Hendriks et al., 2010).  
Researchers have developed several innovative test methods (e.g. Coordinated Automated 
Driving, VEHiL, ViL, driving simulators etc. which have been discussed in sections 0 - 0) to 
meet the challenges to validate ADAS and other automated features present within cars. In 
ADASs, the driver is still in the loop of the driving task and up until SAE Level 3, can take 
over or asked to take over the control of the vehicle at any point in time. Thus, one of the 
biggest challenges faced by researchers and manufactures is to develop a test method that 
provides the ability to reproduce test scenarios and test results in a safe manner while having 
the driver-in-the-loop. The introduction of virtual testing has allowed researchers to increase 
their ability to reproduce results even in a driver-in-the-loop environment, however many 
challenges still exist. Some of test methods and the challenges associated with them are 
discussed in this chapter. 
A2.1. On-Road testing 
Traditionally, on-road testing involves deploying a nearly final version of the subject-under-
test (SUT) into real-world traffic conditions. While traditional automotive systems require 
driver to be still responsible for ensuring safety of the driving task at all times, higher level 
ADAS and AD systems remove the driver from this responsibility. Additionally, due to the 
safety critical nature of ADAS and AD systems, they have the potential to endanger humans 
in case they don’t function properly. The assumption behind on-road testing is that if the 
SUT has experience enough scenarios and is able to handle them in a safe manner, SUT has 
passed the tests and can be deployed. However, the challenge remains to understand the 
number of scenarios required in real-traffic to suggest that SUT has passed on-road testing. 
Until SUT has been proved to be safe, it requires a trained safety driver to be present behind 
the wheel at all times (Wachenfeld and Winner, 2017a). This makes on-road testing highly 
resource (cost and time) intensive. Therefore, it has been suggested that on-road testing just 
before the start of production for ADAS and AD systems will not be sufficient and suitable 
to establish their safety levels. This suggests the needs for other methods for testing ADAS 
and AD systems which may complement on-road testing. 
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A2.2. Coordinated Automated Driving 
Certain test scenarios for driver assistance systems require two or more vehicles to be able to 
perform precisely synchronized manoeuvres, particularly with lateral dynamic manoeuvres. 
As human operation of vehicles is incapable of providing consistent results, and is also 
dangerous in accident-prone scenarios, a coordinated automated driving concept has been 
introduced by Daimler. In this method, the vehicles are driven by robotic systems controlling 
the steering and braking. The robots are programmed to follow the desired path and perform 
the required manoeuvres, thus allowing precise reproduction of the scenario. The robotic 
vehicles are equipped with an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) to measure the actual 
position. However, due to the presence of an inherent drift in an IMU, this system is backed 
up by a Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) to ensure long term accuracy in the 
cm range (Schöner et al., 2009). The system allows for precise trajectory control of the 
vehicles as long as the manoeuvres stay away from the physical limits of vehicle dynamics.  
The robotic vehicles move on an open test track. For safety critical scenarios they are driven 
in driverless mode. In other scenarios the driver has an option to switch between automatic 
control and human control with the press of a switch. The dynamic manoeuvres are of 
special interest to understand whether the system remains within existing legislative limits. 
As a safety system, an operator controls all vehicles via a WLAN network from a common 
base station. It also comprises of a controlled shut-down procedure to prevent any accidents 
due to sudden decelerations. An important feature of this method is the high degree of 
reproducibility even in scenarios requiring high deceleration rates. However, the setup cost 
is high as all vehicles need to be fitted with robotic systems and can only be done towards 
the end of product development. 
A2.3. VEHiL: VEHicle Hardware-in-the-Loop 
The VEhicle Hardware-in-the-Loop (VEHiL) concept introduced by TNO Automotive, the 
Netherlands, allows for evaluation of various driver assistance systems on full scale 
intelligent vehicles and their infrastructure in a laboratory (Verburg et al., 2002). First, a 
virtual environment (PRE-SCAN (Gietelink et al., 2004)) is defined in which the various 
interactions between vehicles and infrastructure are simulated. In a second step, the full scale 
Vehicle Under Test (VUT) is placed on a chassis dynamometer, which is fed with realistic 
road load and interfaced with the simulated environment. The benefit of this method is that 
the VUT is treated as a “black box” from which vehicle states are measured and fed into the 
simulated environment. The whole system works in a partly real and partly simulated 
environment combining the benefits of both types of testing. The added benefit of the 
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chassis dynamometer is that the system can accommodate a wide range of vehicle types, 
giving it added flexibility for validation.  
It is interesting to note that in this method only the relative motion between the VUT and 
other traffic participants is reproduced.  The other traffic participants are realized by a 4-
wheel driven, 4 wheel steered robot vehicle (as shown in Figure A2.1) which responds to the 
motion commands (in terms of position, velocity and acceleration) of the traffic simulator 
and carries out the commands relative to the static VUT. This movement is sensed by the 
VUT sensors fooling it to believe it is actually moving on the road. Various types of ADAS 
systems can be tested using the VEHiL facility, however certain systems like the collision 
mitigation, lane keeping assist system and lane departure warning system cannot be tested to 
appropriate levels. Additionally, the setup of the full system requires a large open space and 
has considerable cost attached with it. On the positive side, various accident-prone scenarios 
can be validated and reproduced in this setup without harm to the human driver. Although, 
no level of virtual validation can completely replace in-field testing, VEHiL seems to 
provide a smooth transition from the full simulation world to in-field testing. 
 
 
A2.4. ViL: Vehicle in the Loop 
The concept of “Mixed Reality” which combines actual reality and virtual reality is another 
prospective approach for validation of ADAS (Blissing et al., 2013). Augmented Reality, a 
manifestation of mixed reality has been widely used in the ADAS validation technologies of 
late. Test tools and techniques described above do fulfil the requirements for safe, 
reproducible methods, but only within limits. For higher levels of automation, which include 
collision mitigation and lane keeping assist, further development of test methods was 
required. A host of driving simulators (which will be discussed in later sections) have been 
Figure A2.1: VEHiL 
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made and test methodologies for ADAS systems have been developed. However, none of 
them have been able to provide a platform for validation of higher levels of automation in 
vehicles. The idea of the Vehicle in the Loop test setup introduced by Audi AG and later 
adopted by Volkswagen, combines a test vehicle and synthetic environment by means of 
Augmented Reality.  
In vehicle in the loop configuration, the driver drives the vehicle in open spaces (a test track) 
without any traffic. Additionally, the driver wears a Head-Mounted Display (HMD) (as 
shown in Figure A2.2) which simulates the traffic and road environment in front of the 
driver by use of augmented reality. Since the whole traffic environment exists in the virtual 
world only, all safety critical scenarios can be easily validated with a high degree of 
accuracy and reproducibility. The vehicle’s trunk houses two separate computers for data 
measurement and traffic flow simulation, along with the radar control unit. The vehicle’s 
position is calculated by a three pronged approach of differential GPS, inertial navigation 
and couple navigation by integrative updating of the vehicle sensor data (Bock et al., 2005). 
This information along with the driver’s head position which is monitored by a head tracker, 
is transferred to the traffic simulation software online. 
The Field of View (FoV) of the driver whilst wearing the HMD is limited to the natural 
visual field which changes continuously according to the driver’s head position. Since there 
is an interaction between the real world and the virtual world, real world sensors need to be 
simulated to enable the communication with the virtual world. Additionally, the ability to 
make manual triggers for various scenarios increases the flexibility of this system. The 
fidelity of the results is highly dependent on the fidelity of the modelled sensors and the 
realism of the augmented reality visuals. The scenario generation is done via a computer 
present in the trunk of the vehicle, which interacts with the HMD and the vehicle systems 
via CAN to generate the view for the driver. Another computer, also present inside the trunk, 
stores the captured data. 
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The setup of the vehicle in the loop system requires a large open space where the driver can 
drive the vehicle without any obstacles. Additionally, due to the presence of the HMD, this 
technique is not optimal for driver behaviour studies which form an essential aspect of the 
acceptance studies for higher level of autonomous features and ultimately a self-driving car. 
The degree of realism of the simulated environment is limited, as the augmented reality field 
is still under progress. In certain scenarios like a vehicle cut-in, the results are compromised 
(Bock et al., 2007). 
A2.5. Driving Simulators 
As mentioned in sections A2.1, even though on-road studies / real-world studies form a 
major part of testing of ADAS and ADS, they can be extremely resource (time and cost) 
intensive. Moreover, due to the safety critical nature of ADAS and ADS, it can be extremely 
difficult to perform certain driving manoeuvres which are evasive in nature in a safe and a 
reproducible manner. In chapter two, the need to better understand and evaluate the 
interaction between ADAS and ADS with drivers to develop mechanisms to increase their 
trust has been discussed. However, most of the on-road studies are undertaken with a trained 
safety driver behind the steering wheel. Thus, it is not possible to understand the driver-
automation interaction as the trained safety drivers would behave differently than a normal 
drivers. 
Driving simulators have been used as a possible tool to overcome some of the challenges of 
real-world testing and to provide a safe environment to test drivers’ response to ADAS and 
AD functions.  One of the major benefits of a driving simulator is that it offers a completely 
safe environment for validation of various technologies in a virtual world with the driver-in-
the-loop and in a reproducible manner (Underwood et al., 2011). Ability to vary both the 
traffic and weather conditions in a reproducible manner, add more fidelity to the results from 
Figure A2.2: ViL 
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a driving simulator study. In order to answer research question one and research objective 
two identified in chapter three on evaluating the effect of knowledge on trust, it was 
essential to use a setup that would enable the author to evaluate users’ interaction with 
automated systems in a safe and reproducible manner. Thus, driving simulator was selected 
as the setup to answer research question one and meet research objective two. The studies 
discussed in this thesis were conducted on WMG’s 3xD Simulator for Intelligent Vehicles 
(WMG, 2017). 
A2.5.1. WMG 3xD Simulator for Intelligent Vehicles 
For the driving simulator studies presented in this thesis, WMG’s 3xD driving simulator was 
used (WMG, 2017). The 3xD simulator offers a unique platform for system validation, as 
well as for driver behaviour studies around autonomous vehicles with varied levels of 
automation. The WMG’s 3xD simulator is housed in a radio-frequency (RF) shielded room 
with dimensions of 9.4 x 9.4 x 3.2 metres and has a 360° Field of View (FoV) which is 
achieved using eight projectors mounted from the ceiling. The 360° FoV is realised via a 
cylindrical screen which is eight metres in diameter and three metres in height. The 
dimensions allowed to have a Land Rover Evoque as the Built-Up Cab which was used for 
the studies. The 360° Field of View, the cylindrical screen and a life-size Land Rover 
Evoque as the ego vehicle (Figure A2.3), help immerse the participants in a driver-in-the-
loop simulation environment. 
Apart from the reasons for choosing a driving simulator (mentioned above), the choice of 
using the 3xD simulator was the ability to control the simulation (i.e., simulation entities like 
ego vehicle, other vehicles, environment, pedestrians etc.) in real-time via a TCP/IP 
Hardware-in-the-Loop (HiL) server-client interface. The real time control involves shifting 
the ego vehicle from manual driving mode to automated driving mode, triggering events in 
the simulation environment, applying emergency braking of the ego vehicle etc. The HiL 
server-client interface allowed external microprocessor to be connected to the simulator. For 
the studies one, two and six, a Raspberry Pi board was connected to the simulator via the 
HiL interface (Figure A2.4). A Raspberry Pi board was chosen as it offered the ability to 
connect the inputs of an analogue switch (button) (via the GPIO pins on the Raspberry Pi) to 
stimulate the 3xD simulator. 
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The challenges offered in the setup of the 3xD simulator were due to the mechanical concept 
and the usage envisioned for it. Some of the research challenges included: steering wheel 
feedback, RF immersive environment, motion cueing and degree of realism. 
RF Immersive Environment 
The simulator itself is housed inside a “Faraday cage” with dimensions 9.4 x 9.4 x 3.2 
metres. The faraday cage provides Radio Frequency (RF) shielding to the setup in simulator 
room. This is required as the 3xD simulator has the ability to artificially create an immersive 
RF environment which includes generation of GPS and wireless communication signals such 
Figure A2.4: 3xD simulator interface with Raspberry Pi via the HiL server-client interface 
Figure A2.3: WMG, 3xD Simulator for Intelligent Vehicles 
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as the IEEE 802.11, LTE, 5G etc. It is important to note that the 3xD simulator wasn’t 
envisioned as a vehicle dynamics evaluation platform, therefore motion cueing inputs for the 
driver are limited. However some degree of pitch, roll and vibration inputs are provided to 
the driver by a fixed motion base and actuator setup to provide an immersive environment to 
the driver. 
30 mile LiDAR route 
In order to increase the immersivity of the driver during the simulation, it is important to 
present a real world scenario to the driver. In order to have a real-world base map, a 30 mile 
geo-specific database was commissioned around Coventry, UK, which includes the main 
ring road, a section of the motorways (M6 and M42) and a number of interconnecting A-
roads, as shown in Figure A2.5. The route was scanned using a LiDAR (Laser Illuminated 
Detection And Ranging) sensor system which provided a road terrain accuracy of up to 2cm. 
 
 
Steering Wheel feedback 
The drive-in feature required the ability to provide steering feedback to the driver with the 
ignition turned off. As is commonly known, the power steering system is extremely stiff 
with the engine off as the power assisted steering isn’t available. On a typical simulator with 
a modified BUC the steering wheel is disconnected from the road wheels and an electric 
motor system is connected to the steering column to allow centring and provide road cues, 
which is not possible on a vehicle that is driven in and can’t be modified. 
Figure A2.5: 3xD simulator LiDAR scanned route 
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The mechanism developed for the drive-in system consists of two separate steering plates 
that the front wheels are placed on. The main plate consists of a circular rotatable plate to 
which one of the wheels is mounted firmly. The plate is then driven by a standard steering 
feedback motor, as would normally be connected to a traditional simulator BUC, with an 
appropriate gear ratio to provide the centring and feedback. The other plate is much simpler 
with a low friction bearing that allows lateral movement. Figure A2.6: Active steering plate 
for steering feedback shows the wheel of the vehicle mounted on the active steering plate.  
The risk of making both the plates active would lead to a possibility of them not being 100% 
synchronized and the motors not being able to deliver the desired steer. Additionally, to 
make the motor drive work, the wheel needs to be held accurately at the correct position to 
ensure it rotates around the correct part of the plate. If this was done for both the wheels it 
would very difficult to get both plates correctly positioned, each time a new vehicle is driven 
in. The secondary passive plate has an ability to not only rotate but also slide in both lateral 
and longitudinal directions. 
 
 
Motion Cueing 
The requirement to have some form of motion cueing for the BUC needed the addition of 
actuators to the BUC vehicle itself. Systems typically use floor mounted actuators to move 
each corner of the vehicle up and down. However in this case there where two issues. Firstly 
due to the drive-in vehicle, there was the need to move the BUC from the simulator to allow 
it to be replaced. This meant that the actuators needed to be removed separately from the 
vehicle and then carefully aligned during replacement, making it a difficult and time 
consuming process. The second issue was the weight of the selected BUC donor vehicle, a 
Figure A2.6: Active steering plate for steering feedback 
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Land Rover Evoque, which even after the removal of non-essential elements had a weight of 
approximately 300Kgs at each corner. This was at the limit of the available off the shelf 
actuator systems. The actuators chosen have a stroke length of 150 mm which has been 
mechanically reduced to 100 mm (due to ergonomic issues in the BUC). They have a 
maximum frequency of 100Hz providing a maximum pitch of ± 2.1° with a maximum roll of 
± 4.8°. 
The original plan was to mount the actuators in place of the shock absorbers but due to the 
weight issue and the length of the actuators the solution shown in Figure A2.6 was adopted. 
It involves the conversion of linear horizontal motion of the actuators into vertical motion 
via a specially design lever mechanism. The system is mounted under the bonnet and in 
place of the rear axle. This mechanism provides the ability to control each of the actuators 
independently. 
 
This has a number of benefits over the original solution: 
 It gives about a 1/3 extra lift but with a reduced movement capability by means of 
the levers.  
 It also removes the need to modify the suspension system to accommodate the 
length of the actuator system 
Table A2.1: Specifications for 3xD Simulator 
Features Specification 
Max. Payload 3000 kg 
Screen diameter 8 m 
Screen Height 3 m 
Number of projectors 8 
Field of view 360° 
Max. BUC roll ± 4.8° 
Max. BUC pitch ± 2.1° 
Figure A2.7: Actuator assembly of the BUC 
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Table A2.2 shows a comparison between driving simulators and other test methods 
discussed earlier.  
Table A2.2: Comparison of various test methods and WMG 3xD simulator 
Features 
Coordinated 
Driving 
VEHiL 
Vehicle in the 
Loop (ViL) 
WMG 3xD 
Simulator 
Aim of methodology 
Testing ADAS 
systems 
Testing ADAS 
systems 
Testing ADAS 
systems 
Testing various levels 
of automation in 
vehicles 
Driver-in-the-Loop 
No (in critical 
scenarios) 
Yes (Less degree of 
realism) 
Yes (with Head 
Mounted Display) 
Yes 
Vehicle 
Interchangeability 
Yes but all 
systems need to 
be re-fitted 
Yes Yes Yes 
Intelligent Features 
that can be system 
validated 
ACC, Collision 
Mitigation, 
LKAS 
(Limited ADAS) 
ACC, 
Collision 
Mitigation,  Fault 
Injection 
(Limited ADAS) 
ACC, Collision 
Mitigation, LKAS 
(Limited ADAS) 
ACC, CACC, 
Collision Mitigation, 
LKAS (ADAS), 
Level 3-4-5 
automation, Path 
Planning Algorithms 
Probability of 
Human Accidents 
High (when 
driver is in the 
loop) 
Low Low 
Zero 
(Since vehicle 
ignition is off) 
Driver Field of View 
(FoV) 
Not Applicable 
(no driver) 
Full Limited 
Full  
360° 
Fidelity of Vehicle 
Dynamics 
(on a scale of 0-10) 
Not Applicable 
(no driver) 
3 8 4 
Possibility of Driver 
Behaviour studies 
No No Yes but not optimal Yes 
System Under Test  
Modified 
Vehicle 
Vehicle Vehicle Vehicle and BUC 
Relative Cost  
(on a scale of 0-10) 
5 8 4 4 
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SPEED AND CONTROLLABILITY: A DRIVING 
SIMULATOR STUDY 
Appendix 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As discussed in chapter 6, the ISO 26262 – 2018 standard is industry’s gold standard for 
functional safety. The standard refers to ASIL as a metric for analysing the risk. An ASIL 
rating comprises of three components: Severity (S), Exposure (E) and Controllability (C). 
However, the standard fails to provide objective guidance to evaluate each of the three (S, E 
and C) ratings or identify the parameters influencing these ratings (Yu et al., 2016). The lack 
of objectivity leads to subjective interpretation of the standard by experts causing intra-rater 
and inter-rater variation leading to reduced reliability of the ratings (Ergai et al., 2016). 
The ISO 26262-2018 (ISO, 2018c) standard states that “The evaluation of the controllability 
is an estimate of the probability that someone is able to gain sufficient control of the 
hazardous event, such that they are able to avoid the specific harm”. The standard classifies 
controllability into four classes: C0 – C3. However, it doesn’t provide an objective manner 
of assigning this rating and thus, introducing subjectivity to the risk rating classification. As 
discussed earlier in chapter five, the risk rating forms a part of the dynamic knowledge and 
unreliable knowledge can lead to low trust. 
Thus, to answer research question three focussed on improving the reliability of the 
knowledge, the concept of objectivising severity and controllability ratings was introduced 
in chapter eight.  
One of the major factors influencing controllability of the hazardous situation is the speed of 
the vehicle. In order to evaluate the effect of speed on controllability of a vehicle, a driving 
simulator experiment was done. This chapter discusses the effect of speed on controllability 
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of the driver in a low-speed automated driving system through a driving simulator study. 
Subsequently, an initial controllability rule-set was developed. 
A3.1. Study Method 
A3.1.1. Participants 
Similar to other driving simulator experiments (discussed in chapter 5), ethical approval for 
the experiment was secured from the University of Warwick’s Biomedical & Scientific 
Research Ethics Committee (BSREC) (REGO-2015-1746 AM02). Forty four participants 
(11 female and 33 male) were recruited via email invitations. Participants were at least 21 
years of age and were required to have a valid driving license. Participants experienced a 
maximum of three study runs (each at a different speed), one at low speed (5 – 10 miles per 
hour: band A), one at medium speed (14 – 16 miles per hour: band B) and one at high speed 
(20 – 25 miles per hour: band C). There were six possible permutations for the order (3P2) in 
which participants would experience the three speeds. The order in which participants 
experienced various speed bands was randomized. 
A3.1.2. Study Design 
The experiment was designed as a 1 x 3 factorial design with vehicle speed band as a within 
subject variable. In band A (5 – 10 mph) and band C (20 -25 mph), there were six speeds 
and in band B there were three speeds (14 – 16 mph). Each band had 36 data points from 36 
individual runs. While most participants completed three runs, some participants had to 
drop-out in between runs due to the onset of simulator sickness. In case a participant 
experienced simulator sickness during a run, that run was removed from the data analysis 
and the study for the participant was stopped. However, any previous study run that the 
participant might have successfully completed was taken into consideration for data 
analysis. 
As part of the study, each participant was driven in automated mode in all three runs and 
participants experienced 19 hazardous situations in each run. All hazardous situations 
required driver intervention to prevent an accident. In order to intervene, participants were 
asked to press an emergency stop button provided to them. Pressing the emergency stop 
button applied full braking power of the vehicle and the vehicle eventually came to a stop. 
Participants were seated in the front passenger’s seat, therefore didn’t have access to brake 
pedal or steering wheel. In case the participants met with an accident, the simulation was 
first paused, participants were told that they have met with an accident and then the 
simulation was restarted from a safe state from a point preceding to the accident impact 
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point. Each complete run lasted around 10 - 15 minutes (depending on the speed band). The 
driving simulator route was a built-up world with bends, roundabouts, straight roads and T-
junctions. The route had urban and rural sections. As the study run was in urban and rural 
sections, all hazardous situations were at low speed (less than 25 m/hr). Hazardous situations 
involved interactions with pedestrians (adults and children), cyclists, vehicles and 
motorcyclists.  
Similar to study one (trust and static knowledge) (in chapter 5), this study also had a 
gamification aspect to it (Table A3.1). Participants were told that they will receive 1 point 
for every second spent in automated mode. In case they applied the emergency brake to 
evade a hazardous situation, they received a bonus of 200 points. However, a wrong 
application of emergency brake led to a penalty of 200 points. In case of a crash, participants 
lost 10000 points. Participants’ goal was to maximise their score.  
 
Table A3.1: Scoring criteria for study (gamification) 
Type of Action Points 
Automated mode 1 / second 
Correct Stoppage of the automated vehicle +200 
Incorrect Stoppage of the automated vehicle -200 
Crash -10000 
 
A3.1.3. Study procedure 
Similar to driving simulator studies discussed earlier (in chapter 5), when participants 
arrived for the experiment, they were initially briefed about the experiment and informed 
consent was taken. In order to familiarise the participants with the driving simulation 
environment, each participant was given a trial run on the driving simulator which lasted 5 
minutes. Participants were told that they can ask for as many trial runs as they wish in order 
to make themselves comfortable with the simulator environment. After the trial runs, 
participants were asked if they wished to continue with the study. In case the participants 
agreed, they experienced three runs at three different speeds (corresponding to the three 
different speed bands in a random order). At the end of each run, participants were asked to 
fill a simulator sickness questionnaire (SSQ) (Kennedy et al., 1993) in order to judge the 
onset of simulator sickness. 
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A3.2. Results 
A3.2.1. Accidents 
During the simulation run, in case the participant’s vehicle (ego vehicle) collided with a 
pedestrian, cyclist or a vehicle, the simulation came to a stop (frozen state) and the instance 
was classified as an accident. As mentioned in section A3.1.1, participants experienced 19 
hazardous situations which could lead to 19 potential accidents. The average number of 
accidents experienced by participants in the three speed bands has been illustrated in Figure 
A3.1. A one-way ANOVA was conducted for the average number of accidents with speed 
bands as a between group variable. Speed bands had a significant effect on the number of 
accidents, F(2, 105) = 14.737, p < 0.05. Post-hoc test revealed that while average number of 
accidents was not significantly different between band A and band B (p > 0.05), the average 
number of accidents in band C was significantly higher than band A (p < 0.001) and band B 
(p < 0.001). While the higher number of accidents in band C could potentially be due to the 
higher speed leading to lower reaction time, the similar ratings for band A (low speed) and 
band B (medium speed) were an interesting result which will be discussed in detail in 
section A3.3. 
 
 
A3.2.2. Missed presses 
The average number of missed presses for the three speed bands showed an opposite trend as 
compared to the average number of accidents. The average number of missed presses 
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Figure A3.1: Average number of accidents in each speed band 
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experienced by participants in the three speed bands has been illustrated in Figure A3.2. A 
one-way ANOVA for the average number of missed presses with speed bands as a between 
group variable suggested a significant difference in the average number of missed presses 
between the speed bands, F(2,105) = , p < 0.001. Post-hoc analysis revealed that the average 
number of missed presses for band A was significantly higher (p < 0.001) at 0.86 as 
compared to 0.167 for band B and 0.083 for band C. This is another interesting result which 
will be discussed in detail in section A3.3. There was no significant difference (p > 0.05) 
between the average number of missed presses for band B and band C. 
 
 
A3.2.3. False presses 
The average number of false presses experienced by participants in the three speed bands has 
been illustrated in Figure A3.3: Average number false presses. The average number of false 
presses for band A was 0.583, for band B was 0.917 and for band C was 0.833. While a 
visual difference could be observed in Figure A3.3 between average numbers of false 
presses for the three bands, the difference was not statistically significant (p > 0.05). 
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Figure A3.2: Average number of missed presses 
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A3.2.4. Speed Controllability Number (SCN) 
Based on the number of accidents, false presses and missed presses, the author created a new 
term, Speed Controllability Number (SCN), to encapsulate the contents into one, to give a 
broader understanding of the ability of the participants to control the hazardous situation and 
prevent an accident. SCN captures within itself, aspects of mistrust and distrust (discussed in 
chapter 3 and chapter 5) and their effect on controllability. The calculation of SCN is 
described in equation 1. 
 
Speed Controllability Number (S.C.N.)= 
100 × (
No. of Correct button presses
No. of Required button presses
 −  
No. of crashes when button pressed
No. of Required button presses
 
−    1.5 × 
No. of crashes when no button pressed
No. of Required button presses
    −   0.5 × 
No. of false presses
No. of Required button presses
) … (1) 
 
The first term in SCN represents “appropriate trust” (discussed in chapter 3 and chapter 5) 
and the participant’s ability to react correctly by providing an active intervention (by 
pressing the emergency stop button) to stop the vehicle in response to a hazardous situation. 
Second term represents late realisation by the participants about the inability of the 
automated system to react to the hazardous situation. Third term represents high over-trust 
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Figure A3.3: Average number false presses 
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leading to no intervention to a hazardous situation. Fourth term represents distrust in the 
automation system, and participant’s intervention, even though no hazardous situation was 
present. 
The average SCN in the three speed bands has been illustrated in Figure A3.4. The average 
SCN for band A was 79.8, band B was 86.5 and for band C was 74.2. A one-way ANOVA 
for SCN values with speed bands as a between groups variable suggested a significant 
difference between the groups, F(2, 105) = 6.502, p < 0.05. A post-hoc test revealed that the 
average SCN for band B was significantly higher than SCN for band C (p < 0.001) and 
nearly significantly higher than SCN for band A (p = 0.053). The SCN for band A and band 
C was not significantly different (p > 0.05). 
 
 
A3.3. Discussion 
Conventional logic would have suggested that the number of accidents would be highest at 
high speeds and lowest at low-speeds. Higher number of accidents at high speeds could be 
attributed to the lack of time to react to a hazardous situation at higher speeds. While the 
results of the study do suggest higher average number of accidents for band C (high speed), 
the lack of difference in the average number of accidents for band A (low-speed) and band B 
(medium speed) is an interesting finding. This finding can be better understood with the 
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discussion of the trend observed for average number of missed presses. The average number 
of missed presses was significantly higher for band A as compared to band B and band C. It 
is worthwhile to note that a missed press would lead to an accident. At low-speeds while 
participants had more time to react to a hazardous situation, they had higher inherent trust in 
the automated system’s ability to react to the situation, suggesting over-trust on their part. 
The hypothesis is further corroborated by some of the qualitative feedback provided by the 
participants. Participant # 9 commented: “false sense of security (at low speed). Harder to 
stay attentive at this speed”. Another participant commented: “I let the system do what it 
could. I expected at low speeds it should be able to handle”. 
The higher SCN value for band B as compared to band C and band A is an interesting 
finding suggesting the existence of an optimum speed range for low-speed automated 
driving systems, which is neither too low (giving a false sense of security), nor too high 
(leaving little time to react for the driver/operator). However, like any other driving 
simulator studies, the results from this study would need to be validated in a real-world 
environment. 
A3.3.1. Initial Controllability rule-set 
The findings of this study were incorporated in the controllability rating rule-set. The 
controllability parameters were mainly influenced by the vehicle’s ability to change 
trajectory and the environment affecting vehicle’s ability to make this change (McGehee et 
al., 2000; Rosén et al., 2011; Schaap et al., 2008; Young and Stanton, 2007). The parameters 
identified for controllability were: 1) vehicle velocity 2) time-to-collision (TTC) 3) distance 
to obstacle 3) maximum acceleration/deceleration 4) availability of safe area 5) road friction 
6) gradient of slope. Time-to-collision (TTC) is defined as “the time taken by the trailing 
vehicle to crash into the front vehicle, if the vehicles continue in the same path without 
adjusting their speeds” (Chin and Quek, 1997). A condensed version of the controllability 
rule-set was used in the pilot study due to logistical reasons and is depicted in Table A3.2. 
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Table A3.2: Initial Controllability rule-set 
Emergency 
Deceleration Value 
Distance to 
Obstacle 
TTC 
Vehicle 
velocity 
Controllability 
Rating 
0.4g - 0.8g 
< 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C3 
1.0 - 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C2 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C0 
> 16 km/h C2 
> 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C2 
1.0 - 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C0 
11 - 16 km/h C0 
> 16 km/h C2 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C0 
> 16 km/h C1 
     
Emergency 
Deceleration Value 
Distance to 
Obstacle 
TTC 
Vehicle 
velocity 
Controllability 
Rating 
< 0.4g 
< 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C3 
11 - 16 km/h C2 
> 16 km/h C3 
1.0 - 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C2 
> 16 km/h C3 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C3 
> 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C3 
11 - 16 km/h C2 
> 16 km/h C3 
1.0 - 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C3 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C2 
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A3.4. Conclusion 
The results from the driving simulator experiment suggest that there exists an optimum 
speed at which controllability of the vehicle is maximum. This optimum speed lies in the 
medium speed band. While no conclusion could be made whether low speed band has higher 
controllability or high speed band, it could be conclusively suggested that both (low and 
higher) have lower controllability as compared to medium speed band. This is an interesting 
finding, albeit counter-intuitive. 
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OBJECTIFICATION OF HARA WORKSHOP 2 
(SWEDEN) 
Appendix 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A4.1. Workshop 2 (Sweden) 
A4.1.1. Participants 
Seventeen participants were recruited for the workshop conducted in Sweden. Participants 
had prior experience in functional safety assessment and most of the participants were 
involved in the Swedish functional safety technical committee involved in formulating 
Swedish comments for the ISO functional safety draft standards. Participants were grouped 
into five groups. Three groups had three participants while two groups had four participants. 
All participants were from Sweden. 
A4.1.2. Workshop structure 
The workshop consisted of an introduction that was followed by four rounds of 40 minutes 
each. Like in workshop one, each group was provided with two different hazardous events 
and were asked to rate the two given hazardous events. The same hazardous events were 
given in each of the four rounds. Figure A4.1 shows the workshop structure. 
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A4.1.2.1. Additional System definition 
In addition, to the system definition for the SAE Level 4 Low-Speed Automated Driving 
system (LSAD) described in chapter 8, participants were also provided with the following 
description: 
 Vehicle crashworthy up to top speed 
 Driving domain: public roads in inner city in UK 
The additional information was provided as it was received as a part of the feedback from 
workshop 1. 
A4.1.2.2. Hazard and hazardous event definition 
The hazard provided to the participants was “Unintended stopping or accelerating to a 
vulnerable position resulting in a collision”. Based on the hazard, participants were 
provided two hazardous events and were asked to discuss the HARA for the two given 
events to give Severity, Exposure and Controllability ratings. The two hazardous events 
provided to the participants were: 
 Pod travels into pedestrian 
 Pod does unintended braking 
Figure A4.1: Sweden workshop structure (workshop 2) 
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A4.1.3. Rule-set 
Based on the learnings from workshop 1 (discussed in chapter eight), a rule-set for exposure 
rating was introduced for workshop 2. In order to provide a better understanding on how to 
use the rule-set, through an example hazardous event, participants were explained in detail 
how to apply the rule-set. Additionally, with a modified definition for the hazard and by 
providing the context to the hazard, more information was the hazardous events was 
provided to the workshop participants. 
A4.1.3.1. Severity rule-set 
Severity rule-set has been depicted in Table A4.1 (same as the one used in workshop 1). 
 
Table A4.1: Severity rule-set (workshop 2) 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming 
Obj. Velocity 
Severity 
Rating 
 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming 
Obj. Velocity 
Severity 
Rating 
Pedestrian 
< 11 km/h 
< 2 km/h S0 
 
Infrastructure 
< 11 
km/h 
0 km/h 
S0 < 6 km/h S1 
 
0 km/h 
< 12km/h S1 
 
0 km/h 
11 - 16 
km/h 
< 2 km/h S1 
 
11 - 16 
km/h 
0 km/h 
S1 < 6 km/h S2 
 
0 km/h 
< 12km/h S2 
 
0 km/h 
> 16 km/h 
< 2 km/h S2 
 
> 16 
km/h 
0 km/h 
S2 < 6 km/h S3 
 
0 km/h 
< 12km/h S3 
 
0 km/h 
     
 
   
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming 
Obj. Velocity 
Severity 
Rating 
 
Type of 
Obstacle 
Vehicle 
Velocity 
Oncoming 
Obj. Velocity 
Severity 
Rating 
Vehicle 
< 11 km/h 
< 10 km/h S0 
 
Cyclist 
< 11 
km/h 
< 8 km/h S0 
< 20km/h S1 
 
< 14km/h S1 
> 20 km/h S2 
 
< 20km/h S2 
11 - 16 
km/h 
< 10 km/h S1 
 
11 - 16 
km/h 
< 8 km/h S1 
< 20km/h S1 
 
< 14km/h S2 
> 20 km/h S2 
 
< 20km/h S2 
> 16 km/h 
< 10 km/h S1 
 
> 16 
km/h 
< 8 km/h S2 
< 20km/h S2 
 
< 14km/h S2 
> 20 km/h S3 
 
< 20km/h S3 
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A4.1.3.2. Controllability rule-set 
Controllability rule-set has been depicted in Table A4.2 and Table A4.3. In addition to the 
rule-set used in workshop 1, an additional rule-set was created for acceleration. 
Table A4.2: Controllability rule-set - part 1 (workshop 2) 
Emergency 
Deceleration Value 
Distance to 
Obstacle 
TTC Vehicle velocity 
Controllability 
Rating 
< 0.4g 
< 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C2 
> 16 km/h C3 
1.0 - 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C2 
> 16 km/h C3 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C3 
> 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C3 
11 - 16 km/h C2 
> 16 km/h C3 
1.0 - 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C3 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C2 
Emergency 
Deceleration Value 
Distance to 
Obstacle 
TTC Vehicle velocity 
Controllability 
Rating 
0.4g - 0.8g 
< 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C3 
1.0 - 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C2 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C0 
> 16 km/h C2 
> 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C2 
1.0 - 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C0 
11 - 16 km/h C0 
> 16 km/h C2 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C0 
> 16 km/h C1 
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Table A4.3: Controllability rule-set - part 2 (workshop 2) 
Acceleration Value 
Distance to 
Obstacle 
TTC Vehicle velocity 
Controllability 
Rating 
< 0.1g 
< 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C2 
> 16 km/h C3 
1.0 - 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C0 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C2 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C0 
11 - 16 km/h C0 
> 16 km/h C1 
> 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C0 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C2 
1.0 - 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C0 
11 - 16 km/h C0 
> 16 km/h C1 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C0 
11 - 16 km/h C0 
> 16 km/h C0 
Acceleration Value 
Distance to 
Obstacle 
TTC Vehicle velocity 
Controllability 
Rating 
0.1g - 0.4g 
< 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C2 
11 - 16 km/h C2 
> 16 km/h C3 
1.0 - 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C2 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C2 
> 6 m 
< 1.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C2 
1.0 - 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C1 
11 - 16 km/h C1 
> 16 km/h C2 
> 2.0 sec 
< 11 km/h C0 
11 - 16 km/h C0 
> 16 km/h C1 
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A4.1.3.3. Exposure rule-set 
As per the learnings from workshop 1, a rule-set for exposure ratings was created and it was 
provided to the participants in workshop 2. Exposure rule-set has been depicted in Table 
A4.4. 
Table A4.4: Exposure rating rule-set (workshop 2) 
Area Driving Domain Country Exposure rating 
City Centre 
Pedestrian Pathways 
India E4 
Sweden E1 
UK E2 
Germany E0 
Normal road 
India E4 
Sweden E1 
UK E2 
Germany E1 
    
Area Driving Domain Country Exposure rating 
Sub-urban areas 
Pedestrian Pathways 
India E3 
Sweden E0 
UK E1 
Germany E0 
Normal road 
India E4 
Sweden E0 
UK E1 
Germany E0 
 
 
A4.1.4. Results 
A4.1.4.1. Quantitative results 
Just like workshop 1, each of the groups were asked to provide ratings for all three ASIL 
components, Severity, Exposure and Controllability. The exposure rule-set was introduced 
based on the learnings from workshop 1. The ASIL ratings given in various rounds to the 
two hazardous events have been depicted in Figure A4.2. The rounds have been plotted in x-
axis and ASIL levels (QM – ASIL D) on the y-axis. In the first round (when no rules were 
provided), for hazardous event 1, the five groups gave four different ratings ASIL ratings, 
and three different ASIL ratings for hazardous event 2. The difference between the highest 
and lowest rating for both the hazardous events was of the order of three (ASIL D – 
ASILA). After round one and before round two, participants in the groups were shuffled. In 
round two, a similar variation in ASIL ratings was observed. For hazardous event 1, the five 
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groups gave three different ratings and for hazardous event 2, the five groups gave four 
different ratings.  The difference between the highest and lowest ratings for both the 
hazardous events was again of the order of three (ASIL D – ASIL A for hazardous event 1 
and ASIL C – QM for hazardous event 2). It is interesting to note that each of the groups 
provided a different justification (based on their assumptions) for their ratings. Once again, 
the wide variation in ASIL ratings illustrate the existence of inter-rater variation in the 
automotive HARA process, even when done by experts. The variation HARA ratings and 
experts’ justification will be discussed in more detail in the qualitative analysis section (0). 
Before round three, three of the groups (groups 1, 2 and 3: same groups as round two) were 
provided with ruleset for HARA. No ruleset was provided to the remaining two groups 
(group 4 and group 5). These two groups were mixed among each other for round three. For 
hazardous event 1, while groups 1, 2 and 3 used the rule-set, there was still variation in the 
ratings provided by them. While group 2 and 3 agreed in their rating (ASIL B), group 1’s 
rating differed by an order of one (ASIL A). The ratings provided by the two other groups 
(group 4 and group 5) differed from the ratings of the three groups who used the rule-set by 
an order of one and two. For hazardous event 2, a similar trend was observed. Groups 1, 2 
and 3, even with using the ruleset, differed in their ratings by an order of one (ASIL A – 
QM). While the two other groups (group 4 and 5), differed in their rating by an order of two 
(ASIL C – ASIL D). 
In round four, all five groups were mixed and were told to use the rule-set to perform the 
HARA to give their ratings for the hazardous events. For hazardous event 1, the five groups 
gave three different ASIL ratings, with a maximum difference of the order of two (ASIL B – 
QM). For hazardous event 2, the five groups gave two different ratings, with a difference of 
the order of one between those ratings (ASIL A – QM). The ASIL ratings with the 
introduction of the ruleset show a visual decrease in variation in Figure A4.2. However, a 
deeper analysis of the ASIL components (Severity (S), Exposure (E) and Controllability (C)) 
provides an interesting insight. 
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Severity 
In round 1, for both the hazardous events, the five groups gave three different ratings with 
the maximum difference between the ratings being in the order of two (S1 – S3) (Figure 
A4.3). Before round two, participants of the five groups were shuffled. In round two, for 
hazardous event 1, while four groups converged in their severity rating to S3, the fifth group 
differed by an order of one and gave S2 rating. As discussed earlier, in round three, three 
groups (groups 1, 2 and 3) were introduced to the rule-set for HARA and were asked to use 
the provided rule-set to perform HARA. The two other groups (group 4 and group 5) didn’t 
receive any rules and the participants were shuffled among the groups. 
In round 3, for hazardous event 1, out of the three groups which received the rule-set, two of 
the groups agreed on their severity rating of S3, while the third group’s rating differed by an 
order of one (S2). The two other groups (group 4 and group 5) differed in their ratings by an 
order of one (S3 – S2). For hazardous event 2, the three groups using the rule-set converged 
in their severity rating at S2. However, the two groups (group 4 and group 5) who didn’t use 
the rule-set differed in their rating by an order of two (S3 – S1). 
 
Figure A4.2: ASIL ratings in workshop 2 (Sweden) 
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In round four, all participants from all five groups were shuffled and were told to use the 
rule-set provided to them for performing the HARA process. For hazardous event 1, four of 
the groups converged in their rating to S3, while the fifth group differed by an order of one 
(S2). Interestingly, for hazardous event 2, all groups converged in their severity rating to S2. 
Thus, suggesting that the rule-set potentially led to the convergence. 
Exposure 
Exposure ratings demonstrated an interesting trend for the two hazardous events. In round 1 
and 2, for hazardous event 1, all five groups converged in their exposure ratings on E4 
(Figure A4.4). However, for hazardous event 2, in round 1, while four of the groups 
converged on the exposure rating of E4, the fifth group differed by an order of one at E3. In 
round two, for hazardous event 2, the five groups gave three different ratings with a 
maximum difference in ratings of the order of two (E4 – E2). 
In round three, for hazardous event 1 and hazardous event 2, the three groups which used the 
rule-set converged in their ratings for both the events, giving an E2 rating. However, the two 
other groups gave a rating of E4 for both the hazardous events. For round four, in which all 
five groups were told to use the rule-set, all five groups converged in their exposure rating 
and gave a rating of E2 for both the hazardous events. 
 
 
Figure A4.3: Severity ratings for workshop 2 (Sweden) 
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Controllability 
In workshop 1 (chapter eight), it was observed that among the ASIL components, 
controllability ratings tend to show the maximum inter-rater variation. A similar trend was 
observed in workshop 2 also (Figure A4.5). In round one, for hazardous event 1, four of the 
five groups gave a rating of C3 while the fifth group gave a rating of C1, differing by an 
order of two (C3 – C1). In round two, the five groups gave three different controllability 
ratings, with the maximum difference being of the order of two (C3 – C1). 
For hazardous event 2, in round 1, the five groups gave three different ratings, with a 
maximum difference in ratings being of the order of two (C3 – C1). In round 2, while three 
groups converged in their rating on C3, two other groups differed by an order of one and 
gave a rating of C2. 
In round three, for hazardous event 1, the three who were told to use the rule-set to assign 
their rating, converged to a controllability rating of C3. However, the two other groups, 
differed in their ratings by an order of one (C3 – C2). For hazardous event 2, the three 
groups using the rule-set gave two different ratings which differed from each other by an 
order of one (C3 – C2). The two other groups gave a rating of C2.  
In round four, in which participants of all the groups were mixed and were told to use the 
rule-set, for hazardous event 1, four out of the five group converged in their rating at C3. 
However, the fifth group differed by an order of one (C3 – C2). Controllability rating for 
hazardous event 2 showed a large variation in round 4, even with the rule-set. The five 
Figure A4.4: Exposure ratings for workshop 2 (Sweden) 
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groups gave three different ratings with a maximum difference between the ratings being of 
the order of two (C3 – C1). 
 
 
A4.1.4.2. Qualitative results 
Similar to workshop 1 (conducted in US, chapter eight), each of the five groups was asked to 
provide feedback to the following questions: 
 (During the workshop) Have you experienced variation in hazard analysis 
discussions based on the group of people involved in the discussion? 
 Do you think by having rules by parametrizing hazard analysis, we can have a more 
objective approach? 
In response to the first question on whether the groups experienced variation in HARA, all 
five groups acknowledged high degree of variation. Furthermore, they commented that the 
variation was caused due to different assumptions made by the groups and also due to 
different level of experience among the members of the group. This is in line with the 
literature discussed in chapter six and the feedback received in workshop 1 (chapter eight). 
One of the participants commented: “analysis… affected by the assumptions in regard to the 
operational situation. Could become very subjective without an underlying framework”. 
When asked about whether the introduction of rules improved the reliability of the 
automotive HARA process, all five groups responded positively and agreed that the rule-set 
Figure A4.5: Controllability ratings for workshop 2 (Sweden) 
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based on parametrisation of the ratings made the ratings more reliable. The groups suggested 
that the rule-set provided added guidance and helped support reasoning for the ratings. On 
the benefits of the parametrised approach, one of the participants commented: “being able to 
compare hazard analysis between companies would be good”.  
However, all the groups mentioned that the rules needed to be more exhaustive to avoid the 
risk of omission of parameters in the analysis. One of the participants commented: “you 
could accidently adapt your event description to tables and the rules available”, while 
another participant said: “easy to just look at the tales and stop thinking. Possible to miss 
hazards”. More pointed feedback suggested the introduction of “type of impact” as an 
additional parameter for severity ratings. It was also suggested that the controllability rule-
set suffered from over dimensionality as it had both TTC and vehicle velocity as parameters. 
Additionally, one of the participants mentioned that more clarity could be added by having 
separate tables for acceleration and deceleration. 
The observed variation in ratings despite the introduction of the rule-set could be explained 
from the feedback from the qualitative groups. Most of the groups commented that the rule-
set was not exhaustive and more parameters were needed. One of the groups commented: “if 
parameters can be agreed upon, it would be beneficial”, while another group commented: 
“tables could be improved” and “rule-set would however need to be better specified”. As 
the groups felt that some of the parameters were missing, the different groups made different 
assumptions for those parameters. Additionally, some of the groups found it hard to 
understand how to apply the rules (despite an initial example demo), with one of the groups 
suggesting that a “user guide (at hand) could be necessary”. 
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